Sterke 9/11-vibes na de aanval van Hamas op Israël. In navolging van EU-voorzitter Ursula von der Leyen verklaarden zowel Mark Rutte als Jesse Klaver dat Israël het recht heeft zich tegen deze terreur te verdedigen. We weten inmiddels hoe Israël zich verdedigt: door zoveel mogelijk Palestijnen aan gort te bombarderen.
Daar moeten wij het verplicht mee eens zijn in dit vrije deel van de wereld. Wierd Duk laat weten dat Afshin Ellian en VVD-Kamerlid Ruben Brekelmans op de staatstelevisie hebben verklaard dat je nú laat zien dat je solidair bent. Wie daar bezwaren tegen heeft, wordt door De Telegraaf als een misdadiger geschandpaald, te boek gesteld als antisemiet en als staatsgevaar. Duk hangt al drie dagen de Opiniepolizei uit, en hij niet alleen. Iedereen die erop wijst dat de Palestijnen de afgelopen decennia ook wat voor hun kiezen hebben gehad, wordt verrot gescholden, voor antisemiet uitgemaakt en bedreigd. Fanatiek sturen de Vrienden van Israël gruwelfilmpjes rond van verminkte lijken, de slachtoffers van Hamas.
Gruweldaden
En het zijn gruweldaden, die Hamas pleegt. De website Electronic Intifada spreekt van een “rechtvaardige bevrijdingsoorlog”, maar in een rechtvaardige bevrijdingsoorlog sleep je niet de naakte lijken van je slachtoffers door de straat, schiet je niet honderden jonge bezoekers van een muziekfestival dood en trek je niet moordend door woonwijken.
Extreemlinkse toetsenbordridders, geretweet door BIJ1-aanhangers, oordelen als kille schrijftafelmoordenaars dat er “geen onschuldige zionisten zijn” en dat “zionisten die blijven als ze de keuze hebben te vertrekken, ophouden burgers te zijn.”
“You don’t get freedom peacefully”, citeert iemand Malcolm X, maar er is verschil tussen “not peacefully” en de barbarij die Hamas tentoonspreidt. Ik ben geen Sun Tzu maar ik zou, als ik Hamas was, uiterst gedisciplineerd zijn geweest, alleen krijgsgevangenen hebben genomen en alle burgers met het uiterste respect hebben behandeld.
Maar het gaat er natuurlijk om Israël zo razend mogelijk te maken zodat het terugslaat met een wrede genadeloosheid die mensen kotsend het theater zal doen verlaten. Dat begrijp ik heus wel.
Israëlische doden
Dit afschuwelijke geweld komt niet uit het niets, al willen de Vrienden van Israël dit ons graag doen geloven. Ruben Brekelmans, bijvoorbeeld, deelt op Twitter een staafdiagram met alleen het aantal Israëlische doden van de afgelopen 15 jaar als gevolg van het “conflict met de Palestijnen.” Fact-checker Marieke Kuypers laat in zo’n zelfde diagram zien dat het aantal Israëlische doden in het niet valt bij het aantal Palestijnse doden.
En hoe Israël het voor elkaar krijgt zo onnoemelijk veel Palestijnse slachtoffers te maken, krijgen we bijna dagelijks in filmpjes te zien waarin we soldaten kinderen zien doodschieten alsof het kalkoenen zijn, Gaza bombarderen waar de bewoners niet uit wegkunnen en waarin kolonisten Palestijnen vernederen die ze net uit hun huis hebben weggejaagd, als ze ze niet gewoon doodschieten.
“Collateral damage” zei een Vriend van Israël tegen mij. Dode Israëlische burgers zijn slachtoffers van terreur, dode Palestijnen zijn “collateral damage”.
Palestijnen zijn ongedierte
Esther Voet zei, toen op het strand van Gaza een groepje voetballende Palestijnse kinderen vanuit een gevechtsvliegtuig aan stukken werd gereten: “Het is wel oorlog, hè!”
Palestijnse levens betekenen hier in Nederland gewoon niks. Palestijnen zijn vuil, uitschot, het is ongedierte, anders praat je niet zo makkelijk over dode kinderen. Zo achteloos, zo zonder enig gevoel.
En dan ben je geschokt dat Hamas net zo achteloos met Israëlische burgers omspringt, en dan ben je kwaad dat Nederlanders hier wijzen op de context van dat geweld.
Feestvieren om slachtparijen
Ik zag filmpjes van mensen die feestvierden vanwege de aanval van Hamas. Ik vind mensen, die juichen om dodelijke slachtoffers, nare mensen. Maar de Vrienden van Israël zijn nogal hypocriet als ze beweren dat zij nooit juichen als er Palestijnen worden gedood. Ze staan op film, de Israëlische jongeren die een soort feestje maakten van het kijken naar de Israëlische beschietingen van Gaza, applaudisserend bij elke inslag. In straatinterviews zeggen Israëliërs dat alle Arabieren moeten worden uitgegroeid, dat hun land en hun huizen eerlijk zijn veroverd in oorlogen.
En hier in Nederland viert GeenStijl feest bij dode Palestijnen, en Laurence Blik en haar vrienden, onder wie zich heel wat prominente Vrienden van Israël bevinden.
Doe niet net of je beter bent dan Hamas. Je bent net zo bloeddorstig, net zo barbaars, net zo wreed en genadeloos.
Gekoloniseerde volken
Waar Nederland nog aan moet wennen, merk ik, is dat de tijd voorbij is dat iedereen braaf ja knikte als er werd gepreekt dat lam Israël was omsingeld door bloeddorstige Arabische leeuwen die het land wilden vernietigen alléén omdat er Joden woonden. Meer pluriformiteit in het medialandschap, want Al Jazeera en sociale media, en een andere samenstelling van de bevolking dan in 1973, maken dat het “conflict” vanuit meerdere perspectieven bekeken wordt. Nazaten van gekoloniseerde volkeren en telgen van nog steeds gekoloniseerde volken zien alles in een andere context.
En je kunt boos worden en schelden en dreigen wat je wilt, met je “Hamas-vriendje” en je “antisemiet” en wat dan ook, die context hoort erbij. Je bent niet meer gezaghebbend, je bepaalt niet meer wat andere mensen denken. Je bent niet meer de baas.
EINDE
Reacties uitgeschakeld voor [Artikel Frontaal Naakt]/Hamas-vriendje
The following questions and answers (Q&A) address issues relating to international humanitarian law (the laws of war) governing current hostilities between Israel and Hamas, and other Palestinian armed groups in Gaza. The purpose is to facilitate analysis of the conduct of all parties involved in the conflict with the aim of deterring violations of the laws of war and encouraging accountability for abuses.
This Q&A focuses on international humanitarian law governing the conduct of hostilities. It does not address whether Palestinian armed groups or Israel were or are justified in their attacks or other matters concerning the legitimacy of resorting to armed force, such as under the United Nations Charter. In accordance with our institutional mandate, Human Rights Watch does not take positions on issues of jus ad bellum (law concerning acceptable justifications to use armed force); our primary goal is documenting violations of the laws of war, and encouraging all parties in armed conflict to respect the laws of war, or jus in bello.
International humanitarian law recognizes the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza as an ongoing armed conflict. Current hostilities and military attacks between Israel and Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups are governed by the conduct of hostilities standards rooted in international humanitarian law, consisting of international treaty law, most notably Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary international humanitarian law applicable in so-called non-international armed conflicts, which are reflected in the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions. These rules concern the methods and means of combat and fundamental protections for civilians and combatants no longer participating in hostilities for both states and non-state armed groups.
Foremost among the rules of international humanitarian law is the rule that parties to a conflict must distinguish at all times between combatants and civilians. Civilians may never be the target of attack. Warring parties are required to take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects, such as homes, shops, schools, and medical facilities. Attacks may target only combatants and military objectives. Attacks that target civilians or fail to discriminate between combatants and civilians, or that would cause disproportionate harm to the civilian population compared to the anticipated military gain, are prohibited.
Additionally, Common Article 3 provides a number of fundamental protections for civilians and persons who are no longer taking part in hostilities, such as captured combatants, and those who have surrendered or become incapacitated. It prohibits violence against such persons – particularly murder, cruel treatment, and torture – as well as outrages against their personal dignity and degrading or humiliating treatment, and the taking of hostages.
The laws of war make no formal distinction between parties to a conflict on the basis of power imbalances or other criteria. The fundamental principles of international humanitarian law still apply. Violating them by deliberately targeting civilians or carrying out indiscriminate attacks can never be justified by pointing to the injustice of the political situation or other political or moral arguments. To permit the targeting of civilians in circumstances in which there is a disparity of power between opposing forces, as is the case in many conflicts, would create an exception that would virtually negate the rules of war.
The laws of war recognize that some civilian casualties may be inevitable during armed conflict, but impose a duty on warring parties at all times to distinguish between combatants and civilians, and to target only combatants and other military objectives. The fundamental tenets of international humanitarian law are “civilian immunity” and the principle of “distinction.”
Combatants include members of a country’s armed forces and commanders and full-time fighters in non-state armed groups. They are subject to attack at all times during hostilities unless they are captured or incapacitated.
Civilians lose their immunity from attack when and only for such time as they are directly participating in hostilities. According to guidance by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the laws of war distinguish between members of the organized fighting forces of a non-state party, who may be targeted during an armed conflict, and part-time fighters, who are civilians who may only be targeted when and only for such time as they are directly participating in hostilities. Similarly, reservists of national armed forces are considered civilians except when they go on duty, in which case they are combatants subject to attack. Fighters who leave the armed group, as well as regular army reservists who reintegrate into civilian life, are civilians until they are called back to active duty.
For an individual’s act to constitute direct participation in hostilities, it must imminently be capable of causing harm to opposing forces and must be deliberately carried out to support a party to the armed conflict. Direct participation in hostilities includes measures taken in preparation for executing the act, as well as deployment to and return from the location where the act is carried out.
