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”The Israeli government’s plan to remove troops and Jewish settlements from the Gaza Strip would not end Israel’s occupation of the territory. As an occupying power, Israel will retain responsibility for the welfare of Gaza’s civilian population.

Under the “disengagement” plan endorsed Tuesday by the Knesset, Israeli forces will keep control over Gaza’s borders, coastline and airspace, and will reserve the right to launch incursions at will. Israel will continue to wield overwhelming power over the territory’s economy and its access to trade.”

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

ISRAEL: ”DISENGAGEMENT” WILL NOT

END GAZA OCCUPATION

28 OCTOBER 2004

Israeli Government Still Holds Responsibility for Welfare of Civilians

The Israeli government’s plan to remove troops and Jewish settlements from the Gaza Strip would not end Israel’s occupation of the territory. As an occupying power, Israel will retain responsibility for the welfare of Gaza’s civilian population.

Under the “disengagement” plan endorsed Tuesday by the Knesset, Israeli forces will keep control over Gaza’s borders, coastline and airspace, and will reserve the right to launch incursions at will. Israel will continue to wield overwhelming power over the territory’s economy and its access to trade.

“The removal of settlers and most military forces will not end Israel’s control over Gaza,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch’s Middle East and North Africa Division. “Israel plans to reconfigure its occupation of the territory, but it will remain an occupying power with responsibility for the welfare of the civilian population.”

Under the plan, Israel is scheduled to remove settlers and military bases protecting the settlers from the Gaza Strip and four isolated West Bank Jewish settlements by the end of 2005. The Israeli military will remain deployed on Gaza’s southern border, and will reposition its forces to other areas just outside the territory.

In addition to controlling the borders, coastline and airspace, Israel will continue to control Gaza’s telecommunications, water, electricity and sewage networks, as well as the flow of people and goods into and out of the territory. Gaza will also continue to use Israeli currency.

A World Bank study on the economic effects of the plan determined that “disengagement” would ease restrictions on mobility inside Gaza. But the study also warned that the removal of troops and settlers would have little positive effect unless accompanied by an opening of Gaza’s borders. If the borders are sealed to labor and trade, the plan “would create worse hardship than is seen today.”

The plan also explicitly envisions continued home demolitions by the Israeli military to expand the “buffer zone” along the Gaza-Egypt border. According to a report released last week by Human Rights Watch, the Israeli military has illegally razed nearly 1,600 homes since 2000 to create this buffer zone, displacing some 16,000 Palestinians. Israeli officials have called for the buffer zone to be doubled, which would result in the destruction of one-third of the Rafah refugee camp.

In addition, the plan states that disengagement “will serve to dispel the claims regarding Israel’s responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.” A report by legal experts from the Israeli Justice Ministry, Foreign Ministry and the military made public on Sunday, however, reportedly acknowledges that disengagement “does not necessarily exempt Israel from responsibility in the evacuated territories.”

If Israel removes its troops from Gaza, the Palestinian National Authority will maintain responsibility for security within the territory—to the extent that Israel allows Palestinian police the authority and capacity. Palestinian security forces will still have a duty to protect civilians within Gaza and to prevent indiscriminate attacks on Israeli civilians.

“Under international law, the test for determining whether an occupation exists is effective control by a hostile army, not the positioning of troops,” Whitson said. “Whether the Israeli army is inside Gaza or redeployed around its periphery and restricting entrance and exit, it remains in control.”

Under international law, the duties of an occupying power are detailed in the Fourth Geneva Convention and The Hague Regulations. According to The Hague Regulations, a “territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.”

The “disengagement plan,” as adopted by the Israeli Cabinet on June 6, 2004, and endorsed by the Knesset on October 26, is available at:

http://www.pmo.gov.il/nr/exeres/C5E1ACE3-9834-414E-9512-8E5F509E9A4D.htm.

