”Hij moest zelf ook regelmatig voor de rechter verschijnen. In 2007 veroordeelde de rechter hem voor aanzetten tot racisme en steun aan een terroristische organisatie.”
Het nieuwe kabinet onder leiding van Benjamin Netanyahu is het meest rechtse Israëlische kabinet ooit. Om binnen zo’n kabinet nog eens op te vallen qua extremisme moet je het wel heel bont maken. Itamar Ben-Gvir (46), de nieuwe minister van Nationale Veiligheid, doet dat.
Ben-Gvir krijgt een van de belangrijkste posten in de nieuwe regering van Netanyahu. De extreem-rechtse politicus wordt minister van Nationale Veiligheid. Ben-Gvir doet regelmatig omstreden uitspraken over Palestijnen, is veroordeeld voor aanzetten tot racisme en wappert graag met z’n vuurwapen. Dat hij nu in zijn coalitie komt, tekent dat Netanyahu geen enkele grens meer kent om zijn knipperlichtrelatie met het Israëlische premierschap in stand te houden.
Netanyahu heeft Ben-Gvir hard nodig, zonder hem geen meerderheid. Voorheen was zijn partij Joodse Kracht een margepartij die de kiesdrempel nooit haalde, maar sinds de afgelopen verkiezingen heeft de partij zes van de 120 zetels in de Knesset. Dat leidde er zelfs toe dat Ben-Gvir eisen kon stellen over de invulling van zijn portefeuille.
De bevoegdheden van het ministerie van binnenlandse veiligheid worden sterk uitgebreid. De reguliere Israëlische politie viel al onder het ministerie, straks valt ook de grenspolitie die actief is op de bezette Westelijke Jordaanoever onder Ben-Gvirs gezag.
De grenspolitie is onder meer verantwoordelijk voor het ontruimen van door Israël illegaal geachte Joodse nederzettingen in bezette gebieden. Een deel van de kolonisten die daar woont is aanhanger van Ben Gvirs partij. Uittredend minister van Defensie Benny Gantz vreest dat Ben-Gvir de 2.000 agenten van de grenspolitie als zijn ‘privéleger’ kan inzetten, dat niet langer de illegale nederzettingen ontruimt en nog harder optreedt tegen Palestijnen.
Cadillac van Rabin
Ben-Gvir, de zoon van een Iraaks-Joodse vader en een Koerdisch Joodse moeder, groeide op tijdens de Eerste Intifada, de Palestijnse opstand die eindigde met de Oslo-akkoorden in 1993. Een jaar later richtte de Joodse terrorist Baruch Goldstein een bloedbad aan onder Palestijnen in een moskee in Hebron. 29 Palestijnen kwamen om.
Die daad werd vergoelijkt door de politieke partij Kach, waar Ben-Gvir actief bij was geworden. Daarom bestempelde Israël Kach als terroristische organisatie, en de partij werd verboden. Aan Ben-Gvirs extremisme kwam toen allerminst een eind.
In 1995 kreeg hij bekendheid toen hij het embleem van de Cadillac stal van toenmalig premier Rabin, de architect achter de Oslo-akkoorden. Triomfantelijk zwaaide hij daarmee op tv: ‘We hebben z’n auto, en we zullen hem ook krijgen.’ Een paar weken later werd Rabin vermoord. Zijn dienstplicht in het leger hoefde hij niet te vervullen. Of beter: mócht hij niet vervullen. Het leger achtte Ben-Gvir te extreem.
Verheerlijken van terrorisme
Ben-Gvir bouwde een carrière op als advocaat. Zijn clientèle bestond voornamelijk uit extremisten. Zo verdedigde hij de daders van brandstichting in een Palestijns huis op de Westelijke Jordaanoever. Daarbij kwamen drie bewoners om. Hij moest zelf ook regelmatig voor de rechter verschijnen. In 2007 veroordeelde de rechter hem voor aanzetten tot racisme en steun aan een terroristische organisatie. Hij had opgeroepen om Arabieren uit Israël te deporteren.
Inmiddels zegt hij te zijn veranderd. Een gematigder imago moet hem meer stemmen opleveren. Daarom verwijderde hij in 2019 een foto van terrorist Baruch Goldstein uit zijn woonkamer, in zijn huis in een nederzetting bij Hebron.
Alleen Arabieren die niet loyaal zijn aan de staat Israël, moeten wat hem betreft het land worden uitgezet. Als zijn aanhangers ‘dood aan de Arabieren’ scanderen, corrigeert hij hen: ‘Alleen dood aan de terroristen!’ Hij beweert niet meer achter de denkbeelden van de extremistische rabbijn Meir Kahane, de oprichter van Kach, te staan, maar tegelijkertijd woonde hij recentelijk wel een herdenking van Kahane bij.
Ben-Gvir schuwt ophef en relletjes niet. In oktober 2021 protesteerde hij tegen de behandeling van een Palestijnse gevangene in hongerstaking, die in een Israëlisch ziekenhuis lag. Bij het ziekenhuis raakte hij slaags met de Arabisch-Israëlische parlementariër Ayman Odeh.
Twee maanden later maakte hij ruzie met twee Arabische beveiligers om een parkeerplaats in Tel Aviv. Daarbij trok hij zijn vuurwapen. Datzelfde deed hij in oktober van dit jaar, bij onlusten tussen kolonisten en Palestijnen in de wijk Sheikh Jarrah in Oost-Jeruzalem. Ben-Gvir liep rond met een getrokken pistool en schreeuwde de Israëlische politie toe dat ze moesten schieten op Palestijnen die stenen gooien.
Kookprogramma
Zijn matiging is dus vooral voor de bühne, zoals ook bij andere extreem- en radicaal-rechtse politici die in het Westen aan de macht proberen te komen. Toch lijkt een deel van de Israëlische samenleving erin te geloven.
Nog maar twee jaar geleden wilde de zelf al bepaald niet gematigde politicus Naftali Bennett niks te maken hebben met Ben-Gvir, toen werd aangedrongen op een lijstverbinding. ‘Waarom niet? Dat is zo vanzelfsprekend, dat ik me er over verbaas dat ik dat uit moet leggen.’
Nu is Ben-Gvir genormaliseerd. Een dag na het trekken van zijn vuurwapen in Sheikh Jarrah was Ben-Gvir afgelopen oktober te gast op de Israëlische tv. Niet om scherp ondervraagd te worden. In een kookprogramma deelde hij zijn favoriete recept voor gevulde paprika’s.
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”Hij had opgeroepen om Arabieren uit Israël te deporteren.”
”Hij beweert niet meer achter de denkbeelden van de extremistische rabbijn Meir Kahane, de oprichter van Kach, te staan, maar tegelijkertijd woonde hij recentelijk wel een herdenking van Kahane bij.”
”Inmiddels zegt hij te zijn veranderd. Een gematigder imago moet hem meer stemmen opleveren. Daarom verwijderde hij in 2019 een foto van terrorist Baruch Goldstein uit zijn woonkamer, in zijn huis in een nederzetting bij Hebron.”
In oktober 2021 protesteerde hij tegen de behandeling van een Palestijnse gevangene in hongerstaking, die in een Israëlisch ziekenhuis lag. Bij het ziekenhuis raakte hij slaags met de Arabisch-Israëlische parlementariër Ayman Odeh
Daarbij trok hij zijn vuurwapen. Datzelfde deed hij in oktober van dit jaar, bij onlusten tussen kolonisten en Palestijnen in de wijk Sheikh Jarrah in Oost-Jeruzalem. Ben-Gvir liep rond met een getrokken pistool en schreeuwde de Israëlische politie toe dat ze moesten schieten op Palestijnen die stenen gooien.
Het Israëlische geweld tegen de Palestijnen op de bezette Westoever gaat alle perken te buiten. De komst van de extremistische Israëlische regering-in-wording voorspelt verdere escalatie. Nederland en de EU moeten nu ingrijpen.
Vrijdag werd op de door Israël bezette Westelijke Jordaanoever een Palestijnse burger in koelen bloede gedood door een lid van de Israëlische gemilitariseerde Border Police. Videobeelden en getuigenverklaringen wijzen uit dat sprake was van een buitengerechtelijke executie. Na te zijn neergeschoten werd het slachtoffer medische hulp onthouden; het doodgebloede lichaam werd door de Israëli’s meegenomen.
Kille executie
De executie speelde zich af in het ten zuiden van Nablus gelegen Huwara, een Palestijnse stad die wordt geterroriseerd door Israëlische kolonisten die, beschermd door het leger, met grote regelmaat burgers en hun bezittingen aanvallen. De stad vormt aldus een microkosmos van wat Palestijnen onder Israëlische bezetting dagelijks ondergaan.
Ook vrijdag 2 december waren het Israëlische kolonisten die vanuit een auto een groep lunchende Palestijnen lastigvielen. Een van de Palestijnen, de 22-jarige Ammar Miflih, ging verhaal halen en trachtte het autoportier te openen. Daarop werd hij door de Israëlische kolonist neergeschoten. Een Palestijnse getuige werd volgens eigen zeggen ook beschoten.
Vervolgens verscheen de Israëlische militair, die niet de kolonisten aansprak maar zich tegen de gewonde Miflih keerde. De daarop volgende vechtpartij, waarbij omstanders hem nog trachtten te ontzetten, eindigde met twee pistoolschoten die Miflih vloerden, gevolgd door zijn kille executie met nog twee schoten.
Samengestelde leugen
De Israëlische bezettingsautoriteiten kwamen met de verklaring een ‘terrorist’ te hebben ‘geneutraliseerd’ die, gewapend met een mes, zou hebben getracht ‘een auto met een Israëlisch stel’ binnen te dringen. Na te zijn neergeschoten zou hij met een mes een groep patrouillerende militairen hebben aangevallen en één van hen in het gezicht hebben gestoken. Daarop werd hij door de commandant ‘geneutraliseerd’ en zou zijn dood zijn vastgesteld. Van de steekwond en het mes werden foto’s gepubliceerd.
Die verklaring is een samengestelde leugen. Niemand heeft een mes gezien. Sterker, uit de videobeelden blijkt dat Miflih ongewapend was. Ook heeft hij – gewond als hij was – geen militairen aangevallen. Maar zelfs als een noodzaak zou hebben bestaan om Miflih te ‘neutraliseren’ legitimeert dat op geen enkele manier de daaropvolgende executie. Evenmin als het feit dat de ondanks zijn schotwonden nog in leven zijnde Miflih medische hulp werd onthouden terwijl Palestijnse hulp op afstand werd gehouden.
Smoking gun
In het licht van de overtuigende bewijslast is de Israëlische verklaring onmogelijk staande te houden en een ‘functionerende democratische rechtsstaat’ [aldus minister Hoekstra] onwaardig. Desondanks is dit geen uitzondering, maar de standaard wijze waarop Israëlische misdaden door het regime worden afgehandeld en gedocumenteerd. Tot de meest gebruikte leugens horen ‘aanvallen met een mes’, ‘car rammings’ en ‘gooien met een molotov-cocktail’.
Het laatste bewijs van deze leugenachtige Israëlische praktijk dateert van gisteren en werd gepresenteerd door de Britse BBC in het artikel ‘West Bank footage throws spotlight on Israel’s use of lethal force’. De zaak draait om een 21-jarige Palestijn die vorige week op 28 november in het dorp Al-Mughayyir door een Israëlische militair werd doodgeschoten. Volgens de Israëlische verklaring gebeurde dat nadat hij een molotov-cocktail had gegooid. De BBC levert nu bewijs voor het tegendeel.
Veelvuldig onderzoek
De realiteit is dat buitengerechtelijke executies aan de orde van de dag zijn. Op deze website beschreven we er talloze. Zo werd op 29 juli in hetzelfde Al-Mughayyir de 15-jarige Amjad Abu Alia doodgeschoten. Eerder beschreven we hoe in negen dagen zes Palestijnse burgers werden gedood. Veel van dergelijke zaken worden wel degelijk onderzocht, onder meer door mensenrechtenorganisaties als het Palestijnse Al-Haq en het Israëlische B’Tselem. Ook gerenommeerde organisaties als Forensic Architecture deden onderzoek, onder meer naar de executie van Ahmad Erekat, of leverden een bijdrage aan onderzoek van media als The New York Times naar de dood van Razan al-Najjar.
Het bekendste voorbeeld is ongetwijfeld de Amerikaans-Palestijnse Al-Jazeera-journaliste Shireen Abu Akleh, die op 11 mei door een Israëlische scherpschutter van het leven werd beroofd. Ondanks het feit dat onderzoeken unaniem hebben uitgewezen dat sprake was van een buitengerechtelijke executie is de dader niet aangeklaagd, laat staan vervolgd. Onder grote druk heeft nu ook de Amerikaanse veiligheidsdienst FBI een onderzoek ingesteld waarvan de uitkomst deze maand wordt verwacht.
Daders toegejuicht
Van al die onderzoeken trekt Israël zich tot dusver niets aan. De realiteit is dat in bezet gebied sprake is van een gerichte shoot-to-kill policy waarbij een Palestijns leven geen cent waard is. Dit jaar zijn op de Palestijnse Westoever (inclusief Oost-Jeruzalem) 155 Palestijnen gedood – een recordaantal sinds in 2005 cijfers worden bijgehouden. De daders blijven structureel ongestraft, en worden zelfs door hun leiders toegejuicht. Zoals door de extremistische politicus Itamar Ben-Gvir, die de beul van Ammar Miflih zaterdag lof toezwaaide en tot ‘held’ uitriep.
Diezelfde Ben-Gvir wordt minister in het nieuwe ultrarechtse Israëlische kabinet. Zijn portefeuille: nationale veiligheid. Van Israëlische zijde is dan ook geen enkele verbetering te verwachten, maar wordt integendeel nog verdere escalatie gevreesd. Het is de buitenwereld die in actie moet komen om de Palestijnen te beschermen en rampen te voorkomen.
De EU en VN hebben hun afschuw uitgesproken over de executie van Miflih en opgeroepen tot onderzoek. En Frankrijk roept op tot een eind aan het geweld tegen de Palestijnen op de Westoever. Het zijn bekende rituelen die geen enkel effect hebben zolang ze niet vergezeld gaan van sancties. De enige vraag die er dan ook toe doet is hoeveel Palestijnse doden nog moeten vallen voordat de EU en Nederland die instellen.
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”
Daders toegejuicht
Van al die onderzoeken trekt Israël zich tot dusver niets aan. De realiteit is dat in bezet gebied sprake is van een gerichte shoot-to-kill policy waarbij een Palestijns leven geen cent waard is. Dit jaar zijn op de Palestijnse Westoever (inclusief Oost-Jeruzalem) 155 Palestijnen gedood – een recordaantal sinds in 2005 cijfers worden bijgehouden. De daders blijven structureel ongestraft, en worden zelfs door hun leiders toegejuicht. Zoals door de extremistische politicus Itamar Ben-Gvir, die de beul van Ammar Miflih zaterdag lof toezwaaide en tot ‘held’ uitriep.”
Far-right Itamar Ben-Gvir tells soldier caught on widely-shared video killing Palestinian in Huwwara that his ‘swift and rigorous’ actions were ‘honourable’
Israel’s incoming national security minister, speaking to the soldier who shot a Palestinian man dead at point-blank range on Friday, hailed the killing as “precise, swift and rigorous”, calling the shooter a “hero”.
Itamar Ben-Gvir said the soldier had carried out a job “well done” in fatally shooting 22-year-old Ammar Mefleh, whose death was caught on video and shared widely on social media.
In the video, the soldier – who has not been identified – scuffled with Mefleh in the occupied West Bank town of Huwwara near Nablus before pulling a gun and firing two shots that sent the youth to ground before shooting him twice more.
“Precise action, you really fulfilled the honour of all of us and did what was assigned to you,” Ben Gvir told the shooter in Saturday’s remarks.
“You protected yourself and the people there. Every terrorist will know that if he wants to steal a weapon and kill a fighter – this is how the fighters operate.”
Israeli forces have claimed that Mefleh had tried to carry out a stabbing attack before he was fatally shot, however in the video Mefleh’s hands are empty during the scuffle with the solider, including during the moments in which he was shot.
In response to Ben Gvir’s praise, the soldier told the MP that he was “glad that we were able to do what was expected of us and that it ended this way”.
‘A clear violation of human rights’
The comments directly contrast rights groups’ description of the shooting as an “execution” in “broad daylight”.