ICRC guidance also sets out that people who have exclusively non-combat functions in armed groups, including political or administrative roles, or are merely members of or affiliated with political entities that have an armed component, such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, may not be targeted at any time unless and only for such time as they, like any other civilian, directly participate in the hostilities. That is, membership or affiliation with a Palestinian movement with an armed wing is not a sufficient basis for determining an individual to be a lawful military target.
The laws of war also protect civilian objects, which are defined as anything not considered a legitimate military objective. Prohibited are direct attacks against civilian objects, such as homes and apartments, places of worship, hospitals and other medical facilities, schools, and cultural monuments. Civilian objects become subject to legitimate attack when they become military objectives; that is, when they are making an effective contribution to military action and their destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite military advantage, subject to the rules of proportionality. This would include the presence of members of armed groups or military forces in what are normally civilian objects. Where there is doubt about the nature of an object, it must be presumed to be civilian.
The laws of war prohibit indiscriminate attacks. Indiscriminate attacks strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction. Examples of indiscriminate attacks are those that are not directed at a specific military objective or that use weapons that cannot be directed at a specific military objective. Prohibited indiscriminate attacks include area bombardment, which are attacks by artillery or other means that treat as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in an area containing a concentration of civilians and civilian objects.
An attack on an otherwise legitimate military target is prohibited if it would violate the principle of proportionality. Disproportionate attacks are those that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack.
Hostage-taking is prohibited in non-international armed conflicts under Article 1(b) of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law. The ICRC Commentary on Common Article 3 defines hostage-taking as “the seizure, detention or otherwise holding of a person (the hostage) accompanied by the threat to kill, injure or continue to detain that person in order to compel a third party to do or to abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release, safety or well-being of the hostage.” Hostages can include civilians and people taking no active part in hostilities, such as members of armed forces who have surrendered or who have been detained. Hostage-taking is a war crime, including under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. People taken as hostages, like all held in custody, must be treated humanely, and cannot be used as human shields.
The ICRC Commentary also notes that hostages are often people, such as civilians posing no security threat, who are taken into custody and detained unlawfully. However, unlawful detention is not necessary for there to be a hostage-taking. An individual whose detention may be lawful, such as a captured soldier, could still be used as a hostage.
A threat to continue detaining someone legally held would not amount to a hostage-taking. For instance, it is not unlawful as part of a negotiation over a prisoner exchange to continue to detain someone, such as a captured combatant, whose release is not legally required. It would, however, be unlawful to make such a threat against a detained civilian unlawfully held.
Hostage-taking is prohibited regardless of the conduct that the hostage-taker aims to impose. So it is still unlawful even when seeking to compel the opposing force to cease an unlawful conduct.
International humanitarian law does not prohibit fighting in urban areas, although the presence of many civilians places greater obligations on warring parties to take steps to minimize harm to civilians. Gaza is one of the most densely populated areas in the world.
The laws of war require that the parties to a conflict take constant care during military operations to spare the civilian population, and to “take all feasible precautions” to avoid or minimize the incidental loss of civilian life and damage to civilian objects. These precautions include doing everything feasible to verify that the objects of attack are military objectives and not civilians or civilian objects, giving “effective advance warning” of attacks when circumstances permit, and refraining from an attack if the rule of proportionality will be violated. In populated areas with buildings or other structures, both above and underground, parties should take into account the difficulty of identifying civilians who may be obscured from view even from advanced surveillance technology.
Forces deployed in populated areas must, to the extent feasible, avoid locating military objectives – including fighters, ammunition, weapons, equipment, and military infrastructure – in or near densely populated areas, and endeavor to remove civilians from the vicinity of military objectives. Belligerents are prohibited from using civilians to shield military objectives or operations from attack. “Shielding” refers to purposefully using the presence of civilians to render military forces or areas immune from attack.
At the same time, the attacking party is not relieved from its obligation to take into account the risk to civilians, including the duty to avoid causing disproportionate harm to civilians, simply because it considers the defending party responsible for having located legitimate military targets within or near populated areas. That is, the presence of a Hamas commander or rocket launcher, or other military facility in a populated area would not justify attacking the area without regard to the threatened civilian population, including the duty to distinguish combatants from civilians and the rule of proportionality.
The use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas is one of the gravest threats to civilians in contemporary armed conflict. In addition to causing civilian casualties directly, explosive weapons with wide-area effects have frequently damaged or destroyed civilian infrastructure, such as bridges, water pipes, power stations, hospitals, and schools, causing long-term harm to civilians, including the disruption of basic services. These weapons have a wide-area effect if they have a large destructive radius, are inherently inaccurate, or deliver multiple munitions at the same time. Their use in populated areas forces people to flee their homes, exacerbating humanitarian needs.
Weapons that have a large destructive radius include those that detonate a large amount of explosive material and those that propel fragments over a large area, or both. Munitions with large amounts of explosive material can produce fragmentation that spreads unpredictably over a wide area, and a powerful blast wave that can cause severe physical injuries to the human body and physical structures, cause blunt force trauma and physical damage from flying debris, and cause or exacerbate other injuries or existing illnesses. Munitions that have preformed fragmentation warheads are designed to spread scores of fragments over an area, making it difficult or impossible to limit the effects of the weapon.
The use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in the densely populated Gaza Strip, where 2.2 million Palestinians live in a strip of territory that is 41 kilometers (25 miles) long and between 6 and 12 kilometers (3.7 and 7.5 miles) wide, and the targeting at times of critical infrastructure, could be expected to cause serious harm to civilians and civilian objects. In addition, rockets launched from Gaza that are fundamentally inaccurate or designed to saturate a large area and are likely to strike civilians and civilian objects inside Israel, also cause foreseeable harm to civilians and civilian objects.
The laws of war require, unless circumstances do not permit, that warring parties give “effective advance warning” of attacks that may affect the civilian population. What constitutes an “effective” warning will depend on the circumstances. Such an assessment would take into account the timing of the warning and the ability of civilians to leave the area. A warning that does not give civilians adequate time to leave for a safer area would not be considered “effective.”
Civilians who do not evacuate following warnings are still fully protected by international humanitarian law. Otherwise, warring parties could use warnings to cause forced displacement, threatening civilians with deliberate harm if they did not heed them. Moreover, some civilians are unable to heed a warning to evacuate, for reasons of health, disability, fear, or lack of anyplace else to go. So, even after warnings have been given, attacking forces must still take all feasible precautions to avoid loss of civilian life and property. This includes canceling an attack when it becomes apparent that the target is civilian, or that the civilian loss would be disproportionate to the expected military gain.
The laws of war also prohibit “acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population.” Statements that called for the evacuation of areas that are not genuine warnings, but are primarily intended to cause panic among residents or compel them to leave their homes for reasons other than their safety, would fall under this prohibition. This prohibition does not attempt to address the effects of lawful attacks, which ordinarily cause fear, but rather those threats or attacks on civilians that have this specific purpose.
Healthcare facilities are civilian objects that have special protections under the laws of war against attacks and other acts of violence including bombing, shelling, looting, forced entry, shooting into, encircling, or other forceful interference such as intentionally depriving facilities of electricity and water.
Healthcare facilities include hospitals, laboratories, clinics, first aid posts, blood transfusion centers, and the medical and pharmaceutical stores of these facilities, whether military or civilian. While other presumptively civilian structures become military objectives if they are being used for a military purpose, hospitals lose their protection from attack only if they are being used, outside their humanitarian function, to commit “acts harmful to the enemy.” Several types of acts do not constitute “acts harmful to the enemy,” such as the presence of armed guards, or when small arms from the wounded are found in the hospital. Even if military forces misuse a hospital to store weapons or shelter able-bodied combatants, the attacking force must issue a warning to cease this misuse, setting a reasonable time limit for it to end, and attacking only after such a warning has gone unheeded.
Under the laws of war, doctors, nurses, and other medical personnel must be permitted to do their work and be protected in all circumstances. They lose their protection only if they commit, outside their humanitarian function, “acts harmful to the enemy.”
Likewise, ambulances and other medical transportation must be allowed to function and be protected in all circumstances. They could lose their protection only if they are being used to commit “acts harmful to the enemy,” such as transporting ammunition or healthy fighters in service. As stated above, the attacking force must issue a warning to cease this misuse, and can only attack after such a warning goes unheeded.
Mosques and churches – like all houses of worship – and schools are presumptively civilian objects that may not be attacked unless they are being used for military purposes, such as a military headquarters or a location for storing weapons and ammunition.
The principle of proportionality also applies to these objects.
All sides were obligated to take special care in military operations to avoid damage to schools, houses of worship, and other cultural property.
As parties to the armed conflict, the armed wings of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Palestinian armed groups are obligated to abide by international humanitarian law. The targeting of military installations and other military objectives is permitted under the laws of war, but only if all feasible precautions to avoid civilian harm are taken. The laws prohibit Palestinian armed groups from targeting civilians or launching indiscriminate attacks or attacks that would cause disproportionate harm to civilians compared to the expected military advantage. Commanders of Palestinian armed groups are also obligated to choose such means of attack that they could direct at military targets and minimize incidental harm to civilians. If the weapons used were so inaccurate that they could not be directed at military targets without imposing a substantial risk of civilian harm, then the group should not have deployed them.
Human Rights Watch has found in prior hostilities that rockets launched by Palestinian armed groups – including locally made short and upgraded long-range rockets, “Grad” rockets, and rockets imported from other sources – are so inaccurate as to be incapable of being aimed in a manner to discriminate between military targets and civilian objects when they were launched toward populated areas. This inaccuracy and inability to target military objectives are exacerbated at the longer ranges that some rockets were fired into Israel.