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Israel’s Obligations to Gaza under International Law

Israeli authorities claim “broad powers and discretion to decide who may enter its territory” and that “a foreigner has no legal right to enter the State’s sovereign territory, including for the purposes of transit into the [West Bank] or aboard.” While international human rights law gives wide latitude to governments with regard to entry of foreigners, Israel has heightened obligations toward Gaza residents. Because of the continuing controls Israel exercises over the lives and welfare of Gaza’s inhabitants, Israel remains an occupying power under international humanitarian law, despite withdrawing its military forces and settlements from the territory in 2005”

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

GAZA: ISRAEL’S ”OPEN AIR PRISON” AT 15

14 JUNE 2022

(Gaza) – Israel’s sweeping restrictions on leaving Gaza deprive its more than two million residents of opportunities to better their lives, Human Rights Watch said today on the fifteenth anniversary of the 2007 closure. The closure has devastated the economy in Gaza, contributed to fragmentation of the Palestinian people, and forms part of Israeli authorities’ crimes against humanity of apartheid and persecution against millions of Palestinians.

Israel’s closure policy blocks most Gaza residents from going to the West Bank, preventing professionals, artists, athletes, students, and others from pursuing opportunities within Palestine and from traveling abroad via Israel, restricting their rights to work and an education. Restrictive Egyptian policies at its Rafah crossing with Gaza, including unnecessary delays and mistreatment of travelers, have exacerbated the closure’s harm to human rights.

“Israel, with Egypt’s help, has turned Gaza into an open-air prison,” said Omar Shakir, Israel and Palestine director at Human Rights Watch. “As many people around the world are once again traveling two years after the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, Gaza’s more than two million Palestinians remain under what amounts to a 15-year-old lockdown.”

Israel should end its generalized ban on travel for Gaza residents and permit free movement of people to and from Gaza, subject to, at most, individual screening and physical searches for security purposes.

Between February 2021 and March 2022, Human Rights Watch interviewed 20 Palestinians who sought to travel out of Gaza via either the Israeli-run Erez crossing or the Egyptian-administered Rafah crossing. Human Rights Watch wrote to Israeli and Egyptian authorities to solicit their perspectives on its findings, and separately to seek information about an Egyptian travel company that operates at the Rafah crossing but had received no responses at this writing.

Since 2007, Israeli authorities have, with narrow exceptions, banned Palestinians from leaving through Erez, the passenger crossing from Gaza into Israel, through which they can reach the West Bank and travel abroad via Jordan. Israel also prevents Palestinian authorities from operating an airport or seaport in Gaza. Israeli authorities also sharply restrict the entry and exit of goods.

They often justify the closure, which came after Hamas seized political control over Gaza from the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in June 2007, on security grounds. Israeli authorities have said they want to minimize travel between Gaza and the West Bank to prevent the export of “a human terrorist network” from Gaza to the West Bank, which has a porous border with Israel and where hundreds of thousands of Israeli settlers live.

This policy has reduced travel to a fraction of what it was two decades ago, Human Rights Watch said. Israeli authorities have instituted a formal “policy of separation” between Gaza and the West Bank, despite international consensus that these two parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory form a “single territorial unit.” Israel accepted that principle in the 1995 Oslo Accords, signed with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Israeli authorities restrict all travel between Gaza and the West Bank, even when the travel takes place via the circuitous route through Egypt and Jordan rather than through Israeli territory.

Due to these policies, Palestinian professionals, students, artists, and athletes living in Gaza have missed vital opportunities for advancement not available in Gaza. Human Rights Watch interviewed seven people who said that Israeli authorities did not respond to their requests for travel through Erez, and three others who said Israel rejected their permits, apparently for not fitting within Israeli’s narrow criteria.

Walaa Sada, 31, a filmmaker, said that she applied for permits to take part in film training in the West Bank in 2014 and 2018, after spending years convincing her family to allow her to travel alone, but Israeli authorities never responded to her applications. The hands-on nature of the training, requiring filming live scenes and working in studios, made remote participation impracticable and Sada ended up missing the sessions.

The “world narrowed” when she received these rejections, Sada said, making her feel “stuck in a small box.… For us in Gaza, the hands of the clock stopped. People all over the world can easily and quickly book flight and travel, while we … die waiting for our turn.”

The Egyptian authorities have exacerbated the closure’s impact by restricting movement out of Gaza and at times fully sealing its Rafah border crossing, Gaza’s only outlet aside from Erez to the outside world. Since May 2018, Egyptian authorities have been keeping Rafah open more regularly, making it, amid the sweeping Israeli restrictions, the primary outlet to the outside world for Gaza residents.

Palestinians, however, still face onerous obstacles traveling through Egypt, including having to wait weeks for permission to travel, unless they are willing to pay hundreds of dollars to travel companies with significant ties to Egyptian authorities to expedite their travel, denials of entry, and abuse by Egyptian authorities.