Following the incident, Jewish Voice for Peace on Friday called on the US to cut off all military funding to Israel, highlighting that Mefleh was the ninth Palestinian killed by the Israeli military this week
Meanwhile, the International Human Rights Foundation said the shooting “must not go unpunished”, calling for sanctions against Israel.
“Such assassinations by agents of the Israeli state are too common and constitute a clear violation of human rights. The International Community must adopt sanctions,” the group said in a post on Twitter.
For his part, Tor Wennesland, UN special envoy for the Middle East Peace Process, offered his “heartfelt condolences” to Mefleh’s family while demanding accountability.
“Such incidents must be fully & promptly investigated, & those responsible held accountable,” Wennesland said.
Ben-Gvir’s mainstream rise
Ben-Gvir, a far-right lawyer whose Jewish Power party last week signed its first coalition deal with Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party, has surged into the mainstream in recent months despite his extreme views.
Among other controversial remarks are his frequent categorisation of Arab colleagues as “terrorists”. He has called for the deportation of his political opponents, and in his youth, his views were so extreme that the army banned him from compulsory military service.
Still, Ben-Gvir is set to be appointed to the new role of “minister of national security”, with significantly extended powers.
Jewish Power will also receive the Negev and Galilee Development Ministry and the Jewish Heritage Ministry, according to the terms of last week’s deal with Likud.
The new national security ministry will be expanded as part of the deal, to include several enforcement authorities that were previously dispersed between different governmental offices, Haaretz reported.
Among these is the Border Police in the occupied West Bank – a military unit made up of 2,000 soldiers who receive training from the Border Police and whose duties include dealing with disturbances, carrying out arrests and evacuating illegal outposts – which until now was under the authority of the Israeli Army’s Central Command.
A senior law enforcement source expressed concern to Haaretz about the move, saying that it effectively “turns the Border Police into Ben-Gvir’s personal police in the territories”.
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Reacties uitgeschakeld voor Noten 17 t/m 29/NOS en Extreem-rechts in Israel
”Gisteren zei de minister, die leider is van de uiterst rechtse partij Joodse Kracht, nog dat hij zijn bezoek aan de Tempelberg zou uitstellen vanwege dreigementen van Hamas, de militante groepering die het voor het zeggen heeft in de Gazastrook. ”
Palestinian elections are on track to take place during the coming months – for the first time in over a decade.
The EU and the US have a decisive role to play in ensuring the electoral process succeeds. In doing so, they can support Palestinian political renewal and improve prospects for a sustainable peace agreement with Israel.
Within Hamas, moderates have gambled on elections. The movement – along with Fatah – is looking for new avenues for political engagement given the increasingly inauspicious regional and international context.
The EU and the US must: commit to respecting the outcome of the Palestinian elections; persuade Israel to support a free, fair, and inclusive process; and pursue a constructive relationship with any new government that pledges respect for democracy, human rights, and international law.
Introduction
Palestinians may soon be heading to the polls for the first time in 15 years. For some, this will be their first taste of electoral politics and democratic participation. Yet it will not be Palestine’s first democratic experiment. Long before the advent of the Arab uprisings, Palestine held free and fair elections to choose a president and a parliament. In hindsight, these elections, held in 2005 and 2006 respectively, marked the high point of Palestinian democracy.
The European Union and the United States were initially strong advocates of Palestinian democracy, and were a driving force behind the last elections, urging the main political rivals – the Islamist Hamas and the secular Fatah – to engage constructively in the process. The EU and the US proved less comfortable when the democratic outcome went against their interests following Hamas’s victory in the 2006 legislative election and the group’s refusal to endorse international demands such as recognising Israel. Subsequent efforts by the EU and the US to boycott and undermine the democratically elected government led by Hamas significantly damaged the Palestinian democratic and state-building project. This stoked Palestinian political tensions and helped provoke a short civil war in June 2007 that left Hamas in control of Gaza and President Mahmoud Abbas, leader of Fatah, in control of the West Bank. These events reverberate to this day.
There is currently a renewed push by Palestinian factions to hold fresh elections in the coming months. This is a welcome development. While this will not by itself mend the many fractures that have arisen since the 2007 Gaza-West Bank split, national elections combined with a post-election power sharing agreement between Hamas and Fatah would nonetheless assist full national reconciliation, institutional and societal reunification, and political reform.
Just as importantly, a successful electoral process would demonstrate to Hamas that political participation and commitment to democratic principles can generate benefits that it cannot obtain through armed violence. This could strengthen more moderate trends within the movement that favour political compromise and engagement. These are all important ingredients in efforts to reach a sustainable peace agreement with Israel.
The coming weeks and months will test the commitment of Palestinian factions, which will have to contend with their own rivalries, as well as restrictions imposed by Israel’s military occupation and interference in the electoral process. But successful elections will also require the EU and the US to learn the lessons of 2006. How they position themselves will be an important factor in determining whether Palestinians can escape the divisive legacy of the past and renew their country’s democratic fabric, and whether Hamas will ultimately choose to prioritise political engagement or armed confrontation. Conversely, an acrimonious collapse of the electoral process or another rejection of the electoral outcome by the EU and the US would likely mark the formal end of Palestine’s state-building project in its current configuration, and of any imminent prospect of national reunification. Either outcome would also entrench the position of hardline Hamas factions – to the detriment of whatever is left of the internationally backed two-state solution.
From democracy to authoritarianism
Despite its current democratic deficit, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has twice held presidential and legislative elections. Yasser Arafat and his Fatah party won the first elections in 1996. These were boycotted by Hamas, which saw them as legitimising the 1993 Oslo Accords and the PA system that these had created – both of which it opposed. Presidential elections were held again in 2005 following Arafat’s death and were won by Abbas, who also took over as head of Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which is formally tasked with negotiating on behalf of Palestinians. The consequence of the failure of the Second Intifada, which ended in 2005, was that Hamas made a strategic decision to move away from armed violence and towards political engagement. It opted to take part in the next legislative elections, held in January 2006, running as the ‘Change and Reform’ list. In doing so, it accepted the PA and the political realities created by the Oslo Accords. Electoral victory gave it a majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and resulted in a smooth transfer of power to a Hamas government headed by prime minister Ismail Haniyeh, under the auspices of Abbas. Haniyeh subsequently became the leader of Hamas in 2017.
By all accounts, the 2006 elections were free and fair. The EU described them as an “important milestone in the building of democratic institutions”. It added that “these elections saw impressive voter participation in an open and fairly-contested electoral process that was efficiently administered by a professional and independent Palestinian Central Elections Commission”. Although short-lived, this arguably put Palestine among the first democratic Arab states – years before the Arab uprisings.
International boycott and the Quartet Principles
Ironically, the 2006 elections were largely the result of sustained pressure on Abbas, Hamas, and Israel by the George W Bush administration as part of the US drive for ‘democratisation’ in the Middle East. The US also pressured Israel into allowing elections – including in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which Israel annexed in contravention of international law in 1980.
Having expected elections to further empower Abbas and Fatah, the US responded to Hamas’s electoral win in a knee-jerk fashion – quickly pushing for international isolation of, and pressure on, the Haniyeh government. It based this on Hamas’s frequent perpetration of attacks, which included suicide bombings against civilians until 2005, and its resultant listing as a terrorist organisation by the US and the EU since 1997 and 2001 respectively.
Meeting just days after the election, but before any new Palestinian government was sworn in, the Quartet for Middle East peace (the US, the EU, Russia, and the United Nations) asserted that any “future Palestinian government must be committed to non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations.” These three conditions have since become known as the Quartet Principles and, ostensibly, continue to be conditions of US and European funding to PA governments to this day. Some Quartet members privately expressed concerns that the principles were ambiguous and could feed intra-Palestinian conflict.[1] Indeed, the real American intent, according to advisers to then British prime minister Tony Blair, was to exclude Hamas from power by deliberately demanding conditions that it could not accept.[2]
The same month, in January 2006, the European Council formally endorsed the Quartet Principles and expanded their scope to encompass Hamas as a whole – rather than merely the members of the Hamas-controlled PA government, as initially stipulated by the Quartet. Then, in April 2006, EU ministers endorsed a proposal put forward by Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg setting out guidelines for limiting contact with new Palestinian government ministers (irrespective of party affiliation) and the Hamas political establishment. This formed the basis of the EU’s ‘no-contact’ policy with Hamas, which remains in effect today – to the chagrin of many European officials who privately describe it as a complete failure. While the US has adopted a similar position, the UN and Russia have continued to talk to Hamas.
After the March 2006 swearing-in of a Hamas-dominated cabinet that refused to abide by the principles, the EU and the US cut all aid to the PA government. Although Haniyeh continued to reject the Quartet conditions, he stressed that Hamas had “accepted the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders” but would agree only to a “truce” with Israel – not “recognition”. This was matched by initial overtures from Hamas figures to European capitals to develop a rolling armistice with Israel under international supervision.
At the time, these positions represented significant concessions by Hamas and a turn towards moderation, reflecting its decision to prioritise engagement. As Muhammad Shehada, a Palestinian writer and analyst, explains, this strategic pivot was made possible by moderate figures within the party who argued, and still argue, that abandoning violence in favour of a political track “would win Hamas greater legitimacy and provide a more effective means of advancing Palestinian rights.” They have been joined by pragmatists who shift between engagement and violence depending on what they consider to be the most expedient way of achieving their goals.
To head off political turmoil and the collapse of the PA due to international sanctions, Fatah and Hamas formed a unity government in March 2007. Led by Haniyeh, it included a Fatah deputy prime minister, Azzam al-Ahmad, and an independent (but Fatah-leaning) foreign minister, Ziad Abu Amr. The government’s political platform brought further concessions. These included affirming its commitment to agreements signed by the PLO with Israel, and backing the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state over all territories occupied in 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital. While it maintained violence as a right of self-defence it did renew the offer of a prolonged period of tahdi’a (calm) with Israel. But its failure to once again fully and formally meet the Quartet Principles resulted in a continuation of the international boycott and sanctions.
De-democratisation and fragmentation
Simmering internal Palestinian tensions and deadlocked governance, stoked by international pressure, eventually erupted into the 2007 civil war, during which Hamas forces ejected Fatah-controlled PA security forces from the Gaza Strip – pre-empting Fatah’s own reported US-supported plan to topple Hamas.
The fracturing of Palestinian governance and the expiration of the four-year mandates of Abbas’s presidency and the PLC has produced a political system that is increasingly authoritarian, unaccountable, and devoid of legislative oversight. This has led to the proliferation of human rights abuses and clientelism under both Hamas and Fatah rule, and the closing down of space for political dissent. A new presidential decree by Abbas to curb the independence of civil society organisations is the most recent reminder of this. Israel’s policy of separation between Gaza and the West Bank, and repeated detention of PLC members – most prominently Khalida Jarrar of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – have further undermined Palestinian institutions and deepened internal divisions.
Such divisions have entrenched the Gaza-West Bank divide. This has prompted Hamas to develop its own institutions in Gaza – including ministries, judicial systems, and security forces – while reverting to a more hardline stance in favour of armed confrontation with Israel. With the legislative process effectively frozen, Abbas has ruled for more than a decade through presidential decrees – a mechanism he has used to appoint his supporters to key positions in the PA’s justice and security systems. While both Fatah and Hamas have secured themselves in their respective fiefdoms, this has come at considerable cost to their domestic reputation, as well as to governance conditions in both the West Bank and Gaza, with the latter now engulfed by a humanitarian crisis.
During this time, there were several failed reunification attempts and unfulfilled promises of elections. The closest the parties came to success was the formation in June 2014 of a short-lived government of national consensus led by a Fatah prime minister and composed of independent technocrats. Although it contained no Hamas members, the movement accepted it, as did the EU and the US. Ultimately, the reconciliation deal failed due to disagreements over technical questions relating to Palestinian reunification. This prompted Abbas to reshuffle the cabinet in July 2015 without consulting Hamas – after which it withdrew its endorsement of the government.
The last roll of the dice
In January 2021, Abbas issued a long-anticipated presidential decree setting dates for a fresh round of elections. These will start with elections for the PLC on 22 May; followed by the election for the PA presidency on 31 July; and finishing with the formation of a new Palestinian National Council (PNC), the PLO’s parliament, by 31 August. This was made possible due to the current weakness of both Hamas and Fatah: domestic, regional, and international dynamics have shifted against them, and they are increasingly aware of the strategic dead-end in which they find themselves. For both, elections combined with a power-sharing agreement provide the best means of protecting their domestic interests and confronting external challenges.
The current electoral push grew out of discussions last year between Palestinian factions to develop a common political platform to resist President Donald Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity” plan for the conflict – which sought to undermine Palestinian aspirations for sovereign statehood – and Israeli plans to annex large swathes of the West Bank. These discussions acquired increasing urgency after the announcement of US-backed normalisation deals between Israel and Arab countries such as the United Arab Emirates, which further weakened and isolated Palestinian groups.
Speculation abounds as to Abbas’s personal motives for moving forward on this. But it seems likely that it was at least partially motivated by his desire to send a positive signal to the incoming Biden administration and re-legitimise his leadership, in preparation for a renewed round of peace talks with Israel.
Despite facing considerable pessimism at home and abroad, Palestinian factions continue to make important progress towards elections. Over the past two months, Palestinian leaders representing PLO factions, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad have twice met in Cairo (on 8-9 February; and 16-17 March) to address outstanding electoral issues. This has delivered several agreements, including on the conduct of elections, confidence-building measures such as the release of political prisoners, and the creation of an electoral court – a divisive issue that led Hamas to boycott past municipal elections. Egypt has facilitated these intra-Palestinian talks and offered logistical support, including offering to monitor the election process in Gaza in the absence of any formal PA presence.
The Central Elections Commission (CEC), chaired by Hanna Nasir, is proving itself to be competent and impartial. Voter registration has proceeded smoothly, and nominations for PLC candidates are expected to open on 20 March as scheduled. In addition, the CEC has shown itself willing and able to defend the integrity of the electoral process. For example, it filed a complaint with the PA’s prosecutor-general over unauthorised changes – allegedly by PA security forces, which are aligned with Fatah – to the location of voting centres in the Hebron area, which voted for Hamas in 2006.
From competition to cooperation
Fatah and Hamas have positioned elections as a stepping-stone towards political reconciliation and national reunification. This is the reverse of past such attempts, which set the creation of a reconciliation agreement and the formation of a transitional national unity government as preconditions for national elections. The new approach allows the parties to initially work around areas of disagreement while gradually rebuilding mutual trust. As an added benefit, they have been able to signal their commitment to Palestinian democratic principles and unity without having to make far-reaching political concessions.
According to recent public opinion polling, three-quarters of Palestinians want elections. In such a scenario, Fatah would win 38 per cent in legislative elections, compared to 34 per cent for Hamas – with Hamas emerging on top in Gaza and Fatah stronger in the West Bank. But it is likely that competing Fatah lists would give Hamas the largest number of seats in the PLC, though it would fall short of a majority. That said, the change to electoral rules since 2006 means that a ruling government will need the support of multiple lists to gain a majority. As far as the presidential election is concerned, Abbas would lose against other prominent national figures such as Haniyeh or Marwan Barghouti, a veteran Fatah leader currently imprisoned by Israel. This is unsurprising given that 66 per cent of Palestinians want the 85-year-old Abbas to resign.
In recent months, Hamas and Fatah have shown their desire to reach a post-election power-sharing deal that preserves their current duopoly on power. Maintaining the political status quo and ensuring access to the PA’s patronage system undoubtedly benefits both Hamas and Fatah. But such a deal – based on electoral cooperation rather than electoral competition – also aims to avoid a repeat of the zero-sum struggle that brought down the Palestinian political system in the past.
Both have indicated a firm intention to form a government of national unity, regardless of which party does better in the legislative elections. In addition, Hamas has signalled that it will not field its own candidate in the presidential election and could instead lend its support to a ‘national unity’ figure (including potentially a candidate from Fatah), although it has so far expressed no preference on its preferred choice.[3] However, this cooperative atmosphere could be difficult to sustain once the electoral campaign gets into full swing and rival factions begin campaigning against each other.
Moving forward, Palestinian leaders need to finalise several outstanding elections-related issues, including security arrangements and the allocation of seats among factions as part of a new PNC. And, of course, the continued spread of covid-19 in the Palestinian territory and lockdown restrictions will add a further layer of complexity.