The use of such rockets against civilian areas violates the prohibition on deliberate and indiscriminate attacks. Likewise, a party that launches rockets from densely populated areas, or co-locates military objectives in or near civilian areas – thus making civilians vulnerable to counterattacks – may be failing to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians under its control against the effects of attacks.
International humanitarian law allows the targeting of military commanders in the course of armed conflict, provided that such attacks otherwise comply with the laws that protect civilians, including being proportionate. Political leaders not taking part in military operations, as civilians, would not be legitimate targets of attack.
Palestinian armed groups’ leaders who are commanding belligerent forces are legitimate targets. However, because Hamas engages in civil governance beyond its military component, merely being a Hamas leader in and of itself does not make an individual lawfully subject to military attack.
Combatants do not have immunity from attacks in their homes and workplaces. However, as with any attack on an otherwise legitimate military target, the attacking force must refrain from attack if it would disproportionately harm the civilian population – including civilian family members of combatants – or be launched in a way that fails to discriminate between combatants and civilians. Under this duty to take all feasible precautions to avoid civilian harm, the attacking force should also consider whether there may be alternative sites where the combatant can be targeted without endangering civilians.
Attacking the home of a combatant who was not physically present at the time of the attack would be an unlawful attack on a civilian object. If such an unlawful attack were carried out intentionally, then it would constitute a war crime. A civilian home does not lose its protected status as a civilian object merely because it is the home of a militant who is not present there. Insofar as the attack is designed to harm the combatants’ families, it would also be a prohibited form of collective punishment.
Personnel or equipment being used in military operations are subject to attack, but whether that justifies destroying an entire large building where they might be present depends on the attack not inflicting disproportionate harm on civilians or civilian property.
The laws of war prohibit the punishment of any person for an offense other than one that they have personally committed. Collective punishment is a term used in international law to describe any form of punitive sanctions and harassment, not limited to judicial penalties, but including sanctions of “any sort, administrative, by police action or otherwise,” that are imposed on targeted groups of persons for actions that they themselves did not personally commit. The imposition of collective punishment – such as, in violation of the laws of war, the demolition of homes of families of fighters, or other civilian objects such as multi-story buildings as a form of punishment – is a war crime. Whether an attack or measure could amount to collective punishment depends on several factors, including the target of the measure and its punitive impact, but of particular relevance is the intent behind a particular measure. If the intention was to punish, purely or primarily as a result of an act committed by third parties, then the attack is likely to have been collective punishment.
Journalists and their equipment benefit from the general protection enjoyed by civilians and civilian objects and may not be targets of an attack unless they are taking direct part in hostilities. Journalists may be subject to legitimate limitations on rights, such as freedom of expression or freedom of movement, imposed in accordance with the law and only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. But they may not be arrested, detained, or subjected to other forms of punishment or retaliation simply for doing their work as journalists.
Radio and television facilities are civilian objects and as such enjoy general protection. Military attacks on broadcast facilities used for military communications are legitimate under the laws of war, but such attacks on civilian television or radio stations are otherwise prohibited because they are protected civilian structures and not legitimate military targets. Moreover, if the attack is designed primarily to undermine civilian morale or to psychologically harass the civilian population, that is also a prohibited war purpose. Civilian television and radio stations are legitimate targets only if they meet the criteria for a legitimate military objective; that is, if they are used in a way that makes an “effective contribution to military action,” and their destruction in the circumstances ruling at the time offers “a definite military advantage.” Specifically, Hamas-operated civilian broadcast facilities could become military targets if, for example, they were used to send military orders or otherwise concretely to advance Hamas’s armed campaign against Israel. However, civilian broadcasting facilities are not rendered legitimate military targets simply because they are pro-Hamas or anti-Israel, or report on the laws of war violations by one side or the other. Just as it is unlawful to attack the civilian population to lower its morale, it is unlawful to attack news outfits that merely shape civilian opinion by their reporting or create diplomatic pressure; neither directly contributes to military operations.
Should stations become legitimate military objectives because of their use to transmit military communications, the principle of proportionality in attack must still be respected. This means that Israeli forces should verify at all times that the risks to the civilian population in undertaking any such attack do not outweigh the anticipated definite military advantage. They should take special precautions in relation to buildings located in urban areas, including giving advance warning of an attack whenever possible.
Under international humanitarian law, parties to a conflict must allow and facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of impartially distributed humanitarian aid to the population in need. The belligerent parties must consent to allow relief operations to take place and may not refuse such consent on arbitrary grounds. They can take steps to ensure that consignments do not include weapons or other military materiel. However, deliberately impeding relief supplies is prohibited.
In addition, international humanitarian law requires that belligerent parties ensure the freedom of movement of humanitarian relief personnel essential to the exercise of their functions. This movement can be restricted only temporarily for reasons of imperative military necessity.
International human rights law is applicable at all times, including during armed conflict situations in which the laws of war apply, as well as during times of peace. Israel and Palestine are party to core international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. These treaties outline guarantees for fundamental rights, many of which correspond to the protections to which civilians are entitled under international humanitarian law (such as the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, nondiscrimination, right to a fair trial).
While the ICCPR permits some restrictions on certain rights during an officially proclaimed public emergency that “threatens the life of the nation,” any derogation of rights during a public emergency must be of an exceptional and temporary nature, and must be “limited to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,” and should not involve discrimination on grounds of race, religion, and other grounds. Certain fundamental rights – such as the right to life and the right to be secure from torture and other ill-treatment, the prohibition on unacknowledged detention, the duty to ensure judicial review of the lawfulness of detention, and the right to a fair trial – must always be respected, even during a public emergency.
Serious violations of the laws of war that are committed with criminal intent are war crimes. War crimes, listed in the “grave breaches” provisions of the Geneva Conventions and as customary law in the International Criminal Court statute and other sources, include a wide array of offenses, including deliberate, indiscriminate, and disproportionate attacks harming civilians, hostage-taking, using human shields, and imposing collective punishments, among others. Individuals also may be held criminally liable for attempting to commit a war crime, as well as assisting in, facilitating, aiding, or abetting a war crime.
Responsibility also may fall on persons planning or instigating the commission of a war crime. In addition, commanders and civilian leaders may be prosecuted for war crimes as a matter of command responsibility when they knew or should have known about the commission of war crimes and took insufficient measures to prevent them or punish those responsible.
States have an obligation to investigate and fairly prosecute individuals within their territory implicated in war crimes.
Alleged war crimes committed during the fighting between Israel and Palestinian armed groups could be investigated by the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor. On March 3, 2021, the ICC prosecutor opened an investigation into alleged serious crimes committed in Palestine since June 13, 2014. The ICC treaty officially went into effect for Palestine on April 1, 2015. The court’s judges have said this gives it jurisdiction over the territory occupied by Israel since 1967, namely Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. The ICC has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, committed in this territory, regardless of the nationality of the alleged perpetrators.
Israel signed but has not ratified the ICC treaty, and in 2002 announced that it did not intend to become a member of the court.
Since 2016, Human Rights Watch has called on the ICC prosecutor to pursue a formal Palestine investigation given strong evidence that serious crimes have been committed there and the pervasive climate of impunity for those crimes. The recent hostilities between Hamas and Israel highlight the importance of the court’s investigation and the urgent need for justice to address serious crimes committed in Palestine. Human Rights Watch has also called on the ICC prosecutor to investigate Israeli authorities implicated in the crimes against humanity of apartheid and persecution against Palestinians.
Certain categories of grave crimes in violation of international law, such as war crimes and torture, are subject to “universal jurisdiction,” which refers to the ability of a country’s domestic judicial system to investigate and prosecute certain crimes, even if they were not committed on its territory, by one of its nationals, or against one of its nationals. Certain treaties, such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Convention against Torture, obligate states to extradite or prosecute suspected offenders who are within that country’s territory or otherwise under its jurisdiction. Under customary international law, it is also generally agreed that countries are allowed to try those responsible for other crimes, such as genocide or crimes against humanity, wherever these crimes took place.
National judicial officials should investigate and prosecute those credibly implicated in serious crimes, under the principle of universal jurisdiction and in accordance with national laws.
In May 2021, the United Nations Human Rights Council established an ongoing Commission of Inquiry to address violations and abuses in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and in Israel, to monitor, document, and report on violations and abuses of international law, advance accountability for perpetrators and justice for victims, and address the root causes and systematic oppression that help fuel continued violence.
Reacties uitgeschakeld voor Human Rights Watch: Questions and answers: October 2023 hostilities between Israel and Armed Palestinian Groups
The recent verdict of the Israeli High Court, which states that the building of the Israeli Wall at the West Bank must be adjusted with 30 kilometers because of the violations of human rights is not only a partial fullfilling of the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian population, but is also in contarily with International Law.
In the first place the motivation for the verdict is being based on the fact that because of the building of the Wall the inhabitants of the Beit Surik community had no entrance to their agricultural grounds and schools, but in the named verdict the Court doesn’t refer to the other Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank [85.000 people], who are likewise excluded from their agricultural grounds.
In the second place the Israeli building of the Wall is as such a violation of International Law, because it cuts deeply in the occupied Palestinian areas which is a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 dd 1967 by which Israel was summoned to withdraw from the in the june-war occupied Palestinian areas.
Further the building of the Wall is being made possible by hugh Palestinian landownings which is yet apart from the flagrant injustice a violation of International Law [the 4th Geneva Convention] which forbids land and house-ownings of ”protected people” [people who are living under an occupation] It is therefore highly recommendable, that the Israeli High Court adjusts its vedict according to the principles of International Law.