Sada said also received an opportunity to participate in a workshop on screenwriting in Tunisia in 2019, but that she could not afford the US$2000 it would cost her to pay for the service that would ensure that she could travel on time. Her turn to travel came up six weeks later, after the workshop had already been held.

As an occupying power that maintains significant control over many aspects of life in Gaza, Israel has obligations under international humanitarian law to ensure the welfare of the population there. Palestinians also have the right under international human rights law to freedom of movement, in particular within the occupied territory, a right that Israel can restrict under international law only in response to specific security threats.

Israel’s policy, though, presumptively denies free movement to people in Gaza, with narrow exceptions, irrespective of any individualized assessment of the security risk a person may pose. These restrictions on the right to freedom of movement do not meet the requirement of being strictly necessary and proportionate to achieve a lawful objective. Israel has had years and many opportunities to develop more narrowly tailored responses to security threats that minimize restrictions on rights.

Egypt’s legal obligations toward Gaza residents are more limited, as it is not an occupying power. However, as a state party to the Fourth Geneva Convention, it should ensure respect for the convention “in all circumstances,” including protections for civilians living under military occupation who are unable to travel due to unlawful restrictions imposed by the occupying power. The Egyptian authorities should also consider the impact of their border closure on the rights of Palestinians living in Gaza who are unable to travel in and out of Gaza through another route, including the right to leave a country.

Egyptian authorities should lift unreasonable obstacles that restrict Palestinians’ rights and allow transit via its territory, subject to security considerations, and ensure that their decisions are transparent and not arbitrary and take into consideration the human rights of those affected.

“The Gaza closure blocks talented, professional people, with much to give their society, from pursuing opportunities that people elsewhere take for granted,” Shakir said. “Barring Palestinians in Gaza from moving freely within their homeland stunts lives and underscores the cruel reality of apartheid and persecution for millions of Palestinians.”

Israel’s Obligations to Gaza under International Law

Israeli authorities claim “broad powers and discretion to decide who may enter its territory” and that “a foreigner has no legal right to enter the State’s sovereign territory, including for the purposes of transit into the [West Bank] or aboard.” While international human rights law gives wide latitude to governments with regard to entry of foreigners, Israel has heightened obligations toward Gaza residents. Because of the continuing controls Israel exercises over the lives and welfare of Gaza’s inhabitants, Israel remains an occupying power under international humanitarian law, despite withdrawing its military forces and settlements from the territory in 2005. Both the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross, the guardians of international humanitarian law, have reached this determination. As the occupying power, Israel remains bound to provide residents of Gaza the rights and protections afforded to them by the law of occupation. Israeli authorities continue to control Gaza’s territorial waters and airspace, and the movement of people and goods, except at Gaza’s border with Egypt. Israel also controls the Palestinian population registry and the infrastructure upon which Gaza relies.

Israel has an obligation to respect the human rights of Palestinians living in Gaza, including their right to freedom of movement throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory and abroad, which affects both the right to leave a country and the right to enter their own country. Israel is also obligated to respect Palestinians’ rights for which freedom of movement is a precondition, for example the rights to education, work, and health. The UN Human Rights Committee has said that while states can restrict freedom of movement for security reasons or to protect public health, public order, and the rights of others, any such restrictions must be proportional and “the restrictions must not impair the essence of the right; the relation between the right and restriction, between norm and exception, must not be reversed.”

While the law of occupation permits occupying powers to impose security restrictions on civilians, it also requires them to restore public life for the occupied population. That obligation increases in a prolonged occupation, in which the occupier has more time and opportunity to develop more narrowly tailored responses to security threats that minimize restrictions on rights. In addition, the needs of the occupied population increase over time. Suspending virtually all freedom of movement for a short period interrupts temporarily normal public life, but long-term, indefinite suspension in Gaza has had a much more debilitating impact, fragmentating populations, fraying familial and social ties, compounding discrimination against women, and blocking people from pursuing opportunities to improve their lives.

The impact is particularly damaging given the denial of freedom of movement to people who are confined to a sliver of the occupied territory, unable to interact in person with the majority of the occupied population that lives in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and its rich assortment of educational, cultural, religious, and commercial institutions.