Alongside this, most of the technical (but still deeply political) questions related to Palestinian reunification may not be broached until after the elections. These include questions such as those on how to return PA governance to Gaza by reintegrating its Hamas-run ministries and civil servants into the PA system; the future of Hamas’s armed wing and security control in Gaza; and the extent to which Israel and Fatah-aligned security forces will allow Hamas to operate freely in the West Bank (and vice versa).
A house still divided
Of course, 15 years of animosity and division are not easily overcome. Fatah’s secretary-general, Jibril Rajoub, and Hamas’s deputy chair, Saleh Arouri, have been the driving force behind the proposed elections and seem to have established a good working relationship with each other. But Hamas has long been sceptical about Abbas’s commitment to elections. They worry that he is only talking about elections to ingratiate himself with the new US administration, before eventually derailing the process and laying the blame on Hamas, Israel, or the pandemic.[4] The prospect of losing his hold on power following one of the elections could provoke a similar manoeuvre. There are other potential spoilers on both sides, including senior Fatah members and PA security officials who are concerned that elections and a power-sharing agreement with Hamas will harm their personal standing, Fatah, and the stability of the PA.
Hamas officials are also concerned that internal divisions within Fatah could complicate the elections and the establishment of power-sharing arrangements.[5] At the same time, they seem willing to play off these internal rivalries to advance their own interests. This was illustrated by the UAE’s delivery of covid-19 vaccines to Gaza over the past two months, which took place at the behest of Mohammed Dahlan, an adviser to Emirati Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayed and high-profile Fatah opponent of Abbas who in the past led PA security crackdowns against Hamas. In exchange, Hamas has allowed several allies of Dahlan to return to Gaza in preparation for elections. Should there be multiple Fatah PLC lists or presidential candidates, Hamas could find itself in the role of kingmaker – potentially allowing it to decide which Fatah faction(s) to form a coalition government with, and which presidential candidate to throw its political weight behind.
Meanwhile, one of the largest obstacles to overcome before elections can be held will be Israel’s response, particularly with regards to the inclusion of Israeli-controlled East Jerusalem – which Fatah and Hamas have both described as a prerequisite. Israeli officials are far from enthusiastic about the prospect of elections. They are concerned that another resounding Fatah defeat could once again unleash post-electoral instability as it did in 2006, potentially leading to a scenario in which Hamas takes over the West Bank and turns it into another ‘Hamastan’. The inclusion of East Jerusalem in elections also poses a political problem for Israel given its claims to exclusive sovereignty over the city and efforts to suppress Palestinian political activities there. However, it is also clear that Palestinian political divisions and weakness have served Israel well – allowing it to dodge serious peace negotiations and consolidate its control over Palestinian territory.
For now, Israel has not publicly articulated its position towards upcoming Palestinian elections. Its government is no doubt keen to avoid such a politically charged question during a tight Israeli general election – to be held next week. In the meantime, Israel likely hopes that the Palestinians will derail the electoral process themselves before it has to show its hand. But the Israeli government has already begun detaining and threatening Hamas members in the West Bank as an explicit warning against running in elections.
The Hamas bet
Hamas is a resilient movement, but it is under considerable political and financial pressure due to the shifting regional geopolitical landscape, which has become more hostile to it.[6] Since the 2007 split, it has had to maintain governance responsibility for the Gaza Strip – which is one of the most densely populated areas in the world and is suffering from a profound, man-made socio-economic crisis. While Hamas corruption and mismanagement have exacerbated this crisis, the situation has been considerably worsened by Israeli sanctions and Egyptian and PA restrictions (which Abbas first imposed in March 2017 to punish Hamas for the failure of previous reconciliation efforts).
The Islamist movement continues to embrace – and, at times, engage in – armed confrontation with Israel. But it has been unable to throw off Israel’s chokehold over Gaza. Three destructive wars with Israel have produced nothing more than continued stalemate and an eventual return to the status quo ante. As the movement’s leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, has noted: “war achieves nothing”. Similarly, it achieved inconclusive results in its attempt to use (mostly nonviolent) popular mobilisation during the 2018-2019 Great March of Return protests along Gaza’s border with Israel. While Hamas still believes it has the right to resist the occupation, it is exhausted and “ready for quiet”.[7]
Since 2018, Hamas has reached a fragile modus vivendi with Israel that has allowed for an incremental and limited easing of some restrictions on Gaza and the influx of Qatari stabilisation funds in exchange for Hamas’s commitment to preserving calm. This agreement does not fundamentally challenge Israel’s closure of the Strip and has broken down on several occasions, each time returning Hamas and Israel to the verge of all-out war. The group is also sensitive to accusations that it is seeking to develop a ‘mini-state’ in Gaza at the expense of national unity.
Against this backdrop, Hamas has come to view Palestinian elections and its participation in a future PA government as its only viable option. It hopes this will relieve it of the burden of administering Gaza and allow for the Strip’s economic redevelopment, including by eventually forcing a more substantial easing of Israeli restrictions. Just as importantly, by offering it membership of the PNC, the electoral process gives Hamas a backdoor into the PLO, which would grant it greater influence and legitimacy within the Palestinian national movement.[8]
In the past, Hamas (along with Islamic Jihad) has been invited to attend PNC meetings as a non-voting observer, although it usually refuses to do so. The selection of a new PNC that included formal participation by Hamas would be an important milestone in efforts to fulfil the group’s political ambitions. This would constitute a full reversal of its past aspirations to compete against, and ultimately replace, the PLO and the PA.
These objectives reflect Hamas’s immediate focus on political empowerment. Its longer-term national goals are less defined, beyond a notional commitment to liberating Palestine – which its leaders increasingly equate with the establishment of an independent state based on the 1967 borders.
Nevertheless, the Islamist movement remains reluctant to play a high-profile role in the next government. It has indicated that it does not intend to nominate senior cabinet members and will avoid ‘front-facing’ roles such as prime minister or foreign minister.[9] This has as much to do with the movement’s desire to minimise Western concerns about its potential role as its bitter experience of governing Gaza over the past 15 years. Some senior members of the movement have described its decision to form PA governments in 2006-2007 as a strategic blunder that cost it domestic support, caused it tremendous financial pain, and trapped it in Gaza.
A return to moderation
In its desire to move forward with elections, Hamas has made several concessions, such as accepting electoral arrangements that are more favourable to Abbas and Fatah. For example, Hamas conceded its preference for holding all three elections at the same time and accepted a sequenced approach, despite its concerns that Abbas may cancel the electoral process after the PLC election – thereby denying it greater access to the PLO. Hamas also accepted the PLO’s status as the legitimate representative body of the Palestinian people, and a new proportional representation (national list) system for PLC elections, which favours Fatah.[10]
The movement is keen to avoid a repeat of the disastrous international response to its victory in the 2006 legislative election. It wants to move towards political engagement with Europe, to end the EU’s no-contact policy, and to be delisted as a terrorist organisation. This is despite its own perception that Europe is not interested in promoting a diplomatic track that would include Hamas to achieve Palestinian reunification and resolve the conflict with Israel.[11] Moderate members of Hamas hope that ensuring political stability and continuity through an arrangement with Fatah based on a moderate political platform can help reassure the EU and the US about its participation in a future PA government.[12]
The Islamist movement continues to formally reject the Quartet Principles, which would require it to violate its ideological red lines – such as its refusal to formally renounce armed resistance and recognise Israel in advance of a peace agreement – a move that Hamas leaders view as political suicide. As Hamas officials are always keen to point out, the Quartet has never formally made such demands of the Israeli government and its constituent parties. Nevertheless, Hamas has indicated that a future PA government in which it participates could accept a two-state solution, abide by existing agreements with Israel, and endorse the principles of non-violence, international law, and democratic governance – reprising and expanding on the moderate positions of its 2007 government.[13]
Senior Hamas leaders have endorsed similar positions in the past. The group’s previous leader, Khaled Mashal, stated in 2017 that it is “prepared to work according to a Palestinian programme jointly with others to establish a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders”. Speaking in 2011, Hamas’s former deputy foreign minister, Ghazi Hamad, made a similar point: “we said, frankly, we accept the state and ‘67 borders … Hamas is ready to go more and more for political solutions.”
Similar views have been voiced by Haniyeh and Sinwar. Hamas’s 2017 Political Document – which represents the group’s official positions – also frames a two-state solution as a “formula of national consensus”. Furthermore, there are strong hints in private that the group could recognise Israel and demobilise within the context of a final peace agreement that settles all claims and creates an independent Palestinian state.[14] As one figure within Hamas noted, “we want to send a clear message that we will engage in a process that can meet Palestinian rights, including the right of return for refugees.”[15] While stopping short of formally renouncing armed resistance, another Politburo member, Husam Badran, has signalled that the movement could prioritise peaceful popular resistance.
To be sure, not all members of Hamas share the same views, and the coming electioneering will likely give rise to contradictory messages. Fathi Hamad, a hardline member of Hamas’s Politburo, regularly extols Hamas’s support for armed resistance and Islamic claims over “historic Palestine”. This, in part, reflects the need to balance domestic campaigning and external engagement. But it is also a genuine reflection of the competing trends and strategic divergences within the group. Which of these camps steers Hamas going forward will depend on whether elections and political engagement can protect the group’s core interests. The outcome of Hamas’s internal elections – which are currently wrapping up – could provide an initial indication of where this balance of power within the movement currently lies.
A make-or-break moment for Palestine
There are many reasons to downplay the merits of the forthcoming elections. They may merely reproduce the current monopolies on power enjoyed by Hamas and Fatah – even with the participation of multiple electoral lists and presidential candidates. These measures may also do little to bridge the generational gap between Palestine’s ageing leadership and its predominantly youthful population, or provide the sorts of political choice and transformation that many Palestinians desire. The elections also will not directly challenge Israel’s military occupation, which remains the ultimate decider of Palestinian life.
It is also unclear how Hamas’s membership of the PNC will play out in the long term. As Sam Bahour, a leading Palestinian analyst, remarks: “any Palestinian political grouping desiring to formally join the PLO has no user’s manual and no path forward”.
Finally, it is worth noting that, in its current configuration, this electoral process will exclude most Palestinians who live outside the occupied territories. As Bahour goes on to note, “a Palestinian in Ain al-Hilweh Refugee Camp in South Lebanon, or in Nazareth, Israel, or Youngstown, Ohio, or Santiago, Chile has the same inalienable right to have their say as do those of us under military occupation in Ramallah, Jerusalem, or Gaza.”
Even putting these concerns aside, the next PA government will inherit deep political and economic challenges. Addressing these issues will require it to balance the competing expectations of Palestinian voters and international donors – both of which will demand accountability.
The future of the PA’s relations with Israel
One key source of tension will remain the PA’s commitment to existing agreements with Israel under the Oslo Accords. The most fraught aspect of this relates to security coordination with Israel given Palestinian public perceptions that it only benefits Israel and its settler population, fails to protect Palestinians from settler violence, and facilitates Israeli security raids. In addition, Palestinians argue that Israel has not respected its own obligations under these agreements – by expanding its settlement project, withholding tax clearance revenues collected on the PA’s behalf in retaliation for Palestinian political decisions it disagrees with, and obstructing Palestinians’ movements between Gaza and the West Bank. More broadly, these agreements have formalised Israeli dominance over the Palestinian political system and prevented the emergence of a transformative political strategy that could challenge Israel’s occupation more effectively.
Against this backdrop, Palestinian politicians regularly call for an end to PA cooperation with Israel. This includes figures not just within Hamas but also in Fatah and the PLO’s Central Council. Abbas too has repeatedly vowed to take such a step. But, as the outgoing government of prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh has found, breaking free from Israel and the Oslo Accords is far from simple given the degree to which they sustain Palestinians’ daily lives and the PA (along with its patronage networks). Mashal himself has acknowledged that “despite the fact that it [Hamas] rejected the Oslo agreement that harmed the interest of our people … Hamas has to deal with this reality”. And, indeed, this was the position of Hamas’s 2006-2007 governments.
So far, no party has laid out a detailed plan for PA governance. But a mixture of political interest and deference to international funding conditions would likely push a government of national unity to abide by existing agreements with Israel, including security commitments in some form. This would allow it to focus on more immediate priorities, such as addressing domestic socio-economic challenges, containing covid-19, and supporting Gaza’s redevelopment – although progress will continue to be hampered by the overarching context of Israel’s occupation. As a means of easing popular pressure and potential criticism from non-governing parties, the government could refer the question of the PA’s future relations with Israel to a new PNC for debate.
Playing the long game
Despite the many challenges ahead, holding free, fair, and inclusive elections in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza would be an important first step towards restoring accountable national institutions and creating space for the emergence of younger, non-factional, and progressive leadership structures – even if many activists cannot stand this time round due to restrictive candidacy requirements. Combined with a post-election power-sharing agreement, this would be a step towards full national reconciliation, institutional and societal reunification, and political reform. Moreover, a revived national political conversation – centred around a reactivated (and ultimately reformed) PNC, accountable leadership and institutions, and empowered civil society – will put Palestinians in a stronger position to navigate some of the core strategic dilemmas currently faced by their national movement. From a European perspective, this would have the added benefit of strengthening the resilience of the PA and bolstering support for the two-state solution in the face of growing domestic challenges.
When it comes to Gaza, a real unity government would be a boon to its beleaguered population. Restoring PA governance would remove one key justification for Israel’s siege of Gaza – even if the country has imposed sanctions on it in some form since the mid-1990s. More immediately, a unified Palestinian authority would facilitate greater international redevelopment efforts and a covid vaccination rollout, and would support the revival of Gaza’s once-vibrant economy. Most tantalisingly, in the longer term, this could open the door to the exploitation of Gaza’s gas reserves, which could provide Palestine with energy self-sufficiency and reduce its reliance on foreign aid.
Just as importantly, a successful electoral process resulting in a viable unity government and Palestinian reunification would vindicate moderate Hamas figures who argue that political participation and a commitment to democratic principles can move their aims forward in a way that armed violence cannot.
Clearly, the prospects for launching meaningful peace negotiations with Israel remain a distant prospect given continued political divergences between Israeli and Palestinian negotiating positions, and Israel’s erosion of the territorial footprint of a future two-state solution. But there may still be room to secure a longer-term calm between both sides by expanding the current ceasefire arrangements between Hamas and Israel in Gaza. This could develop and update ideas previously put forward by the group – such as a 2006 proposal developed by moderate figures within Hamas and Swiss officials. This envisaged a rolling armistice with Israel in exchange for gradual de-occupation and greater Palestinian freedoms – with the ultimate goal of easing tensions and rebuilding trust to enable genuine progress towards a two-state solution. To be sure, this would not provide a final resolution to the conflict. But it could, at the very least, anchor existing de-escalation efforts, while increasing the chances that the coming years will be fought exclusively in the political arena.
Conversely, the collapse of the electoral process would accelerate Palestinian political disintegration and rising authoritarianism. This would destroy whatever international credibility and domestic legitimacy the PA and its leadership have left, potentially provoking a backlash against Abbas by the Palestinian public and emboldened rivals within Fatah. The lack of any realistic prospect for national reunification would push Gaza and the West Bank further apart, encouraging Hamas and Fatah to entrench themselves in their respective fiefdoms. In such a scenario, Gazans would have little chance of escaping their dire humanitarian situation. After two failed attempts to participate in a political process by tabling moderate policy positions and engaging in elections, Hamas’s calculations would be upended in favour of its hardliners’ views. The lesson the movement would take away from the experience would be that only armed resistance can deliver tangible results.
Such an outcome could lead to military escalation with Israel, with the aim of forcing a new modus vivendi that would allow for increased economic redevelopment in Gaza. Or, failing that, Hamas might threaten to ‘go underground’ by relinquishing its current role as Gaza’s de facto government and returning to its origins as an armed insurgent group. This would create a security vacuum that the PA and Israel would struggle to fill. It could also be accompanied by actions in the West Bank to undermine the PA and Fatah.
A second chance for Europe
Europe’s status as the PA’s biggest funder means that what it says and does over the coming weeks and months matters hugely. Given clear signals by Hamas that it wants to prioritise political engagement based on a relatively moderate policy platform, Europe should not follow the sort of path it did 15 years ago. Instead, it should work towards a policy of constructive engagement with any future government in which the group participates. This would be an important means of supporting political reconciliation and national reunification efforts, and would draw Hamas deeper into a diplomatic process that could advance intra-Palestinian reunification and lead to a sustainable peace agreement with Israel.
The single most important step that the EU and European governments can take at this current juncture is to publicly affirm their willingness to respect the results of free and fair elections – something they have so far shied away from doing, but that would signal a serious European commitment to the democratic process.