INTRODUCTION READERSIsn’t it interesting, when roaming the Internet, to find an old article ofyourself, that you almost forgot!It goes about a Letter to the Editor I wrote in the past [2004] to the webzine”The Pravda” and that they apparently published.Not only is that interesting, but more interesting is the fact, that I wrote about averdict of the Israeli High Court about the building of the Israeli Apartheid Wall [1]You all know, of course, the more known verdict of the International Court ofJustice, declaring the Wall illegal for once and for all [2] but few people[I almost forgot!] will remember, that the Israeli High Court gave also its opinion,in fact supporting the building of the Wall, except for some minor point of criticism [3]And here it is, this voice of the past from Astrid Essed, protesting against theverdict of the Israeli High Court!See directly below And see for the notes, under my almost forgotten Letter to the Editor! ENJOY IT! ASTRID ESSED
ASTRID ESSED: THE VERDICT OF ISRAELI HIGH COURT REGARDING THE WALL6 JULY 2004
The recent verdict of the Israeli High Court, which states that the building of the Israeli Wall at the West Bank must be adjusted with 30 kilometers because of the violations of human rights is not only a partial fullfilling of the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian population, but is also in contarily with International Law.
In the first place the motivation for the verdict is being based on the fact that because of the building of the Wall the inhabitants of the Beit Surik community had no entrance to their agricultural grounds and schools, but in the named verdict the Court doesn’t refer to the other Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank [85.000 people], who are likewise excluded from their agricultural grounds.
In the second place the Israeli building of the Wall is as such a violation of International Law, because it cuts deeply in the occupied Palestinian areas which is a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 dd 1967 by which Israel was summoned to withdraw from the in the june-war occupied Palestinian areas.
Further the building of the Wall is being made possible by hugh Palestinian landownings which is yet apart from the flagrant injustice a violation of International Law [the 4th Geneva Convention] which forbids land and house-ownings of ”protected people” [people who are living under an occupation] It is therefore highly recommendable, that the Israeli High Court adjusts its vedict according to the principles of International Law.
”While Israel is heading for de jure annexation, the Wall is an important tool of Israel’s illegal and ongoing de facto annexation. The Wall’s path and its associated regime are planned to de facto annex some 46% of the West Bank, isolating communities into Bantustans, ghettos and “military zones.” STOP THE WALL.ORG https://stopthewall.org/the-wall/
[2]
”In December 2003, Resolution ES-10/14 was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in an emergency special session.[111] 90 states voted for, 8 against, 74 abstained.[111] The resolution included a request to the International Court of Justice to urgently render an advisory opinion on the following question.[111]
“What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?”[111]
The court concluded that the barrier violated international law”
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTLEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE INSTRUCTION OF A WALL INTHE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORYOVERVIEW OF THE CASE https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/131
OVERVIEW OF THE CASE
By resolution ES-10/14, adopted on 8 December 2003 at its Tenth Emergency Special Session, the General Assembly decided to request the Court for an advisory opinion on the following question :
“What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the Report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions ?”
The resolution requested the Court to render its opinion “urgently”. The Court decided that all States entitled to appear before it, as well as Palestine, the United Nations and subsequently, at their request, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, were likely to be able to furnish information on the question in accordance with Article 66, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Statute. Written statements were submitted by 45 States and four international organizations, including the European Union. At the oral proceedings, which were held from 23 to 25 February 2004, 12 States, Palestine and two international organizations made oral submissions. The Court rendered its Advisory Opinion on 9 July 2004.
The Court began by finding that the General Assembly, which had requested the advisory opinion, was authorized to do so under Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter. It further found that the question asked of it fell within the competence of the General Assembly pursuant to Articles 10, paragraph 2, and 11 of the Charter. Moreover, in requesting an opinion of the Court, the General Assembly had not exceeded its competence, as qualified by Article 12, paragraph 1, of the Charter, which provides that while the Security Council is exercising its functions in respect of any dispute or situation the Assembly must not make any recommendation with regard thereto unless the Security Council so requests. The Court further observed that the General Assembly had adopted resolution ES-10/14 during its Tenth Emergency Special Session, convened pursuant to resolution 377 A (V), whereby, in the event that the Security Council has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the General Assembly may consider the matter immediately with a view to making recommendations to Member States. Rejecting a number of procedural objections, the Court found that the conditions laid down by that resolution had been met when the Tenth Emergency Special Session was convened, and in particular when the General Assembly decided to request the opinion, as the Security Council had at that time been unable to adopt a resolution concerning the construction of the wall as a result of the negative vote of a permanent member. Lastly, the Court rejected the argument that an opinion could not be given in the present case on the ground that the question posed was not a legal one, or that it was of an abstract or political nature.
Having established its jurisdiction, the Court then considered the propriety of giving the requested opinion. It recalled that lack of consent by a State to its contentious jurisdiction had no bearing on its advisory jurisdiction, and that the giving of an opinion in the present case would not have the effect of circumventing the principle of consent to judicial settlement, since the subject-matter of the request was located in a much broader frame of reference than that of the bilateral dispute between Israel and Palestine, and was of direct concern to the United Nations. Nor did the Court accept the contention that it should decline to give the advisory opinion requested because its opinion could impede a political, negotiated settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It further found that it had before it sufficient information and evidence to enable it to give its opinion, and empha- sized that it was for the General Assembly to assess the opinion’s usefulness. The Court accordingly concluded that there was no compelling reason precluding it from giving the requested opinion.
Turning to the question of the legality under international law of the construction of the wall by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Court first determined the rules and principles of international law relevant to the question posed by the General Assembly. After recalling the customary principles laid down in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and in General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), which prohibit the threat or use of force and emphasize the illegality of any territorial acquisition by such means, the Court further cited the principle of self-determination of peoples, as enshrined in the Charter and reaffirmed by resolution 2625 (XXV). In relation to international humanitarian law, the Court then referred to the provisions of the Hague Regulations of 1907, which it found to have become part of customary law, as well as to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, holding that these were applicable in those Palestinian territories which, before the armed conflict of 1967, lay to the east of the 1949 Armistice demarcation line (or “Green Line”) and were occupied by Israel during that conflict. The Court further established that certain human rights instruments (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child) were applicable in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
The Court then sought to ascertain whether the construction of the wall had violated the above-mentioned rules and principles. Noting that the route of the wall encompassed some 80 per cent of the settlers living in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Court, citing statements by the Security Council in that regard in relation to the Fourth Geneva Convention, recalled that those settlements had been established in breach of international law. After considering certain fears expressed to it that the route of the wall would prejudge the future frontier between Israel and Palestine, the Court observed that the construction of the wall and its associated régime created a “fait accompli” on the ground that could well become permanent, and hence tantamount to a de facto annexation. Noting further that the route chosen for the wall gave expression in loco to the illegal measures taken by Israel with regard to Jerusalem and the settlements and entailed further alterations to the demographic composition of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Court concluded that the construction of the wall, along with measures taken previously, severely impeded the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination and was thus a breach of Israel’s obligation to respect that right.
The Court then went on to consider the impact of the construction of the wall on the daily life of the inhabitants of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, finding that the construction of the wall and its associated régime were contrary to the relevant provisions of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and of the Fourth Geneva Convention and that they impeded the liberty of movement of the inhabitants of the territory as guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as their exercise of the right to work, to health, to education and to an adequate standard of living as proclaimed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Court further found that, coupled with the establishment of settlements, the construction of the wall and its associated régime were tending to alter the demographic composition of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, thereby contravening the Fourth Geneva Convention and the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Court then considered the qualifying clauses or provisions for derogation contained in certain humanitarian law and human rights instruments, which might be invoked inter alia where military exigencies or the needs of national security or public order so required. The Court found that such clauses were not applicable in the present case, stating that it was not convinced that the specific course Israel had chosen for the wall was necessary to attain its security objectives, and that accordingly the construction of the wall constituted a breach by Israel of certain of its obligations under humanitarian and human rights law. Lastly, the Court concluded that Israel could not rely on a right of self-defence or on a state of necessity in order to preclude the wrongfulness of the construction of the wall, and that such construction and its associated régime were accordingly contrary to international law.
The Court went on to consider the consequences of these violations, recalling Israel’s obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and its obligations under humanitarian and human rights law. The Court stated that Israel must put an immediate end to the violation of its international obligations by ceasing the works of construction of the wall and dismantling those parts of that structure situated within Occupied Palestinian Territory and repealing or rendering ineffective all legislative and regulatory acts adopted with a view to construction of the wall and establishment of its associated régime. The Court further made it clear that Israel must make reparation for all damage suffered by all natural or legal persons affected by the wall’s construction. As regards the legal consequences for other States, the Court held that all States were under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction. It further stated that it was for all States, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to see to it that any impediment, resulting from the construction of the wall, to the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination be brought to an end. In addition, the Court pointed out that all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention were under an obligation, while respecting the Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention. Finally, in regard to the United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Court indicated that they should consider what further action was required to bring to an end the illegal situation in question, taking due account of the present Advisory Opinion.
The Court concluded by observing that the construction of the wall must be placed in a more general context, noting the obligation on Israel and Palestine to comply with international humanitarian law, as well as the need for implementation in good faith of all relevant Security Council resolutions, and drawing the attention of the General Assembly to the need for efforts to be encouraged with a view to achieving a negotiated solution to the outstanding problems on the basis of international law and the establishment of a Palestinian State.[3]
”Of course this is not to say that that the Israeli ruling is a good one. For example, like many Israeli rulings there are political points that are treated as legal ones, such as the false characterization of all Palestinian resistance as “terrorism” [8]. Further the HCJ does justify the Wall in principle though the projected segments reviewed were deemed to be illegal because of the humanitarian impact of the suggested route [9]” ELECTRONIC INTIFADATHE ISRAELI HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE APARTHEID WALL15 JULY 2004 https://electronicintifada.net/content/israeli-high-court-justice-and-apartheid-wall/5156
With the recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion regarding the consequences of the Apartheid Wall, the legality of this enterprise has been much discussed in almost all circles related to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. On the Zionist side, aside from the usual canard about the “anti-Semitism” of the United Nations and the like, many commentaries have pointed to the recent Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) ruling about the wall and declared, in so many words, that this is the only legal ruling that matters. For example, in the recent diatribe against the ICJ by Alan Dershowitz [1] he writes: “The Israeli government has both a legal and a moral obligation to comply with the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision regarding the security fence.”