After 55 years of occupation and 15 years of closure in Gaza with no end in sight, Israel should fully respect the human rights of Palestinians, using as a benchmark the rights it grants Israeli citizens. Israel should abandon an approach that bars movement absent exceptional individual humanitarian circumstances it defines, in favor of an approach that permits free movement absent exceptional individual security circumstances.

Israel’s Closure

Most Palestinians who grew up in Gaza under this closure have never left the 40-by-11 kilometer (25-by-7 mile) Gaza Strip. For the last 25 years, Israel has increasingly restricted the movement of Gaza residents. Since June 2007, when Hamas seized control over Gaza from the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA), Gaza has been mostly closed.

Israeli authorities justify this closure on security grounds, in light of “Hamas’ rise to power in the Gaza Strip,” as they lay out in a December 2019 court filing. Authorities highlight in particular the risk that Hamas and armed Palestinian groups will recruit or coerce Gaza residents who have permits to travel via Erez “for the commission of terrorist acts and the transfer of operatives, knowledge, intelligence, funds or equipment for terrorist activists.” Their policy, though, amounts to a blanket denial with rare exceptions, rather than a generalized respect for the right of Palestinians to freedom of movement, to be denied only on the basis of individualized security reasons.  

The Israeli army has since 2007 limited travel through the Erez crossing except in what it deems “exceptional humanitarian circumstances,” mainly encompassing those needing vital medical treatment outside Gaza and their companions, although the authorities also make exceptions for hundreds of businesspeople and laborers and some others. Israel has restricted movement even for those seeking to travel under these narrow exceptions, affecting their rights to health and life, among others, as Human Rights Watch and other groups have documented. Most Gaza residents do not fit within these exemptions to travel through Erez, even if it is to reach the West Bank.

Between January 2015 and December 2019, before the onset of Covid-19 restrictions, an average of about 373 Palestinians left Gaza via Erez each day, less than 1.5 percent of the daily average of 26,000 in September 2000, before the closure, according to the Israeli rights group Gisha. Israeli authorities tightened the closure further during the Covid-19 pandemic – between March 2020 and December 2021, an average of about 143 Palestinians left Gaza via Erez each day, according to Gisha.

Israeli authorities announced in March 2022 that they would authorize 20,000 permits for Palestinians in Gaza to work in Israel in construction and agriculture, though Gisha reports that the actual number of valid permits in this category stood at 9,424, as of May 22.

Israeli authorities have also for more than two decades sharply restricted the use by Palestinians of Gaza’s airspace and territorial waters. They blocked the reopening of the airport that Israeli forces made inoperable in January 2002, and prevented the Palestinian authorities from building a seaport, leaving Palestinians dependent on leaving Gaza by land to travel abroad. The few Palestinians permitted to cross at Erez are generally barred from traveling abroad via Israel’s international airport and must instead travel abroad via Jordan. Palestinians wishing to leave Gaza via Erez, either to the West Bank or abroad, submit requests through the Palestinian Civil Affairs Committee in Gaza, which forwards applications to Israeli authorities who decide on whether to grant a permit.

Separation Between Gaza and the West Bank

As part of the closure, Israeli authorities have sought to “differentiate” between their policy approaches to Gaza and the West Bank, such as imposing more sweeping restrictions on the movement of people and goods from Gaza to the West Bank, and promote separation between these two parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The army’s “Procedure for Settlement in the Gaza Strip by Residents of Judea and Samaria,” published in 2018, states that “in 2006, a decision was made to introduce a policy of separation between the Judea and Samaria Area [the West Bank] and the Gaza Strip in light of Hamas’ rise to power in the Gaza Strip. The policy currently in effect is explicitly aimed at reducing travel between the areas.”

In each of the 11 cases Human Rights Watch reviewed of people seeking to reach the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, for professional and educational opportunities not available in Gaza, Israeli authorities did not respond to requests for permits or denied them, either for security reasons or because they did not conform to the closure policy. Human Rights Watch also reviewed permit applications on the website of the Palestinian Civil Affairs Committee, or screenshots of it, including the status of the permit applications, when they were sent on to the Israeli authorities and the response received, if any.

Raed Issa, a 42-year-old artist, said that the Israeli authorities did not respond to his application for a permit in early December 2015, to attend an exhibit of his art at a Ramallah art gallery between December 27 and January 16, 2016.