In parallel, they should press the main stakeholders – namely, Hamas, Fatah, the PA, and Israel – to facilitate an electoral process that can pave the way for the peaceful transfer of power and elections every four years. The EU and European governments should be particularly attentive to any indication that Abbas may delay the elections. If necessary, they should use the political leverage created by their funding relationship with the PA to prevent this.
The EU must make clear that it expects Israel to: fulfil its obligations under the Oslo Accords by supporting the electoral process and allowing the deployment of an EU election observation mission, including in East Jerusalem; and refrain from all retaliatory measures against candidates, as well as future members of the PLC and a unity government. Precedent suggests that it is possible for Israel and the CEC to find a way to allow voting to take place in East Jerusalem. How straightforward this will be depends on the composition of Israel’s next government. It may be harder to ensure that Israel does not make life difficult for Palestinian voters and candidates. In both regards, international involvement will be important.
To do this, the EU should enlist the support of its Quartet partners while working with Israel and the CEC to ensure free and fair elections are held in East Jerusalem, building on past arrangements. It could also emphasise to its Israeli interlocutors that it is in their interests to facilitate a successful Palestinian democratic process at a time in which Israel is increasingly accused of consolidating an apartheid system in the occupied territories, where Palestinians are effectively denied political representation. The EU should also remind these interlocutors that Hamas and Israel have already shown themselves able to forge a pragmatic relationship when it suits their interests despite their mutual hostility – a relationship that some Israeli security officials have found easier to manage than that with Abbas and the PA.[16]
Learning its lesson from 2006, the EU should spell out its expectations of a future PA government in advance of elections. But, rather than requiring an explicit recital of the Quartet Principles – which sank the 2007 government of national unity – it should be prepared to accept alternative formulations that can meet European expectations. At the same time, the EU should allow the Palestinian leadership to develop a more transformational political strategy that can more effectively challenge Israel’s occupation and escape from the broken peace-making paradigm. This is another important factor in addressing the current power asymmetry between the two sides, and in incentivising Israeli support for a peaceful end to conflict based on a two-state solution.
The EU should also look to the formation of the 2014 government of national consensus. Although the government was short-lived and ultimately fell victim to unresolved intra-Palestinian political disagreements, the EU and the US adopted a more flexible and hands-on approach to it, giving it greater latitude in meeting their conditions. This resulted in a formula in which they accepted the government based on its endorsement of a previous speech given by Abbas – which endorsed a two-state solution, committed to respect agreements signed with Israel, and reaffirmed a complete rejection of violence and terrorism in all its forms.
With this in mind, the EU should signal its readiness to fund a future Palestinian government that commits to the peaceful establishment of a Palestinian state based on the pre-June 1967 lines, with Jerusalem as its capital. This should also mean endorsing the principles of international law, nonviolence, and democratic governance, including respect for human rights. The EU should then engage with the relevant stakeholders to identify how a future government can demonstrate such commitments in word and deed – such as by potentially reprising Abbas’s 2011 speech as the basis for its political platform. This formula would provide a pragmatic and constructive way to ensure that the EU can continue funding the PA while still supporting its policy objectives.
Finally, the EU and its member states must proactively engage with the new US administration to secure its support for Palestinian elections and a positive response to a unity government. But, while the EU should seek maximum alignment with the Biden administration, it should not allow its own policies to once again be determined by Washington, as happened in 2006 when it followed its lead in signing up to US conditions.
Conclusion
If the EU does not encourage and support the forthcoming polls, it will put the electoral process at greater risk of failure. The EU must, therefore, remain focused on its strategic objectives. Elections provide the EU with an opportunity to help develop Palestinian democracy, accountable institutions, and a unified government based on the rule of law. A unity government could also help support Gaza’s socio-economic recovery and avert another war with Israel.
At a time when the Oslo peace process has run aground and there is almost no realistic prospect of a return to a two-state solution, it would be a significant achievement to bring Hamas into a nonviolent political strategy for resolving the conflict with Israel and ensuring its respect for democratic rules and international law. In doing so, the EU would help create the basis for a sustainable political agreement with Israel underpinned by cross-factional and Palestinian public support. While the path ahead will not be easy, working to back successful elections and secure a positive post-election political environment would be a wise investment of the EU’s political capital.
EINDE BERICHT
[34]
THE RIGHTS FORUM
ISRAEL’S AANVALLEN OP GAZA WAREN EEN DAAD VAN AGRESSIE
Israël noemde de aanvallen ‘zelfverdediging’ en ‘gerechtvaardigd preëmptief geweld’. Ten onrechte. De militaire operatie was een daad van agressie en dient als zodanig te worden veroordeeld.
Eerder deze maand voerde Israël onverwacht aanvallen uit op de Gazastrook. Gedurende drie dagen, van 5 tot en met 7 augustus, bombardeerde en beschoot het naar eigen zeggen doelen van de Palestijnse verzetsorganisatie Islamitische Jihad (PIJ). PIJ antwoordde met het afschieten van projectielen op Israël. Op 7 augustus werd tegen middernacht een wapenstilstand van kracht.
‘Zelfverdediging’
De aanvallen kostten 49 Palestijnen het leven, onder wie 17 kinderen in de leeftijd van 4-16 jaar. PIJ maakte bekend dat twaalf van zijn strijders waren gedood, onder wie twee commandanten. Zo’n 85 Palestijnse gezinnen stonden op straat, hun woningen compleet verwoest. Nog eens ruim 1.700 woningen liepen schade op. Aan Israëlische zijde waren geen doden te betreuren en was de schade gering.
Israël zei te handelen uit ‘zelfverdediging’. Het zou tot het geweld genoodzaakt zijn vanwege een acute dreiging die ‘preëmptieve aanvallen’ rechtvaardigde. Maar was dat ook zo?
Zelfverdediging is onder het Handvest van de Verenigde Naties (artikel 51) slechts toegestaan in reactie op een gewapende aanval. Een staat die buiten de VN-Veiligheidsraad om overgaat tot preëmptief geweld (geweld in reactie op een imminente dreiging) begeeft zich op glad ijs. Het gebruik van zulk geweld is hoe dan ook gebonden aan de regels van het internationaal humanitair recht en dient onder meer proportioneel te zijn. Wat was precies het grote gevaar waaraan Israël dankzij zijn aanvallen is ontsnapt?
Vage ‘indicaties’
Voorafgaand aan het offensief liet Israël slechts weten dat er een ‘vergeldingsactie’ van PIJ vanuit de Gazastrook aanstaande zou zijn, nadat Israëlische bezettingstroepen op 1 augustus een commandant van de organisatie hadden opgepakt op de Westelijke Jordaanoever. Pas achteraf lichtte het een tipje van de sluier op. Volgens een legercommuniqué waren er ‘indicaties voor een op handen zijnde aanval met geleide anti-tankraketten op burgers of militairen langs de grens’. In al zijn vaagheid klinkt dit niet als een dreiging die onder internationaal recht het grootschalige Israëlische geweld kan rechtvaardigen.
Daarbij is het de vraag of PIJ wel over geleide raketten beschikt. En zo ja, waarom het die dan niet tegen Israël heeft ingezet. Volgens het Israëlische leger schoot PIJ in drie dagen 1.175 raketten op Israël af, vrijwel zonder schade aan te richten. Twee op de drie kwamen in onbewoond gebied of in de Gazastrook zelf terecht, van de rest kon 97 procent door het afweergeschut worden onderschept.
Het leger noemde het wapentuig van matige kwaliteit, duidelijk minder dan dat van Hamas, en dat wordt al in belangrijke mate van het spreekwoordelijke oud ijzer in elkaar gezet. Dat PIJ in staat zou zijn met geavanceerde raketten een effectieve aanval op doelen in Israël uit te voeren is niet aannemelijk.
Veroordeling geboden
Israëls minister van Openbare Veiligheid Omer Barlev schaalde de dreiging nog verder af. In werkelijkheid was Israël gebleken dat er ‘een intentie bestond om een anti-tankraket af te vuren op een bus’, verklaarde hij in een interview. De eerdergenoemde aanval met geleide raketten op burgers of militairen bleek bij nader inzien een aanslag met één ongespecificeerde raket op een ongespecificeerde bus. Het maakte de Israëlische aanvallen op commandanten, strijders en infrastructuur van PIJ, met alle bijkomende dood en verderf van dien, nog disproportioneler dan ze al waren.
Barlev deed zijn best de indruk te wekken dat PIJ specifiek ‘een bus met kinderen’ in het vizier had, maar moest die suggestie terugnemen; het zou ook een bus met militairen kunnen zijn, of wat voor bus dan ook, het was domweg onbekend. Het weerhield de journalist er niet van als kop boven het interview te zetten: ‘Barlev over Operatie Dageraad –“Ze waren van plan een bus met kinderen te beschieten”.’
Nog afgezien van de vraag of PIJ werkelijk van plan was een aanslag te plegen – de organisatie zelf ontkende dat – luidt de conclusie dat de Israëlische aanvallen onmogelijk zijn op te vatten als geoorloofd preëmptief geweld. De militaire operatie was een daad van agressie en dient als zodanig te worden veroordeeld, in de eerste plaats door onze regering. Israël deed in feite precies waartegen het zich aanvankelijk zei te moeten verdedigen: het doodde met geleide wapens strijders en burgers. Met het aantal gedode kinderen kun je een bus vullen.
”Hamas organised clinics and schools, which served Palestinians who felt let down by the corrupt and inefficient Palestinian Authority, dominated by the Fatah faction.”
Hamas is the largest of several Palestinian militant Islamist groups.
Its name is an Arabic acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement, originating as it did in 1988 after the beginning of the first Palestinian intifada, or uprising, against Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Under its charter, it is committed to the destruction of Israel.
Hamas originally had a dual purpose of carrying out an armed struggle against Israel – led by its military wing, the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades – and delivering social welfare programmes.
But since 2005, when Israel withdrew its troops and settlers from Gaza, Hamas has also engaged in the Palestinian political process. It won the legislative elections in 2006, before reinforcing its power in Gaza the following year by ousting the rival Fatah movement of President Mahmoud Abbas.
Since then, militants in Gaza have fought four major conflicts with Israel, which along with Egypt has maintained a blockade on the strip to isolate Hamas and to pressure it to stop attacks.
Hamas as a whole, or in some cases its military wing, is designated a terrorist group by Israel, the United States, European Union and United Kingdom, as well as other powers.
Suicide bombings
Hamas came to prominence after the first intifada as the main Palestinian group opposed to the Oslo peace accords signed in the early 1990s between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the body representing most Palestinians.
Despite numerous Israeli operations against it and clampdowns by the Palestinian Authority (the main governing body of the Palestinians) Hamas found it had an effective power of veto over the process by launching suicide
It carried out multiple bus bombings, killing scores of Israelis, and stepped up its attacks after Israel assassinated its chief bomb maker Yahya Ayyash in December 1995.
The bombings were widely blamed for turning Israelis off the peace process and bringing Benjamin Netanyahu – a staunch opponent of the Oslo accords – to power in 1996.
In the post-Oslo world, most particularly following the failure of US President Bill Clinton’s Camp David summit in 2000 and the second intifada which followed shortly thereafter, Hamas gained power and influence as Israel clamped down on the Palestinian Authority, which it accused of sponsoring deadly attacks.
Hamas organised clinics and schools, which served Palestinians who felt let down by the corrupt and inefficient Palestinian Authority, dominated by the Fatah faction.
Many Palestinians cheered the wave of Hamas suicide attacks in the first years of the second intifada. They saw “martyrdom” operations as avenging their own losses and Israel’s settlement-building in the West Bank, territory wanted by Palestinians for a future state of their own.
In March and April 2004, Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and his successor Abdul Aziz al-Rantissi were assassinated in Israeli missile strikes in Gaza.
The death of Fatah leader Yasser Arafat that November saw the Palestinian Authority newly led by Mahmoud Abbas, who viewed Hamas rocket-fire as counter-productive.
When Hamas scored a landslide victory in Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, the stage was set for a bitter power-struggle with Fatah.
Hamas resisted all efforts to get it to sign up to previous Palestinian agreements with Israel, as well as to recognise Israel’s legitimacy and to renounce violence.
ADDITION BBC
The 1988 charter
Hamas’s charter defines historic Palestine – including present-day Israel – as Islamic land and it rules out any permanent peace with the Jewish state.
The document also repeatedly makes attacks on Jews as a people, drawing charges that the movement is anti-Semitic.
In 2017, Hamas produced a new policy document that softened some of its stated positions and used more measured language.
There was no recognition of Israel, but it did formally accept the creation of an interim Palestinian state in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem – what are known as pre-1967 lines.
The document also stresses that Hamas’s struggle is not with Jews but with “occupying Zionist aggressors”. Israel said the group was “attempting to fool the world”.
Sanctions
As a result, the new Hamas-led government was subjected to tough economic and diplomatic sanctions by Israel and its allies in the West.
After Hamas ousted forces loyal to Fatah from Gaza in 2007, Israel tightened its blockade on the territory, and Palestinian rocket-fire and Israeli air strikes continued. Egypt also closed its border crossing with Gaza and has only opened it intermittently since.
Israel holds Hamas responsible for all attacks emanating from the strip, and the two sides have been in a constant state of conflict ranging from deadly incidents around the border to full-scale hostilities.
The deadliest round, in 2014, saw at least 2,251 Palestinians, including 1,462 civilians, killed during 50 days of fighting. On the Israeli side, 67 soldiers and six civilians were killed.
Most recently, an 11-day conflict in May 2021 killed at least 256 people in Gaza and 13 in Israel before it ended with an Egyptian-brokered truce.
Repeated attempts at reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah have failed, and the first Palestinian elections for 15 years, in which Hamas was due to compete, were called off by President Abbas in April 2021.
Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation for the two million Palestinians in Gaza has deteriorated. The strip’s economy has collapsed, and there are shortages of water, electricity and medicine.
[37]
”Hamas organised clinics and schools, which served Palestinians who felt let down by the corrupt and inefficient Palestinian Authority, dominated by the Fatah faction.”
Met grof geweld en arrestaties reageerde Hamas de afgelopen dagen op demonstraties in de Gazastrook tegen prijsverhogingen en de slechte leefomstandigheden. Tientallen betogers werden afgetuigd, honderden opgepakt. Palestijnse mensenrechtenorganisaties uiten zware kritiek op Hamas.
Wij willen leven!’ Onder dat motto gingen afgelopen donderdag, vrijdag en zaterdag inwoners van de Gazastrook de straat op om te demonstreren tegen de extreme leefomstandigheden en recente belastingverhogingen op voedsel en andere elementaire levensbehoeften. Op zeker zeven plaatsen betoogden zij tegen Hamas, de feitelijke bestuurder van Gaza, en tegen de Palestijnse Autoriteit (PA), de officiële machthebber die is gevestigd in Ramallah op de bezette Westelijke Jordaanoever.
Honger
De protesten zijn overwegend georganiseerd door jongeren uit vluchtelingenkampen die het leven in armoede en uitzichtloosheid zat zijn. Onder hen velen die niet eerder bij de organisatie van protesten betrokken waren, schrijft Haaretz (€). In Gaza wordt letterlijk honger geleden vertelt Samir Zaqut, onderdirecteur van de in Gaza gevestigde mensenrechtenorganisatie Al-Mezan, de krant:
In the past, poverty never reached the level of hunger. I can’t say that anymore: today there is definitely hunger. The demonstrations are part of the response to this difficult situation, especially among young people.
Politie- en veiligheidsdiensten van Hamas, zowel in uniform als in burger, traden hard op om de demonstraties de kop in te drukken. Betogers werden met pepperspray bespoten en met wapenstokken afgetuigd. Ook werd in de lucht geschoten. Journalisten zagen hun telefoons in beslag genomen, zodat ze geen opnamen van het geweld konden maken. Sommige burgers die opnamen maakten kregen ordetroepen over de vloer, die het materiaal in beslag namen.
Vele tientallen mensen raakten gewond. Bij een inval in het huis van een journalist werden twee daar aanwezige medewerkers van de Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR) afgetuigd en vervolgens korte tijd vastgehouden. Zaterdag werden vier medewerkers van Al-Mezan en twee andere organisaties met geweld opgepakt. Na ondervraging werden ze vrijgelaten.
Naar schatting zeshonderd mensen, onder wie 19 journalisten, zijn de afgelopen dagen opgepakt en vastgezet. Een aantal van hen is inmiddels op vrije voeten. Onduidelijk is hoeveel mensen nog vastzitten.