The interesting thing about this is that if one actually reads the HCJ decision [2], it in fact makes a very strong case against the Wall in general though its ruling only regarded only one small 40 km stretch of the Wall. Unlike the ICJ Opinion which was, as per its mandate, primarily focused on existing international treaties and conventions and Israel’s obligations stemming from them; the HCJ decision was based more on general legal principle.
The Israeli case – Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank – was a petition against eight separate land confiscation orders for the building of the Wall. The net result was that seven of these eight confiscation orders were deemed illegal and the one that was upheld was only upheld because the petitioners didn’t really argue against it [4].
Key point that resulted in the declaration that these confiscation orders were illegal was the principle of “proportionality” that was very succinctly defined in the ruling itself. [5] The actual factors taken into account were essentially the same that served as the basis of the ICJ Advisory Opinion, specifically the human impact that the Wall had on the resident Palestinian population [6]. The question and standard, treated as the third element of proportionality, deserves to be recalled in full (citations removed):
“The third subtest examines whether the injury caused to the local inhabitants by the construction of the separation fence stands in proper proportion to the security benefit from the the [sic] security fence in its chosen route. This is the proportionate means test (or proportionality “in the narrow sense”). Concerning this topic, Professor Y. Zamir wrote:
“The third element is proportionality itself. According to this element, it is insufficient that the administrative authority chose the proper and most moderate means for achieving the objective; it must also weigh the benefit reaped by the public against the damage that will be caused to the citizen by this means under the circumstances of the case at hand. It must ask itself if, under these circumstances, there is a proper proportion between the benefit to the public and the damage to the citizen. The proportion between the benefit and the damage – and it is also possible to say the proportion between means and objective – must be proportionate.
“This subtest weighs the costs against the benefits. According to this subtest, a decision of an administrative authority must reach a reasonable balance between communal needs and the damage done to the individual. The objective of the examination is to determine whether the severity of the damage to the individual and the reasons brought to justify it stand in proper proportion to each other. This judgment is made against the background of the general normative structure of the legal system, which recognizes human rights and the necessity of ensuring the provision of the needs and welfare of the local inhabitants, and which preserves “family honour and rights” (Regulation 46 of the Hague Regulations). All these are protected in the framework of the humanitarian provisions of the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Convention. The question before us is: does the severity of the injury to local inhabitants, by the construction of the separation fence along the route determine d by the military commander, stand in reasonable (proper) proportion to the security benefit from the construction of the fence along that route?” [7]
It was on this basis that the HCJ ruled seven of the eight confiscation orders under review to be illegal. Were this same principle to be applied to most of the Wall as it exists today, especially in cases like that of the Qalqilya ghetto, it is pretty reasonable to assume that most, if not all, the Wall would be deemed illegal. Better yet, the proportionality argument is generally accepted in all modern legal systems, unlike the more specific treaty/convention law that the ICJ was forced to focus on.
Of course this is not to say that that the Israeli ruling is a good one. For example, like many Israeli rulings there are political points that are treated as legal ones, such as the false characterization of all Palestinian resistance as “terrorism” [8]. Further the HCJ does justify the Wall in principle though the projected segments reviewed were deemed to be illegal because of the humanitarian impact of the suggested route [9].
Further, citing the usual excuse used by the HCJ in regard to IDF decisions, it seeks merely to review military actions for their illegality, not to actually impose its judgment on the IDF [10]. This is, along with the IDF option of utilizing the Emergency Regulations, one of the methods allowed to the IDF to freely disregard the High Court of Justice when so inclined. As was the case in the famous court ruling against torture, that in fact merely amounted to a slight change in the phrasing of the IDF terminology, i.e. “ticking bomb” justification, the court’s ruling can be safely ignored if the government chooses – for whatever reason – not to enforce it. This is one of the luxuries of being a non-constitutional state; the political executive is under no actual obligation to enforce any law or legal ruling. In the ruling itself, the IDF freely concedes that should some portion of the fence that is already constructed be deemed illegal, they will pay compensation, but there is no mention – much less compulsion – to reverse illegal sections or the Wall or to in fact stop committing the construction even if deemed illegal. [11]
Nevertheless, in order to portray itself as being a state that respects the rule of law, High Court of Justice rulings are usually afforded at least some general consideration. Thus the HCJ ruling in Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank, is in fact a rather grave embarrassment since the projected Wall cannot be constructed in the Occupied Palestinian Territories at all without inflicting the same disproportionate – and hence illegal – circumstances on other local Palestinians. So how do they intend to reconcile this ruling with the Wall?
The Jerusalem Post provided the answer to this question on July 14: “A petition against the appropriation of land for construction of the security fence near the Kissufim road in the Gaza Strip was turned down Tuesday by the High Court of Justice. The petition was submitted by Palestinian residents of the al-Karara village in the Gaza Strip. According to IBA news, the ruling also cancels a freeze order on construction in the area.” [12] Since the HCJ ruling only related to one small segment of the Wall, and the determination has already been made, the HCJ can now simply refuse to accept further petitions, based on the argument that the IDF should be assumed to be taking the same proportionality concerns into account in other areas. That is, in so many words, it seems unlikely that there will be an option of legal appeal to any other segments of the Wall, based on the assumption that the IDF will act in “good faith” taking the previous ruling into consideration. Thus, yet agai n, we have another High Court of Justice ruling that can be safely ignored.
Make no mistake about it, the Israeli High Court of Justice is no friend to Palestinians living in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Nevertheless, when Zionists and others choose to counter the ICJ Advisory Opinion citing the HCJ ruling, one can – in all honesty – point out that if the HCJ ruling was in fact applied to the entire Wall, most of it would be illegal even under Israeli law. Of course this won’t happen, and even if it did the IDF is under no obligation to comply anyway, nevertheless, for the scoundrels out to justify the legality of the Wall, the High Court of Justice ruling is certainly no help. END OF THE ARTICLE
END OF THE NOTES
Reacties uitgeschakeld voor Voice from the Past!/Letter to the Editor, sent and published by Pravda/”The verdict of the Israeli High Court regarding the Wall”
Dear Readers Underlying letter I wrote recently to the members of the Dutch parliament about thestructural mistreatment of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons.Here a ghastly example of prisoner mistreatment, revealed by the Israeli newpaperthe Haaretz https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Cq5UjR_NB0
Subject:Israeli violent conduct against Palestinian prisoners [This mail has been sent to all your collegue members of parliament, except forthe parties, The Party for Freedom, Forum for Democracy, the Reformed Political Party and JA21, concerning their pro Israel views https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Party_for_Freedom
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, As you’ll probably know, I write you regularly about the injustice concerning the Middle Eastern conflict and about other cases, concerning human rights. [1]Often I refer extensively to international law aspects [2] However, in this case I try to make it short[er], because the case is simple here:This concerns a shocking case of abuse and mistreatment of Palestinian prisoners and I demand you to use your influence, as fae as possible, to stop this!Here and now! SCHOKKENDE BEELDEN/MISHANDELING PALESTIJNSE GEVANGENEN The news reached me about the shocking mistreatment of Palestinian prisoners in the Israeli prison Ketziot [3] and the pictures were publicized by the Israeli newspaper the Haaretz in its Hebrew edition. [4] Mij bereikte het bericht over de schokkende mishandeling van Palestijnsegevangenen in de Israelische gevangenis Ketziot [3] en de beelden daarvan werden gepubliceerd door de Israelische krant de Haaretz in zijnHebreeuwse editie [4]See also the Youtube images! [5] What you see is obvious.Prisoners are dragged over the ground, thrown in a heap and beaten.What you see is unacceptable! The case, dating from 2019 [6], revealed by the Haaretz [which I appreciate], was ”investigated”I write ”investigated” with quotation marks, because there was noreal investigation, but it was ”swept under the rug” [7] In an editorial article The Haaretz writes:
”It wasn’t only the Prison Service that looked the other way. In the Israel Police, Lahav 433’s National Prison Investigation Unit did as little as possible to probe the affair: Only one guard was questioned and even though he admitted that he had engaged in gratuitous violence, it wasn’t enough for the police or prosecutors to proceed with an indictment. This was a negligent investigation – with no real effort to identify the guards and no police lineup – which proves that even when such an unusual case of abuse has been fully documented, the police still prefer to sweep it under the rug. [8] AND ”It’s hard to believe that the investigation would have ended this way if the prisoners had been Jews. But in this case, the victims were Palestinian terrorists and security prisoners belonging to Hamas. Therefore, not only was the case closed on the grounds that “the offender is not known,” but the warden on duty at the time, General Avichai Ben-Hamo, was promoted to the rank of major general. The other guards allegedly involved in the incident remain at their jobs.” [9] STRUCTURAL Although this incident in itself is serious enough, itdoes not stand alone.No, this violent behaviour against Palestinian prisonersis structural!Amnesty International writes in its review from 2020 among else:””The Israeli authorities arbitrarily detained in Israel thousands of Palestinians from the OPT, holding hundreds in administrative detention without charge or trial. Torture and other ill-treatment of detainees, including children, were committed with impunity.” [10] This is a very serious matter!You must act against this, dear members of parliament, because I don’t have to explain to you, that yet apart from the humanity, those violent acts are contrary with the International Treaties! [11] YOUR EFFORT AND MORAL DUTY I expect from you, members of the Parliament, that you stand up againstthis structural violence against Palestinian prisoners, which also includes torture by violence. [12]Use your political power by posing questions in the Parliament and makinga plea for the suspension of the EU Israel Association Agreement, that includes a human rights clausule [13], in case Israel doesn’t listen. Too long this injustice had its chance and you can’t walk away from it!You swore an Oath or did a promise on the Dutch Constitution, which states in article 90:”The Government shall promote the development of the international legal order.” [14]
I count on your efforts. Kind greetings Astrid EssedAmsterdamThe Netherlands
THOSE ARE THE POLITICAL PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES I WROTE TO, EXCEPT FOR THOSEI MENTIONED IN THE INTRODUCTION
SEE ALSO IN DUTCH ISRAELISCHE BOMBARDEMENTEN OP GAZA IN MEI 2021/TERREUR IN OOST-JERUZALEM EN DE WESTBANK/BRIEF AAN TWEEDE KAMERLEDEN/STOP ISRAELISCHE TERREUR!/STOP DE BEZETTING!ASTRID ESSED18 MEI 2021
””De beelden dateren uit 2019 en zijn naar buiten gebracht door de Israëlische krant Haaretz in zijn Hebreeuwse editie. Ze tonen de mishandeling van een kleine zestig Palestijnse gevangenen door zo’n vijftien gevangenisbewaarders in de C-vleugel van de Ketziot-gevangenis in de Negev/Naqab in Israël.” [TRANSLATION:The images are from 2019 and have been revealed by the Israeli paperHaaretz in its Hebrew edition. They show the mistreatment of about 60 Palestinian prisoners by about 15 jailers in the C wing ofthe Ketziot prison in the Negev/Naqba in Israel”’ ARTICLE FROM THE RIGHTS FORUM THE RIGHTS FORUMSCHOKKENDE BEELDEN VAN MISHANDELING PALESTIJNSE GEVANGENEN IN ISRAELISCHE GEVANGENIS
Tientallen gevangenen worden geboeid over de grond gesleurd, op een hoop gegooid en afgeranseld. De zaak verdween in de doofpot, en dat is geen uitzondering.