The “Beyond the Dream” exhibit sought to highlight the situation in Gaza after the 2014 war. Issa said that the Palestinian Civil Affairs committee continued to identify the status of his application as “sent and waiting for response” and he ended up having to attend the opening of the exhibit virtually. Issa felt that not being physically present hampered his ability to engage with audiences, and to network and promote his work, which he believes limited his reach and hurt sales of his artwork. He described feeling pained “that I am doing my own art exhibit in my homeland and not able to attend it, not able to move freely.”

Ashraf Sahweel, 47, chairman of the Board of Directors of the Gaza Center for Art and Culture, said that Gaza-based artists routinely do not hear back after applying for Israeli permits, forcing them to miss opportunities to attend exhibitions and other cultural events. A painter himself, he applied for seven permits between 2013 and 2022, but Israeli authorities either did not respond or denied each application, he said. Sahweel said that he has “given up hope on the possibility to travel via Erez.”

Palestinian athletes in Gaza face similar restrictions when seeking to compete with their counterparts in the West Bank, even though the Israeli army guidelines specifically identify “entry of sportspeople” as among the permissible exemptions to the closure. The guidelines, updated in February 2022, set out that “all Gaza Strip residents who are members of the national and local sports teams may enter Israel in transit to the Judea and Samaria area [West Bank] or abroad for official activities of the teams.”

Hilal al-Ghawash, 25, told Human Rights Watch that his football team, Khadamat Rafah, had a match in July 2019 with a rival West Bank team, the Balata Youth Center, in the finals of Palestine Club, with the winner entitled to represent Palestine in the Asian Cup. The Palestinian Football Federation applied for permits for the entire 22-person team and 13-person staff, but Israeli authorities, without explanation, granted permits to only 4 people, only one of whom was a player. The game was postponed as a result.

After Gisha appealed the decision in the Jerusalem District Court, Israeli authorities granted 11 people permits, including six players, saying the other 24 were denied on security grounds that were not specified. Al-Ghawash was among the players who did not receive a permit. The Jerusalem district court upheld the denials. With Khadamat Rafah prevented from reaching the West Bank, the Palestine Football Federation canceled the Palestine Cup finals match.

Al-Ghawash said that West Bank matches hold particular importance for Gaza football players, since they offer the opportunity to showcase their talents for West Bank clubs, which are widely considered superior to those in Gaza and pay better. Despite the cancellation, al-Ghawash said, the Balata Youth Center later that year offered him a contract to play for them. The Palestinian Football Federation again applied for a permit on al-Ghawash’s behalf, but he said he did not receive a response and was unable to join the team.

In 2021, al-Ghawash signed a contract with a different West Bank team, the Hilal al-Quds club. The Palestinian Football Federation again applied, but this time, the Israeli army denied the permit on unspecified security grounds. Al-Ghawash said he does not belong to any armed group or political movement and has no idea on what basis Israeli authorities denied him a permit.

Missing these opportunities has forced al-Ghawash to forgo not only higher pay, but also the chance to play for more competitive West Bank teams, which could have brought him closer to his goal of joining the Palestinian national team. “There’s a future in the West Bank, but, here in Gaza, there’s only a death sentence,” he said. “The closure devastates players’ future. Gaza is full of talented people, but it’s so difficult to leave.”

Palestinian students and professionals are frequently unable to obtain permits to study or train in the West Bank. In 2016, Augusta Victoria Hospital in East Jerusalem agreed to have 10 physics students from Al-Azhar University in Gaza come to the hospital for a six-month training program. Israeli authorities denied five students permits without providing a rationale, two of the students said.

The five other students initially received permits valid for only 14 days, and then encountered difficulties receiving subsequent permits. None were able to complete the full program, the two students said. One, Mahmoud Dabour, 28, said that when he applied for a second permit, he received no response. Two months later, he applied again and managed to get a permit valid for one week. He received one other permit, valid for 10 days, but then, when he returned and applied for the fifth time, Israeli authorities rejected his permit request without providing a reason. As a result, he could not finish the training program, and, without the certification participants receive upon completion, he said, he cannot apply for jobs or attend conferences or workshops abroad in the field.

Dabour said that the training cannot be offered in Gaza, since the necessary radiation material required expires too quickly for it to be functional after passing through the time-consuming Israeli inspections of materials entering the Gaza Strip. There are no functioning devices of the kind that students need for the training in Gaza, Dabour said.

One of the students whose permit was denied said, “I feel I studied for five years for nothing, that my life has stopped.” The student asked that his name be withheld for his security.