Steeds vaker protest tegen Hamas
Hamas beschuldigt de PA ervan achter de demonstraties te zitten. Bij sommige betogingen verschenen leden van de Al-Qassam-brigades, de militaire tak van Hamas, met posters van PA-president Mahmud Abbas en de tekst ‘Vertrek’.
De afgelopen twee jaar trachtte de PA Hamas met draconische maatregelen – het terugschroeven op zelfs stopzetten van betalingen voor elektriciteit, medische voorzieningen en ambtenarensalarissen – op de knieën te dwingen. Daarmee verergerde ze de dramatische effecten van de bijna twaalf jaar durende Israëlische blokkade. Het volledig stopzetten van de Amerikaanse hulp aan de Palestijnen door president Trump maakte de ellende nog groter.
Protesten van de bevolking van Gaza zijn doorgaans dan ook gericht tegen Israël, Trump en de PA. Maar steeds vaker wordt ook tegen Hamas gedemonstreerd, dat verantwoordelijk is voor de recente prijsstijgingen van eerste levensbehoeften. De hardhandige reactie van Hamas op de protesten maakte onder de bevolking opnieuw bittere kritiek los. Op Facebook regende het verontwaardigde statements van inwoners van Gaza.
Mensenrechtenorganisaties
Zware kritiek is er ook van Palestijnse mensenrechtenorganisaties, waaronder Al-Mezan, Al-Haq, de ICHR en het Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR). Zij roepen de autoriteiten op de gevangenen vrij te laten en de vrijheid van meningsuiting, vergadering en demonstratie te respecteren, die is vastgelegd in de Palestijnse ‘Basic Law’ en het internationaal recht. Daarnaast willen zij dat onderzoek wordt ingesteld naar het geweld tijdens de ‘Opstand van de hongerigen’, dat schuldigen worden vervolgd en slachtoffers recht wordt gedaan.
Namens de Verenigde Naties veroordeelde Nickolay Mladenov, de Speciale Coördinator voor het Midden-Oosten Vredesproces, het optreden van Hamas. Ook hij benadrukte het recht van de bevolking om te demonstreren tegen misstanden:
The long-suffering people of Gaza were protesting the dire economic situation and demanded an improvement in the quality of life in the Gaza Strip. It is their right to protest without fear of reprisal.
Mars van Terugkeer-demonstraties afgelast
Voor het eerst in bijna een jaar werden afgelopen vrijdag de wekelijkse ‘Grote Mars van Terugkeer’-demonstraties bij het zogenoemde ‘grenshek’ tussen Gaza en Israël geannuleerd. Aanleiding daartoe vormden aanvallen van de Israëlische luchtmacht op honderd ‘Hamas-doelen’ in de voorafgaande nacht.
De aanvallen volgden op het afschieten van twee raketten vanuit Gaza in de richting van Tel Aviv eerder in de nacht. De raketten zouden per ongeluk zijn afgevuurd tijdens onderhoudswerkzaamheden, luidde achteraf de door Israël onderschreven verklaring. De raketten kwamen in open terrein terecht en richtten geen schade aan. Bij de Israëlische luchtaanvallen raakten vier Palestijnen gewond.
EINDE ARTIKEL
”It carried out multiple bus bombings, killing scores of Israelis, and stepped up its attacks after Israel assassinated its chief bomb maker Yahya Ayyash in December 1995.
The bombings were widely blamed for turning Israelis off the peace process and bringing Benjamin Netanyahu – a staunch opponent of the Oslo accords – to power in 1996.”
When a territory is placed under the authority of a hostile army, the rules of international humanitarian law dealing with occupation apply. Occupation confers certain rights and obligations on the occupying power.
Prohibited actions include forcibly transferring protected persons from the occupied territories to the territory of the occupying power. It is unlawful under the Fourth Geneva Convention for an occupying power to transfer parts of its own population into the territory it occupies. This means that international humanitarian law prohibits the establishment of settlements, as these are a form of population transfer into occupied territory. Any measure designed to expand or consolidate settlements is also illegal. Confiscation of land to build or expand settlements is similarly prohibited.
”The establishment of the settlements contravenes international humanitarian law (IHL), which states that an occupying power may not relocate its own citizens to the occupied territory or make permanent changes to that territory, unless these are needed for imperative military needs, in the narrow sense of the term, or undertaken for the benefit of the local population.”
The illegality of the Israeli settlements is based on article 49, Fourth Geneva Convention and on the Hague Convention of 1907
THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION, ARTICLE 49
”Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.”
Art. 55. The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.
CONVENTION RESPECTING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WARON LAND AND ITS ANNEX: REGULATIONS CONCERNINGTHE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND
Israel’s policy of settling its civilians in occupied Palestinian territory and displacing the local population contravenes fundamental rules of international humanitarian law.
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states: “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” It also prohibits the “individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory”.
The situation in the OPT is primarily governed by two international legal regimes: international humanitarian law (including the rules of the law of occupation) and international human rights law. International criminal law is also relevant as some serious violations may constitute war crimes.
STATUS OF SETTLEMENTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Israel’s policy of settling its civilians in occupied Palestinian territory and displacing the local population contravenes fundamental rules of international humanitarian law.
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states: “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” It also prohibits the “individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory”.
The extensive appropriation of land and the appropriation and destruction of property required to build and expand settlements also breach other rules of international humanitarian law. Under the Hague Regulations of 1907, the public property of the occupied population (such as lands, forests and agricultural estates) is subject to the laws of usufruct. This means that an occupying state is only allowed a very limited use of this property. This limitation is derived from the notion that occupation is temporary, the core idea of the law of occupation. In the words of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the occupying power “has a duty to ensure the protection, security, and welfare of the people living under occupation and to guarantee that they can live as normal a life as possible, in accordance with their own laws, culture, and traditions.”
The Hague Regulations prohibit the confiscation of private property. The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the destruction of private or state property, “except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations”.
As the occupier, Israel is therefore forbidden from using state land and natural resources for purposes other than military or security needs or for the benefit of the local population. The unlawful appropriation of property by an occupying power amounts to “pillage”, which is prohibited by both the Hague Regulations and Fourth Geneva Convention and is a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and many national laws.
Israel’s building of settlements in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem, does not respect any of these rules and exceptions. Transferring the occupying power’s civilians into the occupied territory is prohibited without exception. Furthermore, as explained earlier, the settlements and associated infrastructure are not temporary, do not benefit Palestinians and do not serve the legitimate security needs of the occupying power. Settlements entirely depend on the large-scale appropriation and/or destruction of Palestinian private and state property which are not militarily necessary. They are created with the sole purpose of permanently establishing Jewish Israelis on occupied land.
In addition to being violations of international humanitarian law, key acts required for the establishment of settlements amount to war crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Under this body of law, the “extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly” and the “transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory” constitute war crimes. As stated above, “pillage” is also a war crime under the Rome Statute.
Israel’s settlement policy also violates a special category of obligations entitled peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) from which no derogation is permitted. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed that the rules of the Geneva Conventions constitute “intransgressible principles of international customary law”. Only a limited number of international norms acquire this status, which is a reflection of the seriousness and importance with which the international community views them. Breaches of these norms give rise to certain obligations on all other states, or “third states”, which are explained below.
SETTLEMENTS, DISCRIMINATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
States have a duty to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of people under their jurisdiction, including people living in territory that is outside national borders but under the effective control of the state. The ICJ confirmed that Israel is obliged to extend the application of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other treaties to which it is a state party to people in the OPT. Israel is a state party to numerous international human rights treaties and, as the occupying power, it has well defined obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of Palestinians.
However, as has been well documented for many years by the UN, Amnesty International and other NGOs, Israel’s settlement policy is one of the main driving forces behind the mass human rights violations resulting from the occupation. These include:
Violations of the right to life: Israeli soldiers, police and security guards have unlawfully killed and injured many Palestinian civilians in the OPT, including during protests against the confiscation of land and the construction of settlements. UN agencies and fact-finding missions have also expressed concern about violence perpetrated by a minority of Israeli settlers aimed at intimidating Palestinian populations.
Violations of the rights to liberty, security of the person and equal treatment before the law: Amnesty International has documented how Palestinians in the OPT are routinely subjected to arbitrary detention, including through administrative detention. Whereas settlers are subject to Israeli civil and criminal law, Palestinians are subject to a military court system which falls short of international standards for the fair conduct of trials and administration of justice.
Violations of the right to access an effective remedy for acts violating fundamental rights: Israel’s failure to adequately investigate and enforce the law for acts of violence against Palestinians, together with the multiple legal, financial and procedural barriers faced by Palestinians in accessing the court system, severely limit Palestinians’ ability to seek legal redress. The Israeli High Court of Justice has failed to rule on the legality of settlements, as it considered the settlements to be a political issue that that it is not competent to hear.
Violations of the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly: Amnesty International has documented Israel’s use of military orders to prohibit peaceful protest and criminalize freedom of expression in the West Bank. Israeli forces have used tear gas, rubber bullets and occasionally live rounds to suppress peaceful protests.
Violations of the rights to equality and non-discrimination: Systematic discrimination against Palestinians is inherent in virtually all aspects of Israel’s administration of the OPT. Palestinians are also specifically targeted for a range of actions that constitute human rights violations. The Israeli government allows settlers to exploit land and natural resources that belong to Palestinians. Israel provides preferential treatment to Israeli businesses operating in the OPT while putting up barriers to, or simply blocking, Palestinian ones. Israeli citizens receive entitlements and Palestinians face restrictions on the grounds of nationality, ethnicity and religion, in contravention of international standards.
The Israeli authorities have created a discriminatory urban planning and zoning system. Within Area C, where most settlement construction is based, Israel has allocated 70% of the land to settlements and only 1% to Palestinians. In East Jerusalem, Israel has expropriated 35% of the city for the construction of settlements, while restricting Palestinians to construct on only 13% of the land. These figures clearly illustrate Israel’s use of regulatory measures to discriminate against Palestinian residents in Area C.
The UN has also pointed to discrimination against Palestinians in the way in which the criminal law is enforced. While prosecution rates for settler attacks against Palestinians are low, suggesting a lack of enforcement, most cases of violence against Israeli settlers are investigated and proceed to court.
Violations of the right to adequate housing: Since 1967, Israel has constructed tens of thousands of homes on Palestinian land to accommodate settlers while, at the same time, demolishing an estimated 50,000 Palestinian homes and other structures, such as farm buildings and water tanks. Israel also carries out demolitions as a form of collective punishment against the families of individuals accused of attacks on Israelis. In East Jerusalem, about 800 houses have been demolished since 2004 for lack of permits. Israel also confiscates houses inhabited by Palestinians in the city to allocate them to settlers. By forcibly evicting and/or demolishing their homes without providing adequate alternative accommodation, Israel has failed in its duty to respect the right to adequate housing of thousands of Palestinians.
Violations of the right to freedom of movement: Many restrictions on freedom of movement for Palestinian residents are directly linked to the settlements, including restrictions aimed at protecting the settlements and maintaining “buffer zones”. Restrictions include checkpoints, settler-only roads and physical impediments created by walls and gates.
Violations of the rights of the child: Every year, 500-700 Palestinian children from the occupied West Bank are prosecuted in Israeli juvenile military courts under Israeli military orders. They are often arrested in night raids and systematically ill-treated. Some of these children serve their sentences within Israel, in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The UN has also documented that many children have been killed or injured in settler attacks.
Violations of the right to enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health: Restrictions on movement limit Palestinians’ access to health care. Specialists working with Palestinian populations have also documented a range of serious mental health conditions that stem from exposure to violence and abuse in the OPT.
Violations of the right to water: Most Palestinian communities in Area C are not connected to the water network and are prevented from repairing or constructing wells or water cisterns that hold rainwater. Water consumption in some Area C communities is reported by the UN to be 20% of the minimum recommended standard. Israel’s failure to ensure Palestinian residents have a sufficient supply of clean, safe water for drinking and other domestic uses constitutes a violation of its obligations to respect and fulfil the right to water.
Violations of the right to education: Palestinian students face numerous obstacles in accessing education, including forced displacement, demolitions, restrictions on movement and a shortage of school places. An independent fact-finding mission in 2012 noted an “upward trend” of cases of settler attacks on Palestinian schools and harassment of Palestinian children on their way to and from school. Such problems can result in children not attending school and in a deterioration in the quality of learning.
Violations of the right to earn a decent living through work: The expansion of settlements has reduced the amount of land available to Palestinians for herding and agriculture, increasing the dependency of rural communities on humanitarian assistance. Settler violence and the destruction of Palestinian-owned crops and olive trees have damaged the livelihoods of farmers. The UN has reported that in Hebron city centre, the Israeli military has forced 512 Palestinian businesses to close, while more than 1,000 others have shut down due to restricted access for customers and suppliers.
SUSTAINED INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION
Most states and international bodies have long recognized that Israeli settlements are illegal under international law. The European Union (EU) has clearly stated that: “settlement building anywhere in the occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, is illegal under international law, constitutes an obstacle to peace and threatens to make a two-state solution impossible.”
The settlements have been condemned as illegal in many UN Security Council and other UN resolutions. As early as 1980, UN Security Council Resolution 465 called on Israel “to dismantle the existing settlements and, in particular, to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.” The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention have reaffirmed that settlements violate international humanitarian law. The illegality of the settlements was recently reaffirmed by UN Security Council Resolution 2334, passed inDecember 2016, which reiterates the Security Council’s call on Israel to cease all settlement activities in the OPT. The serious human rights violations that stem from Israeli settlements have also been repeatedly raised and condemned by international bodies and experts.
Reacties uitgeschakeld voor The Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories are illegal under International Law/Why?
When a territory is placed under the authority of a hostile army, the rules of international humanitarian law dealing with occupation apply. Occupation confers certain rights and obligations on the occupying power.
Prohibited actions include forcibly transferring protected persons from the occupied territories to the territory of the occupying power. It is unlawful under the Fourth Geneva Convention for an occupying power to transfer parts of its own population into the territory it occupies. This means that international humanitarian law prohibits the establishment of settlements, as these are a form of population transfer into occupied territory. Any measure designed to expand or consolidate settlements is also illegal. Confiscation of land to build or expand settlements is similarly prohibited.
B
WAT ZEGT DE ISRAELISCHE MENSENRECHTENORGANISATIE BTSELEM
”The establishment of the settlements contravenes international humanitarian law (IHL), which states that an occupying power may not relocate its own citizens to the occupied territory or make permanent changes to that territory, unless these are needed for imperative military needs, in the narrow sense of the term, or undertaken for the benefit of the local population.”
De Illegaliteit van de nederzettingen is gebaseerd op artikelen
uit de 4e Conventie van Geneve en het Haags Verdrag van 1907
DE VIERDE CONVENTIE VAN GENEVE
ARTIKEL 49, 4E CONVENTIE VAN GENEVE
”Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.”
De Staat, die een gebied bezet heeft, mag zich slechts beschouwen als beheerder en vruchtgebruiker der openbare gebouwen, onroerende eigendommen, bosschen en landbouwondernemingen, welke aan den vijandelijken Staat behooren en zich in de bezette landstreek bevinden. Hij moet het grondkapitaal dier eigendommen in zijn geheel laten en die overeenkomstig de regelen van het vruchtgebruik beheeren.”
IN HET ENGELS Art. 55. The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.
CONVENTION RESPECTING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WARON LAND AND ITS ANNEX: REGULATIONS CONCERNINGTHE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND
Israel’s policy of settling its civilians in occupied Palestinian territory and displacing the local population contravenes fundamental rules of international humanitarian law.
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states: “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” It also prohibits the “individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory”.
The situation in the OPT is primarily governed by two international legal regimes: international humanitarian law (including the rules of the law of occupation) and international human rights law. International criminal law is also relevant as some serious violations may constitute war crimes.
STATUS OF SETTLEMENTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Israel’s policy of settling its civilians in occupied Palestinian territory and displacing the local population contravenes fundamental rules of international humanitarian law.
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states: “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” It also prohibits the “individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory”.
The extensive appropriation of land and the appropriation and destruction of property required to build and expand settlements also breach other rules of international humanitarian law. Under the Hague Regulations of 1907, the public property of the occupied population (such as lands, forests and agricultural estates) is subject to the laws of usufruct. This means that an occupying state is only allowed a very limited use of this property. This limitation is derived from the notion that occupation is temporary, the core idea of the law of occupation. In the words of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the occupying power “has a duty to ensure the protection, security, and welfare of the people living under occupation and to guarantee that they can live as normal a life as possible, in accordance with their own laws, culture, and traditions.”