De beelden dateren uit 2019 en zijn naar buiten gebracht door de Israëlische krant Haaretz in zijn Hebreeuwse editie. Ze tonen de mishandeling van een kleine zestig Palestijnse gevangenen door zo’n vijftien gevangenisbewaarders in de C-vleugel van de Ketziot-gevangenis in de Negev/Naqab in Israël. De gevangenen worden geboeid over de betonnen vloer gesleept, boven op elkaar gegooid, geschopt en met wapenstokken geslagen. Vijftien gevangenen raakten zodanig gewond dat ze in het ziekenhuis belandden. De beelden roepen herinneringen op aan de mishandeling van Iraakse gevangenen door Amerikaanse militairen en CIA-medewerkers in de Abu Ghraib-gevangenis bij Bagdad in 2004.
Doofpot
In zijn redactioneel commentaar schrijft Haaretz dat het geweld kennelijk een wraakactie was voor het neersteken van een bewaarder elders in het gevangeniscomplex – volgens Wikipedia het grootste detentiecentrum van Israël en zelfs ter wereld. De Israel Prison Service maakte destijds bekend dat veiligheidstroepen op de bewuste dag ‘een opstand van gevangenen onder controle hadden gebracht’. Op de beelden is van een opstand echter niets te zien.
De zaak is door de autoriteiten in de doofpot gestopt, schrijft Haaretz. De Prison Service ‘keek de andere kant op’ en de onderzoeksafdeling van de Israëlische politie – de National Prison Investigation Unit – volstond met het ondervragen van één gevangenisbewaarder. Hoewel die toegaf zich schuldig te hebben gemaakt aan ‘onnodig geweld’, werd geen vervolging ingesteld. De zaak werd gesloten onder het mom dat ‘de dader onbekend is’.
De politie ‘veegde de zaak onder het tapijt’, concludeert Haaretz, en ook de openbaar aanklager kwam niet in actie. ‘Het is moeilijk voor te stellen dat het zo zou zijn gelopen als de gevangenen Joden waren geweest’, voegt de krant daaraan toe. In dit geval ging het echter om ‘terroristen en veiligheidsgevangenen die lid waren van Hamas’.
Geen uitzondering, maar regel
Overigens betekent dat niet dat de gevangenen daadwerkelijk lid waren van Hamas en een misdaad op hun geweten hebben. Afgelopen jaar besteedden wij in een brede analyse aandacht aan het oppakken van Palestijnen onder het mom van ‘betrokkenheid bij terrorisme’. Onder die noemer verdwijnen aan de lopende band Palestijnen uit de door Israël bezette gebieden in Israëlische gevangenissen. Het is onderdeel van ‘het intimideren en terroriseren van de bevolking door het Israëlische bezettingsregime’, concludeerden wij.
Daarop wijst vandaag ook de vooraanstaande Israëlische mensenrechtenorganisatie B’Tselem. In een persbericht schrijft het dat het ‘witwassen’ van de zaak door de autoriteiten geen uitzondering is, maar regel: de Israëlische overheersing van de Palestijnen is gebaseerd op geweld en het witwassen daarvan. De nu naar buiten gekomen zaak onderstreept volgens B’Tselem het belang van onderzoek en vervolging door internationale gerechtshoven als het Internationaal Gerechtshof en het Internationaal Strafhof in Den Haag:
Het Israëlische apartheidsregime is gebaseerd op constant, georganiseerd geweld tegen Palestijnen. Dat geweld is cruciaal voor zijn voortbestaan. Daarom is het regime noch bereid, noch in staat om degenen die het geweld plannen en uitvoeren te onderzoeken, laat staan te vervolgen. […] De zaak bewijst eens te meer dat Palestijnse slachtoffers van geweld van Israëlische veiligheidstroepen binnen het bestaande Israëlische systeem geen gerechtigheid kunnen krijgen, en alleen kunnen hopen op behandeling van hun zaken door internationale gerechtshoven.
Mishandeling schering en inslag
Het mishandelen en martelen van Palestijnse ‘verdachten’ en ‘veiligheidsgevangenen’ is in Israëlische ondervragings- en detentiecentra schering en inslag. Het Israëlische Hooggerechtshof staat echter ‘speciale ondervragingsmethoden’ toe als er sprake is van ‘bijzondere veiligheidsrisico’s’, en die bepaling biedt politiediensten, de Prison Service en de veiligheidsdienst Shin Bet een vrijbrief om verdachten te mishandelen zonder dat er een haan naar kraait. Het Israëlische Comité tegen Marteling (PCATI) diende tussen 2001 en 2020 circa 1300 officiële klachten wegens marteling door de Shin Bet in. Dat leidde in slechts één geval tot strafrechtelijk onderzoek, dat uitliep op seponering.
Het martelen van gevangenen is onder internationaal recht en de Universele Verklaring van de Rechten van de Mens strikt verboden en geldt in het oprichtingsverdrag van het Internationaal Strafhof – het Statuut van Rome – als een oorlogsmisdaad. Eerder dit jaar maanden zeven mensenrechtenexperts van de VN Israël zich aan het internationaal recht te houden en rigoureus een eind te maken aan de verboden praktijken. De autoriteiten dienen alle wetten, voorschriften, beleidslijnen en praktijken die zulke misdaden mogelijk maken met spoed te herzien. Staten zijn verplicht marteling en mishandeling te voorkomen en, in het geval zulk wangedrag toch plaatsvindt, te bestraffen. Slachtoffers dienen gerehabiliteerd en gecompenseerd te worden.
END OF ARTICLE
[7]
”This was a negligent investigation – with no real effort to identify the guards and no police lineup – which proves that even when such an unusual case of abuse has been fully documented, the police still prefer to sweep it under the rug.”
The shocking video from Wing 3 of Ketziot Prison should have set off an earthquake in the Israel Prison Service, police and the State Prosecutor’s Office: Scores of Arab security prisoners were forcibly thrown down onto a concrete floor, sometimes on top of each other, as guards passed between them for long minutes, beating them with batons and kicking them randomly, without any resistance from their victims (as Josh Breiner reported Thursday).
The unrestrained violence is believed to have been carried out in revenge for the stabbing of a guard shortly beforehand near the wing. The guards’ act of revenge, which left 15 prisoners injured, was described by the Prison Service as “gaining control over a riot.” But the evidence clearly shows there was no riot, just the abuse of prisoners. The evidence was an open secret in the Prison Service: Top officials had viewed the video and knew exactly what occurred but acted as if nothing happened. The Prison Service knew that Ketziot’s officers turned a blind eye while at least 10 guards brutally beat the bound prisoners.
It wasn’t only the Prison Service that looked the other way. In the Israel Police, Lahav 433’s National Prison Investigation Unit did as little as possible to probe the affair: Only one guard was questioned and even though he admitted that he had engaged in gratuitous violence, it wasn’t enough for the police or prosecutors to proceed with an indictment. This was a negligent investigation – with no real effort to identify the guards and no police lineup – which proves that even when such an unusual case of abuse has been fully documented, the police still prefer to sweep it under the rug.
It’s hard to believe that the investigation would have ended this way if the prisoners had been Jews. But in this case, the victims were Palestinian terrorists and security prisoners belonging to Hamas. Therefore, not only was the case closed on the grounds that “the offender is not known,” but the warden on duty at the time, General Avichai Ben-Hamo, was promoted to the rank of major general. The other guards allegedly involved in the incident remain at their jobs.
Now, when the evidence has been revealed to the public, the affair can no longer remain behind prison walls. The state prosecutor must immediately order a thorough investigation that includes all the guards alleged to have been involved, and bring indictments. Any other outcome will only prove that from the state’s viewpoint, security prisoners don’t deserve to be treated like human beings.
The above article is Haaretz’s lead editorial, as published in the Hebrew and English newspapers in Israel.
END OF THE ARTICLE
[8] ”It wasn’t only the Prison Service that looked the other way. In the Israel Police, Lahav 433’s National Prison Investigation Unit did as little as possible to probe the affair: Only one guard was questioned and even though he admitted that he had engaged in gratuitous violence, it wasn’t enough for the police or prosecutors to proceed with an indictment. This was a negligent investigation – with no real effort to identify the guards and no police lineup – which proves that even when such an unusual case of abuse has been fully documented, the police still prefer to sweep it under the rug.”
”It’s hard to believe that the investigation would have ended this way if the prisoners had been Jews. But in this case, the victims were Palestinian terrorists and security prisoners belonging to Hamas. Therefore, not only was the case closed on the grounds that “the offender is not known,” but the warden on duty at the time, General Avichai Ben-Hamo, was promoted to the rank of major general. The other guards allegedly involved in the incident remain at their jobs.”
Israel continued to impose institutionalized discrimination against Palestinians living under its rule in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). It displaced hundreds of Palestinians in Israel and the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, as a result of home demolitions and imposition of other coercive measures. Israeli forces continued to use excessive force during law enforcement activities in Israel and the OPT. Israeli forces killed 31 Palestinians, including nine children, in the OPT; many were unlawfully killed while posing no imminent threat to life. Israel maintained its illegal blockade on the Gaza Strip, subjecting its residents to collective punishment and deepening the humanitarian crisis there. It also continued to restrict freedom of movement of Palestinians in the OPT through checkpoints and roadblocks. The Israeli authorities arbitrarily detained in Israel thousands of Palestinians from the OPT, holding hundreds in administrative detention without charge or trial. Torture and other ill-treatment of detainees, including children, were committed with impunity. The authorities used a range of measures to target human rights defenders, journalists and others who criticized Israel’s continuing occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Syrian Golan Heights. Violence against women persisted, especially against Palestinian citizens of Israel. The authorities denied asylum-seekers access to a fair or prompt refugee status determination process. Conscientious objectors to military service were imprisoned.
Background
Israel held parliamentary elections in March, the third in just over a year. In May, the two largest parties in the Knesset, Likud and the Blue and White alliance, reached a power-sharing agreement that included an announcement that Israel would further annex territories in the occupied West Bank starting in July 2020. This followed US President Donald Trump’s announcement of his “deal of the century”, which included a formal extension of Israel’s sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and the vast majority of the illegal settlements in the rest of the occupied West Bank in exchange for land currently inside Israel. Israel postponed the annexation plans following diplomatic deals with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in September. The parliament was again dissolved in December, triggering another round of elections in three months’ time.
Israel imposed lockdown measures in March and in September to contain the spread of COVID-19, triggering waves of protests calling on the Prime Minister to step down. The measures allowed the Israel Security Agency (ISA) to use surveillance capabilities usually reserved for Palestinians to trace COVID-19 infections. The Prime Minister’s trial on corruption charges began in May.
In February, the Palestinian armed group Islamic Jihad fired around 80 rockets and mortar shells from the Gaza Strip towards Israel, causing minor injuries to over 20 people, after Israeli forces killed an Islamic Jihad operative. The Israeli army carried out multiple airstrikes in Gaza, injuring 12 Palestinians, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza.
In August and September, Israel launched artillery and airstrikes against Gaza in retaliation for incendiary balloons and kites launched from Gaza into Israel. Palestinian armed groups launched indiscriminate rockets into Israel in response.
In August, Israel launched airstrikes against Hizbullah targets in Lebanon after it said that shots were fired from Lebanon into Israel. Israel also launched airstrikes against Iranian and Hizbullah targets in Syria.
In July, a district court rejected a case to force the Ministry of Defense to revoke the export licence of spyware company NSO Group, dealing a blow to victims of unlawful and targeted international surveillance.
Forcible transfers, forced evictions and demolitions
Israel demolished 848 Palestinian residential and livelihood structures in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, displacing 996 people, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Israeli authorities said many of the demolished buildings lacked Israeli-issued permits, which are virtually impossible for Palestinians to obtain, or were in closed military zones. The law of occupation prohibits such destruction unless necessary for military operations.
In other cases, Israel confiscated residential and livelihood structures, including some that were donated for humanitarian purposes. Israeli forces also punitively demolished at least six Palestinian homes, leaving 22 people, including seven children, homeless, according to B’Tselem. Punitive demolitions constitute collective punishment and are prohibited under international law.
On 5 March, Israeli forces demolished the homes of Walid Hanatsheh, in Ramallah, and Yazan Mughamis, in Birzeit, displacing six Palestinians, after an Israeli court rejected a petition by the families against the punitive demolition. On 11 March, Israeli forces punitively demolished the home of Qassam Barghouti in Kobar village near Ramallah. The three men are in prison in Israel for alleged involvement in an attack in August 2019 that killed an Israeli civilian and injured two others outside Ramallah city in the occupied West Bank.
Israeli settler organizations initiated, with the support of the Israeli authorities, forcible evictions of Palestinians from their homes in East Jerusalem.
OCHA estimated in December that around 200 Palestinian households in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, had eviction cases pending against them, placing 800 adults and children at risk of displacement.
Israeli authorities demolished at least 29 residential and livelihood structures that belonged to Bedouin citizens living in “unrecognized” villages in the Negev/Naqab, according to the Negev Coexistence Forum, an Israeli NGO.
Discrimination
Israel continued to discriminate against Palestinian citizens of Israel in areas of planning, budget allocation, policing and political participation. According to the Adalah-The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Israel maintains over 65 laws that discriminate against Palestinians.
Local Palestinian councils in Israel went on strike to protest against discrimination in the distribution of the state budget for local councils. The vast majority of Palestinians in Israel, comprising over 20% of the total population, live in around 139 towns and villages. They received only 1.7% of the state budget for local councils.
In August, Adalah and the Arab Center for Alternative Planning filed a petition to the Israeli Supreme Court on behalf of 10 local Palestinian councils and dozens of Palestinian citizens of Israel against government policy discriminating against these communities in the distribution of housing, construction and land development benefits compared to neighbouring Jewish communities that enjoy higher socio-economic status and have access to such benefits.
Israel continued to deny Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza married to Palestinian citizens of Israel the right to nationality by enforcing the discriminatory Entry to Israel Law.
In December, the magistrate court in Krayot, near Haifa, rejected a petition for access to education by Palestinian citizens of Israel living in Karmiel, citing the discriminatory Nation State Law. The decision said that establishing an Arabic school in the town or funding transport for its Palestinian residents to study in Arabic schools in nearby communities would undermine the town’s “Jewish character”.
In December, the Israeli Health Ministry began the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines that excluded the nearly 5 million Palestinians who live under Israeli military occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Unlawful killings and excessive use of force
Israeli military and police used unnecessary and excessive force during law enforcement activities, including search and arrest operations, and when policing demonstrations.
Military and security forces killed at least 31 Palestinians, including nine children, in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, according to OCHA. Many were unlawfully killed by live ammunition or other excessive force when posing no imminent threat to life. Some of the unlawful killings appeared to be wilful, which would constitute war crimes.
Israeli forces frequently used excessive force against protesters in Kufr Qadum who continued weekly protests against settlements and settlement expansion. According to OCHA, 214 protesters and bystanders were injured during the year.
On 15 February, Israeli forces shot and injured in the eye nine-year-old Malek Issa while he was returning home from school in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Issawiya. No clashes were recorded at the time, according to OCHA. Israeli forces were maintaining a violent and intense police operation in Issawiya as a form of collective punishment.
Israeli forces frequently opened fire on fishermen and farmers in Gaza. According to Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, 12 fishermen and five farmers were injured.
Freedom of movement
For the 13th consecutive year, Israel continued its illegal air, land and sea blockade of the Gaza Strip, restricting the movement of people and goods in and out of the area, which continued to have a devastating impact on the human rights of Gaza’s 2 million inhabitants. Israel stopped the entry of construction materials and fuel into Gaza repeatedly. This shut down the only power plant in Gaza, leading to a further reduction in the supply of electricity, which had already been available for only about four hours a day. Israel also imposed a full maritime closure and repeatedly limited entry of goods to food and medicine only. The measures amounted to collective punishment at a time of increasing COVID-19 infections in Gaza.
On 2 February, following an exchange of attacks between Israeli forces and Palestinian armed groups, Israel cancelled the permits of 500 traders from Gaza that enable their holders to travel to Israel and the West Bank for business. The permits were reactivated on 18 February.
On 18 June, Omar Yaghi, a baby with a cardiac condition, died in Gaza after Israel denied the family a permit to enter Israel for a scheduled operation on 24 May at the Sheba Medical Center in Ramat Gan city.
In the West Bank, at least 593 Israeli checkpoints and roadblocks continued to heavily restrict the movement of Palestinians and access to rights, including health, education and work. Holders of Palestinian identification cards faced an ongoing bar on using roads built for Israeli settlers.
Israeli restrictions on freedom of movement continued to impede Palestinians’ access to health care, posing further threats to vulnerable populations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Lack of access to hospitals and specialized clinics during the pandemic particularly affected Palestinian residents of the East Jerusalem neighbourhoods of Kufr Aqab and Shu’fat Refugee Camp, which are segregated from the rest of the city by military structures, including checkpoints, and the fence/wall.
Arbitrary detention
Israeli authorities conducted hundreds of raids throughout the West Bank to arrest Palestinians, usually at their homes at night. Those arrested were detained in prisons in Israel, along with thousands of other Palestinians from the OPT arrested in previous years. This violated international humanitarian law, which prohibits the transfer of detainees into the territory of the occupying power.
Israeli authorities used renewable administrative detention orders to hold Palestinians without charge or trial. Some 4,300 Palestinians from the OPT, including 397 administrative detainees, were held in Israeli prisons as of December, according to the Israel Prison Service. Many families of Palestinian detainees in Israel, particularly those living in Gaza, were not permitted entry to Israel to visit their relatives.