The Hague Regulations prohibit the confiscation of private property. The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the destruction of private or state property, “except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations”.
As the occupier, Israel is therefore forbidden from using state land and natural resources for purposes other than military or security needs or for the benefit of the local population. The unlawful appropriation of property by an occupying power amounts to “pillage”, which is prohibited by both the Hague Regulations and Fourth Geneva Convention and is a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and many national laws.
Israel’s building of settlements in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem, does not respect any of these rules and exceptions. Transferring the occupying power’s civilians into the occupied territory is prohibited without exception. Furthermore, as explained earlier, the settlements and associated infrastructure are not temporary, do not benefit Palestinians and do not serve the legitimate security needs of the occupying power. Settlements entirely depend on the large-scale appropriation and/or destruction of Palestinian private and state property which are not militarily necessary. They are created with the sole purpose of permanently establishing Jewish Israelis on occupied land.
In addition to being violations of international humanitarian law, key acts required for the establishment of settlements amount to war crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Under this body of law, the “extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly” and the “transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory” constitute war crimes. As stated above, “pillage” is also a war crime under the Rome Statute.
Israel’s settlement policy also violates a special category of obligations entitled peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) from which no derogation is permitted. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed that the rules of the Geneva Conventions constitute “intransgressible principles of international customary law”. Only a limited number of international norms acquire this status, which is a reflection of the seriousness and importance with which the international community views them. Breaches of these norms give rise to certain obligations on all other states, or “third states”, which are explained below.
SETTLEMENTS, DISCRIMINATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
States have a duty to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of people under their jurisdiction, including people living in territory that is outside national borders but under the effective control of the state. The ICJ confirmed that Israel is obliged to extend the application of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other treaties to which it is a state party to people in the OPT. Israel is a state party to numerous international human rights treaties and, as the occupying power, it has well defined obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of Palestinians.
However, as has been well documented for many years by the UN, Amnesty International and other NGOs, Israel’s settlement policy is one of the main driving forces behind the mass human rights violations resulting from the occupation. These include:
Violations of the right to life: Israeli soldiers, police and security guards have unlawfully killed and injured many Palestinian civilians in the OPT, including during protests against the confiscation of land and the construction of settlements. UN agencies and fact-finding missions have also expressed concern about violence perpetrated by a minority of Israeli settlers aimed at intimidating Palestinian populations.
Violations of the rights to liberty, security of the person and equal treatment before the law: Amnesty International has documented how Palestinians in the OPT are routinely subjected to arbitrary detention, including through administrative detention. Whereas settlers are subject to Israeli civil and criminal law, Palestinians are subject to a military court system which falls short of international standards for the fair conduct of trials and administration of justice.
Violations of the right to access an effective remedy for acts violating fundamental rights: Israel’s failure to adequately investigate and enforce the law for acts of violence against Palestinians, together with the multiple legal, financial and procedural barriers faced by Palestinians in accessing the court system, severely limit Palestinians’ ability to seek legal redress. The Israeli High Court of Justice has failed to rule on the legality of settlements, as it considered the settlements to be a political issue that that it is not competent to hear.
Violations of the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly: Amnesty International has documented Israel’s use of military orders to prohibit peaceful protest and criminalize freedom of expression in the West Bank. Israeli forces have used tear gas, rubber bullets and occasionally live rounds to suppress peaceful protests.
Violations of the rights to equality and non-discrimination: Systematic discrimination against Palestinians is inherent in virtually all aspects of Israel’s administration of the OPT. Palestinians are also specifically targeted for a range of actions that constitute human rights violations. The Israeli government allows settlers to exploit land and natural resources that belong to Palestinians. Israel provides preferential treatment to Israeli businesses operating in the OPT while putting up barriers to, or simply blocking, Palestinian ones. Israeli citizens receive entitlements and Palestinians face restrictions on the grounds of nationality, ethnicity and religion, in contravention of international standards.
The Israeli authorities have created a discriminatory urban planning and zoning system. Within Area C, where most settlement construction is based, Israel has allocated 70% of the land to settlements and only 1% to Palestinians. In East Jerusalem, Israel has expropriated 35% of the city for the construction of settlements, while restricting Palestinians to construct on only 13% of the land. These figures clearly illustrate Israel’s use of regulatory measures to discriminate against Palestinian residents in Area C.
The UN has also pointed to discrimination against Palestinians in the way in which the criminal law is enforced. While prosecution rates for settler attacks against Palestinians are low, suggesting a lack of enforcement, most cases of violence against Israeli settlers are investigated and proceed to court.
Violations of the right to adequate housing: Since 1967, Israel has constructed tens of thousands of homes on Palestinian land to accommodate settlers while, at the same time, demolishing an estimated 50,000 Palestinian homes and other structures, such as farm buildings and water tanks. Israel also carries out demolitions as a form of collective punishment against the families of individuals accused of attacks on Israelis. In East Jerusalem, about 800 houses have been demolished since 2004 for lack of permits. Israel also confiscates houses inhabited by Palestinians in the city to allocate them to settlers. By forcibly evicting and/or demolishing their homes without providing adequate alternative accommodation, Israel has failed in its duty to respect the right to adequate housing of thousands of Palestinians.
Violations of the right to freedom of movement: Many restrictions on freedom of movement for Palestinian residents are directly linked to the settlements, including restrictions aimed at protecting the settlements and maintaining “buffer zones”. Restrictions include checkpoints, settler-only roads and physical impediments created by walls and gates.
Violations of the rights of the child: Every year, 500-700 Palestinian children from the occupied West Bank are prosecuted in Israeli juvenile military courts under Israeli military orders. They are often arrested in night raids and systematically ill-treated. Some of these children serve their sentences within Israel, in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The UN has also documented that many children have been killed or injured in settler attacks.
Violations of the right to enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health: Restrictions on movement limit Palestinians’ access to health care. Specialists working with Palestinian populations have also documented a range of serious mental health conditions that stem from exposure to violence and abuse in the OPT.
Violations of the right to water: Most Palestinian communities in Area C are not connected to the water network and are prevented from repairing or constructing wells or water cisterns that hold rainwater. Water consumption in some Area C communities is reported by the UN to be 20% of the minimum recommended standard. Israel’s failure to ensure Palestinian residents have a sufficient supply of clean, safe water for drinking and other domestic uses constitutes a violation of its obligations to respect and fulfil the right to water.
Violations of the right to education: Palestinian students face numerous obstacles in accessing education, including forced displacement, demolitions, restrictions on movement and a shortage of school places. An independent fact-finding mission in 2012 noted an “upward trend” of cases of settler attacks on Palestinian schools and harassment of Palestinian children on their way to and from school. Such problems can result in children not attending school and in a deterioration in the quality of learning.
Violations of the right to earn a decent living through work: The expansion of settlements has reduced the amount of land available to Palestinians for herding and agriculture, increasing the dependency of rural communities on humanitarian assistance. Settler violence and the destruction of Palestinian-owned crops and olive trees have damaged the livelihoods of farmers. The UN has reported that in Hebron city centre, the Israeli military has forced 512 Palestinian businesses to close, while more than 1,000 others have shut down due to restricted access for customers and suppliers.
SUSTAINED INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION
Most states and international bodies have long recognized that Israeli settlements are illegal under international law. The European Union (EU) has clearly stated that: “settlement building anywhere in the occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, is illegal under international law, constitutes an obstacle to peace and threatens to make a two-state solution impossible.”
The settlements have been condemned as illegal in many UN Security Council and other UN resolutions. As early as 1980, UN Security Council Resolution 465 called on Israel “to dismantle the existing settlements and, in particular, to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.” The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention have reaffirmed that settlements violate international humanitarian law. The illegality of the settlements was recently reaffirmed by UN Security Council Resolution 2334, passed inDecember 2016, which reiterates the Security Council’s call on Israel to cease all settlement activities in the OPT. The serious human rights violations that stem from Israeli settlements have also been repeatedly raised and condemned by international bodies and experts.
Reacties uitgeschakeld voor De Israelische nederzettingen in bezet Palestijns Gebied/illegaal volgens het Internationaal Recht
CHRISTMAS MESSAGE 2022/TEN YEARS WANDERING THROUGH AMSTERDAM/TEN YEARS REFUGEE VICTIMS OF THE SADISTIC DUTCH GOVERNMENT
A Poor Couple on their way to their PLace of Birth, on the orders of a foreign occupier, who wants to registrate the occupied people.
So is nthe World.
Rulers want to have, they NEED control on everything and everyone.
It is a journey full of hardships, the Wife is pregnant and travels
on the only way poor people can, when they are not walking:
On a Donkey.
And of course she can not walk, for she is full of
Child and the Birth can happen anytime.
When they arrive in their PLace of Birth, there is nowhere a shelter
or Place and the Mother is obliged to deliver her Child in a sort
of Cave, facilitated by a compassionate innkeeper
The Couple gets a warm welcome, not by the authorities,
who don’t care about poor people [just as in our Times],
but by common people.
Like shepherds and local residents.
But also by three Wise Men, who were intrigued by a
miraculous natural phenomenon……
But Hardship is not the end of their Trouble, for the Couple has
to flee, because the occupiers puppet king wants to kill
the newborn child, since a prediction says, that a child, born in
that city, will overshadow the king, when it grows up.
They flee to Egypt, where they can take shelter until
the Danger is over.
Glad for them, that they lived two thousand years ago:
For in this Time, they were, fleeing from Asia [where their
country is situated] stopped at some Wall or deported again [1]
especially when they had the nerves to go to Europe……
2012-2022
That’s what happened in Christmas Night.
It’s all about persecution, exclusion, discrimination.
That’s NOT something from the past
IT HAPPENS NOW!
Because I know a Group of Refugees, who are hunted down
for ten years by a cruel Dutch government, that throws her responsibility from government to municipality, etc
No one to blame?
THEY ARE ALL TO BLAME, ALL SEGMENTS OF
THE DUTCH STATE!
It concerns the Refugee from the ”WE are Here Group”, originally
coming from asylum refugee Centre Ter Apel [2] to the city
of Amsterdam, because they couldn’t be deported [their asylum had
been rejected] to their country of origin, but were not permitted to remain in the Netherlands either. [3]
Is that not sadistic?
Like throwing people in purgatory! [4]
Yes, there is a socalled ”No Fault Criterium”, implying, that when
refugees can’t possibly return to their country, after tried their
stinking best to leave [for departure is entirely the responsibility of
rejected refugees], that they can get a permit to stay in the Netherlands [5, text alas in Dutch].
But in practice the criteria are that strict, that no one can meet
them……..
This also implies also this Group, composed of people,
coming from all sort of war and conflict countries [6] [which makes that they can’t be deported and also the fact, that their country of origin refuses to give travel documents to return to the country]
WANDERING FROM PLACE TO PLACE
So what’s their Fate?
Wandering from place to place, from squatter centre to squatter centre, mostly helped by leftist radical quatter activists, but
also organizing their own group, their own resistance [7]
With no help whatsoever from the municipality Amsterdam,
only evictions from their poor shelterings, making them homeless…
[8]
It;s a shame
Those people are totally without rights
As undocumented refugees they have only right to an advocate and
medical service in case of an emergency
That’s NOT the way you deal with people
People have the right to flee, the right on elementary
necessities of life, the right on a warm Shelter, the right on
enough food to live, the right to build a decent life
I AM FURIOUS BECAUSE OF THIS AND MORE THAN ONCE I CONFRONTED THE DUTCH AMSTERDAM MUNICIPALITY
GOVERNMENT WITH THIS! [9]
CHRISTMAS 2022
Long ago a Poor Couple was rejected and excluded
After 2022 years, on and on refugees are rejected,
as the We are here Group
We, people who seek Justice, will not stand by and let it pass
Reacties uitgeschakeld voor Christmas Message 2022/2012-2022/Ten Years wandering through Amsterdam/Ten years refugee victims of a sadistic Dutch Government!
A record number of people have been forced to sleep outside the refugee centre at Ter Apel on Tuesday as staff struggle to cope with demand. Some 700 people had to make do with makeshift shelters around the centre, a spokeswoman for the refugee settlement agency COA told press agency ANP. Backlogs at the immigration service IND and a lack of accommodation in other parts of the country for people who have been granted asylum are at the bottom of an ever deepening refugee crisis with no easy solution on the horizon.
The conditions at the centre, the first port of call for all refugees, have been causing tension for months. Instances of theft and violence have prompted Westerwold local council to declare the area around the centre a safety risk, giving police powers to stop and search. A number of intake staff reportedly interrupted work on Tuesday in protest. ‘We spoke about how we go from here. You could call that a work stoppage,’ COA spokeswoman Jacqueline Engbers told regional paper Dagblad van het Noorden. Staff are particularly upset about having to refuse people at the gate, Engbers said. ‘We are here to offer accommodation, not leave them to sort themselves out. At some point you start to think: is that what I joined COA for?’ The government is currently bypassing local council authorities in an effort to force them to take in refugees but the move has proved controversial, especially among local councillors from the right-wing governing party VVD.
Het kan voorkomen dat een vreemdeling er alles aan doet om terug te keren naar zijn land van herkomst, maar dat dit niet lukt. Dit kan bijvoorbeeld zo zijn als zijn land van herkomst weigert een (tijdelijk) reisdocument (laissez-passer) te geven, waarmee toegang tot dat land wordt verleend. Voor vreemdelingen die buiten hun schuld niet uit Nederland kunnen vertrekken is er een speciale verblijfsvergunning: de buitenschuldvergunning.
Voor alleenstaande minderjarigen is er een speciaal buitenschuldbeleid. Dit beleid geldt alleen als zij binnen drie jaar nadat de eerste aanvraag is ingediend, buiten hun schuld, niet kunnen terugkeren naar het land van herkomst. Om voor de buitenschuldvergunning in aanmerking te komen moet de amv aan een aantal voorwaarden voldoen. Bijvoorbeeld dat er geen adequate opvang is in het land van herkomst en dat de alleenstaande minderjarige heeft meegewerkt aan zijn terugkeer.
EINDE
PARTLY ENGLISH TRANSLATION
SERVICE RETURN AND DEPARTURE
[DUTCH STATE SERVICE TO PERSUADE AND FORCE
REJECTED REFUGEES TO RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN]
NO FAULT CRITERIUM
It can happen that a foreigner [a rejected refugees/astrid essed explanation] does everything
he can to return to his country of origin, without results.
That is possible when the country of origin refuses to give a [temporary] permit to travel [laissez-passer],
which gives access to that country.
For foreigners, who can’t leave the Netherlands without
Voor ongedocumenteerde migranten die buiten hun schuld niet uit Nederland kunnen vertrekken is er een speciale verblijfsvergunning. Het kan bijvoorbeeld gebeuren dat de migrant geen identiteitsdocumenten heeft, en het land van herkomst weigert om een vervangend reisdocument te geven om terug te keren. Zo’n vervangend reisdocument heet een laissez-passer.
De verblijfsvergunning ‘buiten schuld’ is bedoeld als oplossing voor mensen die echt proberen om uit Nederland te vertrekken, maar waar dat niet lukt. Om in aanmerking te komen voor deze verblijfsvergunning, moet iemand zelf bewijzen dat hij buiten zijn schuld niet uit Nederland kan vertrekken. Hij moet laten zien dat:
Er geen twijfel is over zijn identiteit en nationaliteit
Hij altijd heeft meegewerkt met de DT&V om het vertrek mogelijk te maken
Hij gemotiveerd is voor terugkeer
Wat zijn de voorwaarden?
Om zijn best te doen om terug te keren, moet een ongedocumenteerde migrant in elk geval de volgende stappen hebben gezet:
de vreemdeling heeft de DT&V om bemiddeling verzocht ten behoeve van zijn vertrek uit Nederland of het verkrijgen van een (vervangend) reisdocument bij de autoriteiten van zijn land van herkomst of een ander land waar hij toegelaten zou kunnen worden, en deze bemiddeling heeft niet het gewenste resultaat opgeleverd;
de vreemdeling heeft naar het oordeel van de DT&V in houding en gedrag laten zien dat hij wil terugkeren naar zijn land van herkomst of een ander land waar hij toegelaten zou kunnen worden, bijvoorbeeld doordat dat hij zich heeft gehouden aan de afspraken die de DT&V met hem heeft gemaakt gedurende de bemiddelingsprocedure; en
op het moment van beslissen is er geen sprake van een lopende procedure in het kader van een aanvraag voor een verblijfsvergunning en voldoet de vreemdeling niet aan de voorwaarden voor verlening van een andere verblijfsvergunning.