On 16 July, Israeli forces arrested Iyad Barghouti, an astrophysicist and professor at Jerusalem’s Al-Quds University, at a checkpoint near Jerusalem and placed him in administrative detention. He had previously been administratively detained in 2014 and 2016.
Israel held 157 Palestinian children in prison, including two in administrative detention, as of October. Defense for Children International Palestine said that children were interrogated without their parents present and placed with adults in prison. Under international law, detention of children should be a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate time.
Unfair trials
Palestinian civilians, including children, from the OPT were prosecuted in military courts that did not meet international fair trial standards.
Torture and other ill-treatment
Israeli soldiers, police and ISA officers continued to torture and otherwise ill-treat Palestinian detainees, including children, with impunity. Reported methods included beating, slapping, painful shackling, sleep deprivation, use of stress positions and threats of violence against family members. Prolonged solitary confinement, sometimes lasting months, was commonly used as a punishment.
Israeli forces occasionally denied medical help for Palestinians injured during law enforcement activities.
Freedoms of expression and association
The authorities used a range of measures, including raids, incitement campaigns, movement restrictions and judicial harassment, to target human rights defenders who criticized Israel’s continuing military occupation of Palestinian and Syrian territories.
Israel continued to deny human rights bodies entry to the OPT, including the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the OPT.
On 30 July, Israeli forces arrested Mahmoud Nawajaa, a human rights defender and co-ordinator of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement in the occupied West Bank, from his home in Ramallah. A prisoner of conscience, he was released without charge on 17 August.
On 13 November, the Jerusalem District Court rejected a petition by Amnesty International against the arbitrary and punitive travel ban imposed on its employee, human rights defender Laith Abu Zeyad. For undisclosed reasons, Israeli security forces continued to bar him from entering occupied East Jerusalem and from travelling abroad through Jordan.
Rights of refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants
Israel continued to deny asylum-seekers access to a fair and prompt refugee status determination process, leaving many without access to basic services. About 31,000 asylum-seekers were living in Israel.
Gender-based violence
Violence against women persisted in Israel, especially against Palestinian citizens.
At least 21 women were killed as a result of gender-based violence.
Conscientious objectors
At least four Israeli conscientious objectors to military service were imprisoned. Hillel Rabin spent 56 days in military prison for refusing to serve in the Israeli army citing oppressive policies against Palestinians.
In interrogating Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories, the Israel Security Agency (ISA, also known by the Hebrew acronyms Shin Bet or Shabak) routinely used methods that constituted ill-treatment and even torture until the late 1990s. In doing so, the ISA relied on the 1987 recommendations of a state commission headed by retired Supreme Court Justice Moshe Landau. The commission had held that, in order to “prevent terrorism”, ISA interrogators were permitted to use “psychological pressure” and a “moderate degree of physical pressure”. This permission was grounded, in the commission’s opinion, in the “necessity defense” laid out in Israeli Penal Law. In practice, the interrogation methods used by the ISA during that time went far beyond a reasonable interpretation of the term “moderate physical pressure”.This state of affairs persisted for years, despite the right not to be subjected to ill-treatment or torture – whether physical or psychological – being one of the few human rights that are considered absolute. As an absolute right, it may never be balanced against other rights and values and cannot be suspended or limited, even in difficult circumstances.In September 1999, following a series of petitions filed by human rights organizations and by Palestinians interrogated by the ISA, Israel’s High Court of Justice (HCJ) ruled that Israeli law does not empower ISA interrogators to use physical means in interrogation. The justices ruled that the specific methods discussed in the petitions – including painful binding, shaking, placing a sack on a person’s head for prolonged periods of time and sleep deprivation – were unlawful. However, they also held that ISA agents who exceed their authority and use “physical pressure” may not necessarily bear criminal responsibility for their actions, if they are later found to have used these methods in a “ticking bomb” case, based on the “necessity defense”. Following this ruling, reports of torture and ill-treatment in ISA interrogations did drop. However, ISA agents continued to use interrogation methods that constitute abuse and even torture, relying on the court’s recognition of the “ticking bomb” exception. These methods were not limited to exceptional cases and quickly became standard interrogation policy.Several joint research reports published by B’Tselem and HaMoked: Center for the Defence of the Individual, based on hundreds of affidavits and testimonials given by Palestinians who underwent ISA interrogations after the HCJ ruling, indicate that the ISA still routinely employs psychological and physical abuse in interrogations. While interrogators steer clear of the specific methods that the court disqualified, the rationale is the same: using isolation from the outside world and harsh incarceration conditions, in addition to the interrogation itself, to psychologically pressure and physically weaken the individual. This combined use of holding conditions and interrogation methods constitutes abuse and inhuman, degrading treatment, at times even amounting to torture. It is regularly employed against Palestinians in ISA interrogations, in blatant violation of international law and basic moral standards.According to the accounts of Palestinians who have undergone ISA interrogation, they are held in inhuman conditions, including narrow, windowless cells that are sometimes moldy and foul-smelling and are constantly lit with artificial lighting that is painful to the eyes. Some detainees reported being held in solitary confinement, completely cut off from their surroundings. Some reported exposure to extremes of heat and cold, as well as sleep deprivation. Many described abominable hygienic conditions; among other things, they stated that the prison authorities do not allow them to shower, change clothes, brush their teeth or even use toilet paper. The food is intentionally poor in quality and quantity, and detainees lose weight while in custody. In the interrogation room, they are forced to sit bound to a chair, without moving, for hours and even days on end. Interrogators threaten the detainees, including threats to harm their relatives, as well as shouting and employing violence against them.Most Palestinians who are physically or mental abused in interrogation have no way to complain until the interrogation is over. This is because Palestinian detainees are regularly denied the right to meet with counsel, and HCJ petitions against the denial of this right have been repeatedly dismissed. Also, they usually cannot use the opportunity of coming before a judge in a remand hearing to air their grievances: Most hearings are extremely cursory and, in some of them, detainees are not represented or are denied the opportunity to confer with the lawyer representing them. Most detainees are not aware of the fact that they may approach the judge on their own initiative. In any case, they shy away from sharing what they are undergoing with the judge for fear of reprisal back in the interrogation room. Even when detainees do come forward, the authorities take no action, as years of monitoring by human rights organizations reveal. Since 2001, not a single criminal investigation has been launched into a complaint against an ISA interrogator, despite hundreds of complaints being lodged with the relevant authorities. Although formal changes have been made to the apparatus charged with looking into these complaints – including the appointment of an Inspector of Complaints by ISA Interrogees inside the ISA, and the subsequent transfer of the position to the Ministry of Justice – they have done nothing to alter the situation: Hundreds of complaints, zero criminal investigations.This system of interrogation, which relies on a combination of holding conditions and interrogator conduct, was shaped by state authorities. It is not the personal initiative of any particular interrogator or prison guard, and the actions described here are not anomalies to be weeded out by the justice system. The cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of Palestinian detainees is inherent to the ISA’s violent interrogation policy. This policy is dictated from above, and not set by interrogators in the field.While the ISA runs the system, a broad network of partners collaborates to facilitate it. The Israel Prison Service (IPS) adapts prison conditions to match the interrogation plan designed to break the detainee’s spirit. Medical and mental health personnel greenlight the interrogation of Palestinians who arrive at the facility – including in cases of poor health – and even hand detainees back to the interrogators after caring for physical and mental injuries they sustained in interrogation, knowing full well that they would be subjected to measures of abuse and torture; soldiers and police officers abuse detainees while transporting them to the ISA, with their commanders turning a blind eye and the MAG Corps and State Attorney’s Office not bringing them to justice or holding them fully accountable. Military judges almost automatically sign off on motions for remand in custody and effectively sanction the continued abuse and inhuman conditions. The State Attorney’s Office and the Attorney General have thus far provided ISA interrogators with full immunity. Finally, HCJ judges regularly reject petitions seeking to overturn the denial of detainee’s rights to meet with legal counsel, clearing the way for continued abuse.All these are party, in one form or another, to the cruel, inhuman, degrading and abusive treatment to which Palestinians are subjected in ISA interrogations. By enabling the existence of this abusive interrogation regime, they all bear responsibility for the severe violations of interrogatees’ human rights and for the mental and physical harm inflicted on these individuals END OF THE ARTICLE [13] Article 2 Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement.EURO MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENT establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/israel/documents/eu_israel/asso_agree_en.pdf
[14] Article 90 Promotion of the international legal order The Government shall promote the development of the international legal order.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDSChapter 5 Legislation and administration
TO THE PALESTINIAN MISSION IN THE HAGUE/THE NETHERLANDS
Mrs Rawan Sulaiman, ambassador
Subject: The arrest of mr Issa Amro by the security troops of
the Palestinian Authority
”Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”
![The Israeli separation barrier divides East Jerusalem and the Palestinian West Bank town of Qalandia. [File: Thomas Coex/AFP]](https://ci3.googleusercontent.com/proxy/TafQOExghNFA53NWHdh6penouZCvg70GtnbRrSB5al6iUqhN5NMC9AiFHgZa_PRE2xa2RV-0Paw3fM1ydDP59Mr06NcHTpZBuORzLshWkqgtvJh8D5hMeaUsOtT29XSiwRSpnn96EVKsSb41qtVJ7lnSCpyVg226VF1yyQlH=s0-d-e1-ft#https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/4805b373bf0949d0a31e6b7a375a0128_8.jpeg?fit=1170%2C696)
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Since late 2015, 249 Palestinians have been killed in Israel and the Palestinian territories [File: EPA]
Since late 2015, 249 Palestinians have been killed in Israel and the Palestinian territories [File: EPA]