Kunnen gezinsleden ook in Nederland blijven?
Ja. Dit is onder bepaalde voorwaarden mogelijk, maar alleen voor de partner en minderjarige kinderen. Om een verblijfsvergunning te kunnen krijgen, moeten de gezinsleden voldoen aan de volgende voorwaarden:
De gezinsleden verblijven samen met de aanvrager in Nederland.
Er is geen twijfel over dat de gezinsleden familie van elkaar zijn.
Hoe werkt het in de praktijk?
Het is erg lastig om deze verblijfsvergunning te krijgen. De DT&V gelooft vaak niet dat de aanvrager echt terug wil en er ook alles aan heeft gedaan om terug te keren. Begin op tijd met hulp te vragen van de DT&V, en volg hun adviezen op. Registreer ook zelf wat je hebt gedaan met de afspraken en adviezen van DT&V.
Om een verlenging te krijgen van de verblijfsvergunning buiten schuld moet iemand de hele tijd blijven proberen terug te keren naar het land van herkomst. Anders wordt de verblijfsvergunning niet verlengd.
Staatlozen hebben een bijzondere positie. Zij kunnen vaak hun staatloosheid niet bewijzen. Dat maakt het voor hen moeilijker om een verblijfsvergunning te krijgen. Dat geldt nog sterker voor een verblijfsvergunning ‘buitenschuld’. Er is beleid in ontwikkeling om staatloosheid vast te stellen.
Kinderen die in Nederland worden geboren zonder nationaliteit maar wel met een verblijfsvergunning, kunnen na 3 jaar naturaliseren. Er is beleid in ontwikkeling om het ook makkelijker te maken voor kinderen zonder nationaliteit en zonder verblijfsvergunning om te naturaliseren in Nederland.
Het VN-Vluchtelingenverdrag – Genève 1951 – verplicht elk land dat het ondertekend heeft om mensen die op de vlucht zijn voor oorlog, vervolging of andere vormen van geweld, de gelegenheid te geven een asielverzoek in te dienen in dat land. Vluchten is een recht.
Een groep van enkele honderden afgewezen vluchtelingen die niet in Nederland mogen blijven maar ook niet terug kunnen, zoekt sinds 2012 in Amsterdam de openbaarheid: Wij Zijn Hier.
Velen van hen zijn afgewezen omdat zij geen identiteits- of nationaliteitsdocumenten bezitten en op straat gezet met de aanzegging Nederland binnen 4 weken te verlaten. Zij zitten klem tussen de pressie om te vertrekken en de onmogelijkheid om daadwerkelijk terug te keren vanwege het geweld dat hun in het land van herkomst te wachten staat.
Als supporters van Wij Zijn Hier hebben wij in de afgelopen vier jaar grondige kennis opgedaan van de vluchtverhalen van deze vluchtelingen. Via deze mail vestigen wij uw aandacht op het feit dat deze vluchtelingen binnen het Nederlandse vreemdelingenrecht geen effectieve rechtsmiddelen hebben om aan te tonen dat zij buiten hun schuld niet kunnen vertrekken omdat terugkeer voor hen te gevaarlijk is.
De Buitenschuldprocedure: niet voor vluchtelingen
Het Nederlandse vreemdelingenrecht kent een procedure voor vreemdelingen die buiten hun schuld Nederland niet kunnen verlaten. Deze zogenoemde buitenschuldprocedure is bedoeld voor vreemdelingen van wie nationaliteit en identiteit boven elke twijfel verheven zijn, maar die er, ook met hulp van de Nederlandse overheid, niet in zijn geslaagd om te vertrekken, hoewel zij er alles aan gedaan hebben om zelfstandig het land te verlaten. Het kan hier bijvoorbeeld gaan om mensen aan wie de ambassades van het herkomstland of van een ander land waar de persoon verbleven heeft, geen inreispapieren willen verschaffen. Het vertrek uit Nederland stuit dan op wat men ‘administratieve problemen’ zou kunnen noemen.
Asielaspecten spelen bij de buitenschuldprocedure nadrukkelijk geen enkele rol. Het is een ‘reguliere’ procedure, geen asielprocedure. Gevaren die de vreemdeling bedreigen bij terugkeer, kunnen in de buitenschuldprocedure niet als beletstel voor het vertrek ingebracht worden. Dit is ook wat de Adviescommissie Vreemdelingenzaken (ACVZ) stelt in haar rapport over de buitenschuldprocedure Waar een wil is, maar geen weg 2013 p. 10: ‘Asielgerelateerde gronden kunnen geen rol spelen in het buitenschuldbeleid’. De ‘schuld’ van de onmogelijkheid te vertrekken ligt bij onwillige ambassades, en niet bij gevaren die bij terugkeer te duchten zijn.
Het merendeel van de vluchtelingen van Wij Zijn Hier is afkomstig uit een land dat in oorlog is (Somalië, Libië, Jemen, Zuid-Sudan, Congo), of zij kunnen bij terugkeer mishandeling, marteling of de dood tegemoet zien (Eritrea, Ethiopië). Zij kunnen dus niet terug naar hun land. Bij gebrek aan papieren is het hun tot nu toe niet gelukt hun identiteit of nationaliteit te bewijzen, zodat zij veroordeeld zijn tot een leven in de illegaliteit onder de voortdurende dreiging in detentie genomen te worden. Er staan hun geen effectieve rechtsmiddelen ter beschikking om aan te tonen dat zij buiten hun schuld niet kunnen vertrekken omdat terugkeer voor hen te gevaarlijk is.
Natuurlijk ZOUDEN vluchtelingen in deze positie kunnen besluiten hun vluchtelingenstatus op te geven en het buitenschuldtraject in te gaan, in de hoop op grond van de weigerachtigheid van hun ambassades verblijf-buiten-schuld te verwerven. Tot nu toe heeft echter geen enkele vluchteling van Wij Zijn Hier deze stap gezet. Om duidelijk te maken waarom dit zo is, schetsen wij wat gedetailleerder het reguliere buitenschuld traject dat de vluchtelingen van Wij Zijn Hier dus ZOUDEN moeten doorlopen als zij voor een verblijfsvergunning-buiten-schuld zouden gaan.
Allereerst zouden zij de vluchtelingenstatus moeten opgeven door eventueel nog lopende asielaanvragen in te trekken, waarmee zij dus afzien van een mogelijke erkenning als vluchteling.
Zij zouden bereid moeten zijn om onder de hoede van de Dienst Terugkeer & Vertrek (DT&V) een in het algemeen meerjarig voortraject in te gaan. Zij zouden hierbij geen verblijfsrecht of recht op voorzieningen hebben – gevaarlijk spel, omdat zij elk moment in detentie genomen kunnen worden.
In dit voortraject zouden zij hun herkomst aannemelijk moeten proberen te maken bij de ambassade van het herkomstland met wat zij inmiddels aan bewijsmiddelen bemachtigd hebben, en op grond van de aldus verkregen identiteitsdocumenten inreispapieren van de ambassade moeten proberen te verkrijgen. Maar de ervaring leert dat ambassades vaak helemaal geen zaken willen doen met onderdanen die illegaal uitgereisd zijn: zelfs weigeren zij vaak hen überhaupt te ontvangen. Als zij hen wel te woord willen staan, dan weigeren zij vaak de gevraagde reispapieren af te geven. Voor veel arme landen vormen onderdanen in de diaspora met de geldzendingen aan hun familie een belangrijke inkomstenbron, zodat de bereidheid om illegaal uitgereisde onderdanen terug te nemen vaak gering is.
Deze weigering zou vervolgens teruggemeld moeten worden aan de DT&V, en wel middels een schriftelijke verklaring van de betreffende ambassade, dat de aanvrager wel als onderdaan erkend wordt, maar toch het land niet in mag. De kans dat ambassades zo’n compromitterende verklaring afgeven is bijzonder klein.
Maar zonder zo’n verklaring van de ambassade, zo is de ervaring van ‘reguliere’ aanvragers, laat de DT&V zich er vaak niet van overtuigen dat de vreemdelingen er echt alles aan gedaan hebben om de gewenste papieren te verkrijgen: ‘u wilde niet echt terug’, ‘u werkt niet mee’. De bewijslast ligt geheel bij de vreemdelingen, zij moeten ‘beter hun best doen’, en het nog eens gaan proberen, en nog eens, en nog eens, soms tot tien keer toe, jarenlang. In heel weinig gevallen geeft de DT&V uiteindelijk een verklaring af aan de IND op grond waarvan deze de buitenschuldaanvraag in behandeling wil nemen. Het aantal toekenningen van verblijf-buitenschuld is dan ook bijzonder klein: in 2012 werden 40 van de 240 aanvragen ingewilligd, in 2013 waren dat er 10 van de 160. Het aantal aanvragen daalt dan ook gestaag, tot 80 in 2014. Tot nu toe zitten daar geen aanvragen van Wij-Zijn-Hier-vluchtelingen bij.
Van veel kanten wordt aangedrongen op een versoepeling van het buitenschuldcriterium. Maar om een dergelijk verblijfscriterium van toepassing te laten zijn op vluchtelingen als die bij Wij Zijn Hier zijn aangesloten, is meer nodig dan alleen een versoepeling van de huidige procedure. Er moet binnen de categorie asiel een parallel buitenschuldcriterium ingesteld worden waarin de gevaarvolheid van terugkeer tot gelding kan komen als grond voor verlening van verblijf-buiten-schuld.
Wat moet er veranderen?
Er dient een mogelijkheid te komen voor vluchtelingen om aan te tonen dat ze buiten hun schuld niet kunnen vertrekken omdat zij bij terugkeer naar hun land gevaar lopen. Zij dienen asiel te krijgen, conform artikel 3 EVRM, dat het terugsturen van asielzoekers die gevaar lopen bij terugkeer naar hun land, verbiedt.
Als zij meer dan drie jaar hun herkomst, identiteit en/of nationaliteit aannemelijk hebben proberen te maken, en dit lukt min of meer, ook al voldoen hun bewijsstukken niet alle aan de hardheidscriteria van de IND, dan moeten zij het voordeel van de twijfel krijgen.
Thank you very much for your support of more than two years, for everything you brought and you keep on bringing to us. Now that we have a hard moment than before, Now that we are tired and sick, now that the government is punishing us and now that we cannot go back to our respective countries, we turn ourselves towards you, the people of the Netherlands. Knowing that we cannot stay here, and we cannot go to other EU countries due to the EU Dublin’s agreement (law) what are we going to do? We need politically your support more than before.
When we come to Vlucht School in Zuidelijke wandelweg, the Gemeente decided to leave us staying in the Vlucht School until last Monday when suddenly and surprisingly the Gemeente decided that we have to free the building on Friday of this week. Hence, two days the Gemeente decided to evict us because if we do not leave the school building where we are actually squatting, we would be considered as criminals on Friday. “We are here” group decides to stay until police arrest us because we do not have any other options, we are tired and sick. Yesterday at five o’clock, the Gemente decided not to arrest us but rather to evict and put us on the street. Now that it’s very cold and raining what are going to do? We do not have any other alternative. We need your support at all levels, even politically!!
We are not radical group and we do not want to do radical actions. We came here to get peace and security. So we deserve to have the minimum right like you. Yesterday the Gemeente decided to leave us staying in the Vlucht School Zuidelijke wandelweg until Saturday morning at 07.00 am, when the police will come to evict us from the building.
Please, we call you for coming to support us on Saturday this week at 07.00 am. We do not want confrontation with the police or the Government. We just want normal live.
We Are Here (Dutch: Wij Zijn Hier) is a collective of migrants based in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, which campaigns for human rights for its members and all undocumented migrants. The asylum seekers have in many cases had their applications to remain in the Netherlands denied but they either cannot go back or refuse to return to their country of origin. They ask for access to social services such as medical care and housing. The group formed in 2012 and by 2015 contained over 200 migrants from around 15 countries.
The collective is constantly in flux as a result of individually precarious legal situations. Since its members refuse to use the homeless shelters offered by the city of Amsterdam, which can only be used from 5 p.m. until 9 a.m., the collective has squatted a chain of buildings in and around the city since 2012. Most buildings are quickly evicted, some have led to offshoot projects. The group is mostly composed of men originally from Africa, although there have also been women-only occupations. There have been some successes, such as the Vluchtmaat, where a long-term deal was negotiated with the owner, and some long-term squats such as the Vluchtgarage, where Amsterdam city council tolerated the occupation. As of 2017, roughly one hundred people from the group had gained Dutch residence permits.
By 2018, the new council had pledged to set up 24 hour shelters for up to 500 undocumented migrants, but We Are Here stated it was against the hostels since they were only for a short time period and it disputed the plan to send asylum seekers back to their country of origin at the end of the project. The collective has diversified into different subgroups occupying different buildings, such as a women-only group, a Swahili language group, and a group composed of people mainly from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan.
Refugees seeking asylum in the Netherlands are assessed by the Immigration and Naturalisation Service and then either gain residency or fail to do so, based on their documentary evidence. For some who have fled warzones, it is difficult to provide documents or other proof for their claim. If the refugees fail to be granted asylum, they are given temporary housing and have 28 days to leave.[1][2] Some people fall into what human rights groups term the “asylum gap” since they are unable to return to their country of origin, whilst others want to go back but cannot because they do not possess the required visas or identity documents.[3] In 2016, it was estimated there were 35,000 undocumented migrants in the Netherlands. Without a residence permit they are denied access to social services such as healthcare and housing.[1][2]
By the end of 2017, the migrants of the We Are Here collective had occupied over 30 buildings and parks.[4] They argue that they should have access to basic needs such as housing and healthcare. The city council of Amsterdam refuses to accede to their demands. Much of the dispute with the council is that it only offers the so-called BBB service – Bed-Bath-Bread (Dutch: bed-bad-broodvoorziening) – that is to say an overnight accommodation open from 5 p.m. until 9 a.m., which cannot be stayed in during the day. The migrants reject this offer as insufficient and comment that the service is also often over-subscribed.[4] The city council argues that its actions are limited by the policy of the Dutch Government.[5] Therefore, We Are Here have chosen to squat a number of buildings to live in. By 2019, the total had risen to over 50 squats, according to the group. The occupations are tracked on a map hosted on the We Are Here website.[6]
We Are Here is mostly composed of men originally from Africa. In some squats, such as the Vluchtgarage occupation, the collective has been men only.[7] However, there have also been women only squats.[8] The group’s membership changes often since people are often being deported or detained. Overall, representatives of the group estimated that over one hundred people had gained residence permits by 2017.[4] A spokesperson for the group, Khalid Jone, who escaped war in Sudan and had lived in the Netherlands for 16 years, was granted a residence permit in 2018.[9] The collective regularly makes demonstrations highlighting the plight of individuals.[8] It has also set up the We Are Here Academy, a scheme to offer university level qualifications for undocumented migrants.[10]
In 2018, a newly elected Amsterdam city council, now controlled by a centre-left coalition of GroenLinks, D66, PvdA and SP, decided to go against the will of the Parliament and set up a 24-hour shelter for homeless failed asylum seekers.[11] However, We Are Here as a group announced it would not make use of the shelter, since it would only exist for a maximum time of eighteen months and afterwards participants would be required to return to their country of origin. Since We Are Here was set up for people unable to return to their motherland, a spokesman said the plan offered no real solution.[12] In March 2019, the council announced seven prospective sites for its plan to set up shelters for undocumented migrants. It was considering up to 23 sites, with around 30 beds at each. The cities of Rotterdam, Utrecht, Groningen and Eindhoven stated that they were all also looking for sites.[13]
Femke Halsema, previously parliamentary leader of GroenLinks, started serving a six-year term as Mayor of Amsterdam in July 2018. In 2019, she discussed making the enforcement of the Dutch squatting ban tougher and suggested that the immigration police could be employed to stop the We Are Here collective squatting. GroenLinks asked for clarification since the tradition in Amsterdam is that illegal migrants are not searched for by the police.[14] Halsema stated that if We Are Here members did nothing wrong they had nothing to fear, but that squatting was a criminal offence.[15] GroenLinks stated it was troubled by this position.[16]
We Are Here coalesced as a group in 2012, when a small number of asylum seekers whose claims had been rejected began a protest camp at the garden of the Diakonie on the Nieuwe Herengracht in the Grachtengordel in central Amsterdam.[17] More migrants joined the protest, which then moved location to Notweg in Osdorp. The camp swelled to 130 people and received national media attention. The camp was evicted on 30 November. Everyone was arrested and some people were held in foreign detention (Dutch: vreemdelingendetentie).[18]
After a few nights staying at the Vondelpark Bunker and OT301, the group squatted an empty church in Bos en Lommer. This became known as the Vluchtkerk, a portmanteau of the Dutch words for migrant (Dutch: vluchteling) and church (Dutch: kerk). This began the tradition of giving every new location a nickname, by adding ‘Vlucht’ to the type of place. The Vluchtkerk again generated a lot of media attention in the Netherlands.[19][20] Celebrities such as popstar Anouk made solidarity performances.[21]
The Vluchtkerk was occupied until 31 May 2013. Mayor of Amsterdam Eberhard van der Laan then asked the group to leave a building they had squatted on the Weteringschans and the council offered the migrants the possibility to stay in a former prison for 6 months. Many people refused, citing bad prior experiences of prisons, but 75 others took the opportunity and it became known as the Vluchthaven.[22][23] Only migrants who signed up with the Dutch Refugee Council were eligible to stay there. By the end of the period, a total of 165 people had stayed in the prison. Of these, three had returned to their country of origin, three more were planning to, twelve had successfully gained residency, one person had died and the largest group (38) was formed by those still gathering documents for their asylum process. In terms of country of origin, the largest numbers of people were from Somalia (48), Eritrea (31) and Ethiopia (28).[24]
On 13 December 2013, a building in Amsterdam Zuid Oost was occupied by a group of 90 migrants and their supporters. It was a derelict parking garage with offices attached, which became known as the Vluchtgarage.[25] It was occupied until April 2015. In August 2014, a Somali man called Nassir Guuleed died at the squat. A few days later, Ibrahim Touré from Côte d’Ivoire suffered a brain haemorrhage and broken vertebra when he fell off a stairway. Police and ambulance services refused to enter the building, citing fears of the presence of asbestos, though the city had found none in an inspection earlier that same day. The severely injured man was carried to the ambulance.[26]Fred Teeven, Undersecretary for Security and Justice announced his intention to evict the Vluchtgarage in January 2015. At this point there were around 100 people living there.[27] Following the eviction in April 2015, people camped on land in the De Pijp neighbourhood but were moved on by the council.[28]
By 2015, We Are Here was composed in total of around 225 migrants from about 15 countries. As well as occupying several buildings, they regularly made demonstrations demanding rights.[29] At each squat, the collective was helped out by local people who donated things. If something was needed, a request was made on the website or on Facebook. Often things were scavenged from the street.[30] The Vluchtmaat was occupied in 2015 by 40 migrants mainly from Ethiopia and Eritrea. The building had formerly been used by the construction company Bouwmaat. Unusually, the owner did not want to evict the squatters but came to an arrangement with them whereby they could stay for a fixed time as long as the building costs were paid. The security of short-term tenure allowed the former squatters to break the offices up into residential units and spaces which small businesses could rent affordably, thus supplying enough money to pay the costs of electricity, water, insurance and so on. A foundation, Stichting Noodzaak, was set up to deal with the owner. The initial contract was for six months and has since been extended in six month blocks.[31]
Another subgroup of We Are Here is composed of Swahili language speakers. They first squatted on Amstelstraat in the centre of Amsterdam at the end of 2016.[32] They then occupied a disused kindergarten in Amsterdam-Zuidoost in May 2017 and a building on Sarphatistraat in September of the same year.[33][34] In May 2018, they were occupying the former discotheque Club Empire on Buikslootermeerplein in Amsterdam-Noord.[35]
In April 2017, the We Are Here subgroup composed of men from West Africa, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan occupied a derelict office building on Nienoord street in Diemen. The owner was the Arq Group, which specialises in treating people with severe psychotraumas which cannot be treated by psychologists or psychiatrists.[36] The owner was sympathetic to the squatters but said the building contained asbestos and therefore was unliveable.[36] We Are Here denounced Arq for not making a temporary contract since the building would not be demolished for two years and added that many in the group had actually attended treatment sessions for trauma provided by the group’s Equator Foundation.[37] Normally the group would leave a building willingly after a court order or having made an agreement with the owner, but in this case the squatters said they would resist the eviction, since they were tired of constantly moving.[38] The building was evicted in November 2017 by the police, with one arrest. It was the 29th building which had been squatted by We Are Here since 2012.[39] Out of the 90 people evicted, 17 were from Sudan. Some said they had escaped the Darfur genocide, but the immigration authorities had refused their claims.[40]
In April 2018, We Are Here occupied eleven apartments and a shop on Rudolf Dieselstraat in Amsterdam-Oost. They renamed the street ‘We Are Here Village’. Since the housing corporation, Ymere, had left the apartments empty for some time, they asked that they could stay there until they were demolished. The city council backed their request.[41] The previously unknown street became both a media and political sensation with many actors becoming involved in the debate about whether We Are Here should be able to stay or not.[42][43][44][45]
In Parliament, centre-right parties VVD and CDA demanded that the state took action to evict the squatters.[46] This was in response from a motion at the Amsterdam city council put forward by centre-left parties D66, PvdA, SP and GroenLinks proposing that the council would not put asylum seekers on the street and would ask owners of occupied buildings not to evict migrants.[47] Acting mayor Jozias van Aartsen of the VVD party opposed the motion. He later received criticism from within his party for not taking further action and replied that “You must be very careful with the mayor’s office and not go down the route of politicizing the mayor’s role.”[48] CDA Parliament member Madeleine van Toorenburg stated that “the enforcement of the law [which criminalised squatting] is a joke.”[49]
The housing corporation, Ymere, went to court to evict the squatters. The judge decided that Ymere was not demonstrating an immediate need for the buildings, which would eventually be demolished. He stated that the squat action had not disturbed the public order and that the squatters could stay until 1 June.[50] The situation then became more tense when a far-right group announced that they would also occupy a building on the same estate, in protest against We Are Here. Identitair Verzet (a small Dutch branch of Generation Identity) claimed to have squatted a building but Ymere later stated a property guardian had let them into a house.[51] The house was immediately attacked with fireworks and had its windows smashed.[52] The police then evicted the house on grounds of public order. Identitair Verzet had also previously tried to demonstrate against the Vluchtkerk.[53] The houses occupied by the We Are Here collective were subsequently evicted in June.[54]
2018-
We Are Here squatted in a building in Amstelveen on Groen van Prinstererlaan in June 2018, having left Rudolf Dieselstraat. They had briefly occupied a former bowling alley in Amsterdam-Noord and failed to squat at Hoog Kadijk and Weesperzijde.[55] They were then given an eviction order for the end of the month.[56]
The Weesperzijde squat action at a former United Nations building became a notorious incident, since the building was actually inhabited. A heated confrontation between We Are Here and a resident, who happened to be the son of the chair of the local branch of the VVD, was filmed and circulated in the press.[57][58] In April 2019, member of the collective Fortune M. was given a three-day jail sentence and a conditional fine of €150, for damaging a door during the attempt to squat the building.[59]
2015–2016: Inspired by meeting members of the We Are Here collective and following them around for several months, Dutch artist Manon van Hoeckel created the Limbo Embassy. This provided a way for people to hear the stories of We Are Here participants. Members of the collective were otherwise not allowed to work or volunteer, but because it was an artistic project they could be paid for performances and sell political printed matter. Between June 2015 to June 2016, the embassy visited 15 events, including the Dutch Design Week in Eindhoven.[1][61]
2015: Alexandra Jansse made an hour-long documentary called Wij Zijn Hier about the group [62]
2017: We Are Here featured in the exhibition Architecture of Appropriation at Het Nieuwe Instituut (the Dutch Institute of Architecture), in Rotterdam.[63]
2018: Artist Hilda Moucharrafieh won the International Bursary Award at the Amsterdam Fringe Festival for her project Tracing Erased Memories: A parallel walk of Amsterdam & Cairo. She worked with members of We Are Here to make a choreographed roadmap in which a person walked through central Amsterdam wearing headphones and hearing the sounds of someone walking through central Cairo.[64]
2018: Academics who have studied We Are Here organised a meeting at Spui 25 cultural centre to discuss their findings with members of the collective and to listen to their feedback.[65]
^ Karman, Jasper (6 December 2013). “Havenstraat biedt iedereen hoop”. Parool (in Dutch). Archived from the original on 5 July 2019. Retrieved 5 July 2019. Dat tot frustratie van de burgemeester en de gemeenteraad, die allebei graag meer wilden doen, maar moesten blijven herhalen dat niet Amsterdam, maar Den Haag over het asielbeleid gaat en dat de stad geen asielzoekers mág opvangen.
^“BED, BAD, BROOD EN MÉÉR…”Vluchtverhalen (in Dutch). 20 June 2017. Archived from the original on 5 July 2019. Retrieved 5 July 2019. Het zijn alleen mannen, afkomstig uit vooral Afrikaanse en Arabische landen.
^ van Unen, David (3 June 2018). “We Are Here probeert tevergeefs nieuw pand te kraken”. Parool. Archived from the original on 10 May 2019. Retrieved 10 July 2019. Het nieuwe college van Groenlinks, D66, PvdA en SP wil, ondanks weerstand uit Den Haag, 24-uursopvang gaan aanbieden voor de veelal uitgeprocedeerde asielzoekers van We Are Here.
^ van Unen, David (3 June 2018). “We Are Here probeert tevergeefs nieuw pand te kraken”. Parool. Archived from the original on 10 May 2019. Retrieved 10 July 2019. De nieuwe opvang biedt voor maximaal anderhalf jaar een oplossing. Daarna moeten asielzoekers meewerken aan een terugkeer naar het land van herkomst, terwijl dat juist niet is wat We Are Here wil.
^ Koops, Ruben (18 December 2019). “Halsema: ‘Illegalen die geen strafbare feiten plegen hebben niets te vrezen'”. Het Parool (in Dutch). Archived from the original on 14 March 2020. Retrieved 27 December 2019. GroenLinks had om opheldering gevraagd, nadat Halsema eerder dit jaar zei dat zij de vreemdelingenpolitie wil inschakelen tegen de asielactivisten van We Are Here […] GroenLinks was bang dat de burgemeester daarmee afscheid nam van de Amsterdamse traditie dat op illegale vreemdelingen in principe niet gejaagd wordt door de veiligheidsdiensten.
^ Koops, Ruben (18 December 2019). “Halsema: ‘Illegalen die geen strafbare feiten plegen hebben niets te vrezen'”. Het Parool (in Dutch). Archived from the original on 14 March 2020. Retrieved 27 December 2019. Illegalen die niets hebben gedaan worden niet in detentie geplaatst,” beloofde Halsema. “Maar ook voor We Are Here geldt dat, als er strafbare feiten worden gepleegd, er aanhoudingen volgen en de juridische procedure moet worden doorlopen.
^ Wolthuizen, Josien (17 November 2017). “Arrestatie bij ontruiming 29ste onderkomen Wij Zijn Hier”. Parool (in Dutch). Archived from the original on 20 June 2019. Retrieved 20 June 2019. In september van dat jaar sloegen drie asielzoekers uit Eritrea een tentje op in de achtertuin van de Diakonie op de Nieuwe Herengracht
^“BED, BAD, BROOD EN MÉÉR…”. VLUCHTVERHALEN. Vluchtverhalen. 20 June 2017. Archived from the original on 5 July 2019. Retrieved 5 July 2019. Het aantal bewoners in het tentenkamp in Osdorp groeit tot ongeveer 130 […] Uiteindelijk geeft burgemeester Eberhard van der Laan op 30 november 2012 de politie opdracht het kamp te ontruimen. Vele mensen worden gearresteerd. Een tiental verdwijnt in vreemdelingendetentie.
^ Redactie (26 December 2012). “Weblog Vluchtkerk: kerst met Anouk en PVV met een geweer”. BN DeStem (in Dutch). Archived from the original on 3 July 2019. Retrieved 3 July 2019. Afrikaanse muziek is het natuurlijk niet, maar de titel van een van de nummers die Anouk op kerstavond zong tijdens haar verrassingsoptreden in De Vluchtkerk was wel toepasselijk:’I don’t wanna hurt no more’ …….
^ Eigenraam, Anouk. “Amsterdamse asielzoekers kraken nieuw pand”. NRC (in Dutch). Retrieved 5 July 2019. Burgemeester Eberhard van der Laan eiste dat de groep uit dit pand zou vertrekken. Ongeveer 75 anderen accepteerden het bod van de gemeente Amsterdam en kregen zo onderdak in een voormalige gevangenis aan de Havenstraat. Ze mogen daar een halfjaar blijven.
^ Karman, Jasper (6 December 2013). “Havenstraat biedt iedereen hoop”. Parool (in Dutch). Archived from the original on 5 July 2019. Retrieved 5 July 2019. Daarnaast riep ook het gebouw zelf weerstand op: bij de aanblik van de gevangenis hadden velen vervelende associaties.
^ Eigenraam, Anouk. “Amsterdamse asielzoekers kraken nieuw pand”. NRC (in Dutch). Retrieved 5 July 2019. De uitgeprocedeerde asielzoekers die sinds begin december door Amsterdam zwerven, hebben vandaag een nieuw pand gekraakt, zo laten ze in een verklaring weten. Het gaat om de groep van negentig asielzoekers die niet in aanmerking kwam voor opvang in een voormalige gevangenis.
^“Vluchtgarage Amsterdam wordt ontruimd”. NOS (in Dutch). 13 January 2015. Archived from the original on 5 July 2019. Retrieved 5 July 2019. De ruim honderd uitgeprocedeerde asielzoekers die worden opgevangen in de Vluchtgarage in Amsterdam, moeten het gebouw uit. Staatssecretaris Teeven van Justitie laat weten dat de oude garage in Zuidoost ontruimd zal worden.
^ Jump up to:ab Wolthuizen, Josien (17 November 2017). “Arrestatie bij ontruiming 29ste onderkomen Wij Zijn Hier”. Parool (in Dutch). Archived from the original on 3 July 2019. Retrieved 20 June 2019. Over twee jaar wordt het gesloopt, maar vanwege de asbest kunnen we het niet verhuren. Daarom vinden we ook dat er geen mensen zouden moeten wonen. Het is hartstikke gevaarlijk
^“Wij Zijn Hier-leden kondigen verzet aan bij ontruiming”. Parool (in Dutch). 16 November 2017. Archived from the original on 20 June 2019. Retrieved 10 July 2019. ‘Wij zijn kapot van het rondzwerven en hebben besloten niet vrijwillig te vertrekken. We hebben al onze sympathisanten opgeroepen ons te komen ondersteunen in ons vreedzaam verzet.’
^“Darfur refugees among 90 forcibly evicted in Amsterdam”. Radio Dabanga. 18 November 2017. Archived from the original on 14 December 2017. Retrieved 11 July 2019. A human rights activist told Radio Dabanga that the Dutch immigration authority has closed the files of 17 Sudanese nationals in the Netherlands including Darfuris, as they do not believe they come from Darfur. The refugees said they had proved it, but the immigration authorities doubted their arguments.
^ Hiemstra, Eelco (26 January 2019). “Straks compact wonen in de nieuwe ‘Rudolf Dieselbuurt'”. Oost Online (in Dutch). Retrieved 20 June 2019. Ongedocumenteerde vluchtelingen van We Are Here kraakten er tijdens de paasdagen een aantal woningen en vanaf dat moment wisten vele voor- en tegenstanders, journalisten en politici de tot dan toe relatief onbekende straat te vinden.
^“ID Verzet is ‘rechtse splintergroepering'”. Nu (in Dutch). ANP. 18 June 2013. Archived from the original on 24 June 2015. Retrieved 12 July 2019. De Vluchtkerk in Amsterdam kreeg in april met ID Verzet te maken. Een aangekondigde demonstratie bij de Vluchtkerk ging niet door.
^“Celstraf en voorwaardelijke boete lid We Are Here”. Parool. ANP. 26 April 2019. Archived from the original on 10 May 2019. Retrieved 10 May 2019. De politierechter in Amsterdam heeft de 36-jarige Fortune M., lid van het vluchtelingencollectief We Are Here, veroordeeld tot een celstraf van drie dagen en een voorwaardelijke geldboete van 150 euro.
^“We Are Here”. International Photography Awards. Retrieved 5 July 2019.
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