Two employees of Zimam, a Ramallah-based organization focused on youth empowerment and conflict resolution, said that the Israeli authorities repeatedly denied them permits to attend organizational training and strategy meetings. Atta al-Masri, the 31-year-old Gaza regional director, said he has applied four times for permits, but never received one. Israeli authorities did not respond the first three times and, the last time in 2021, denied him a permit on the grounds that it was “not in conformity” with the permissible exemptions to the closure. He has worked for Zimam since 2009, but only met his colleagues in person for the first time in Egypt in March 2022.

Ahed Abdullah, 29, Zimam’s youth programs coordinator in Gaza, said she applied twice for permits in 2021, but Israeli authorities denied both applications on grounds of “nonconformity:”

This is supposed to be my right. My simplest right. Why did they reject me? My colleagues who are outside Palestine managed to make it, while I am inside Palestine, I wasn’t able to go to the other part of Palestine … it’s only 2-3 hours from Gaza to Ramallah, why should I get the training online? Why am I deprived of being with my colleagues and doing activities with them instead of doing them in dull breakout rooms on Zoom?

Human Rights Watch has previously documented that the closure has prevented specialists in the use of assistive devices for people with disabilities from opportunities for hands-on training on the latest methods of evaluation, device maintenance, and rehabilitation. Human Rights Watch also documented restrictions on the movement of human rights workers. Gisha, the Israeli human rights group, has reported that Israel has blocked health workers in Gaza from attending training in the West Bank on how to operate new equipment and hampered the work of civil society organizations operating in Gaza.

Israeli authorities have also made it effectively impossible for Palestinians from Gaza to relocate to the West Bank. Because of Israeli restrictions, thousands of Gaza residents who arrived on temporary permits and now live in the West Bank are unable to gain legal residency. Although Israel claims that these restrictions are related to maintaining security, evidence Human Rights Watch collected suggests the main motivation is to control Palestinian demography across the West Bank, whose land Israel seeks to retain, in contrast to the Gaza Strip.

Egypt

With most Gaza residents unable to travel via Erez, the Egyptian-administered Rafah crossing has become Gaza’s primary outlet to the outside world, particularly in recent years. Egyptian authorities kept Rafah mostly closed for nearly five years following the July 2013 military coup in Egypt that toppled President Mohamed Morsy, whom the military accused of receiving support from Hamas. Egypt, though, eased restrictions in May 2018, amid the Great March of Return, the recurring Palestinian protests at the time near the fences separating Gaza and Israel.

Despite keeping Rafah open more regularly since May 2018, movement via Rafah is a fraction of what it was before the 2013 coup in Egypt. Whereas an average of 40,000 crossed monthly in both directions before the coup, the monthly average was 12,172 in 2019 and 15,077 in 2021, according to Gisha.

Human Rights Watch spoke with 16 Gaza residents who sought to travel via Rafah. Almost all said they opted for this route because of the near impossibility of receiving an Israeli permit to travel via Erez.

Gaza residents hoping to leave via Rafah are required to register in advance via a process the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has deemed “confusing” and “obscure.” Gaza residents can either register via the formal registration process administered by Gaza’s Interior Ministry or informally via what is known as tanseeq, or travel coordination with Egyptian authorities, paying travel companies or mediators for a place on a separate list coordinated by Egyptian authorities. Having two distinct lists of permitted travelers coordinated by different authorities has fueled “allegations of the payment of bribes in Gaza and in Egypt to ensure travel and a faster response,” according to OCHA.

The formal process often takes two to three months, except for those traveling for medical reasons, whose requests are processed faster, said Gaza residents who sought to leave Gaza via Rafah. Egyptian authorities have at times rejected those seeking to cross Rafah into Egypt on the grounds that they did not meet specific criteria for travel. The criteria lack transparency, but Gisha reported that they include having a referral for a medical appointment in Egypt or valid documents to enter a third country.

To avoid the wait and risk of denial, many choose instead the tanseeq route. Several interviewees said that they paid large sums of money to Palestinian brokers or Gaza-based travel companies that work directly with Egyptian authorities to expedite people’s movement via Rafah. On social media, some of these companies advertise that they can assure travel within days to those who provide payment and a copy of their passport. The cost of tanseeq has fluctuated from several hundred US dollars to several thousand dollars over the last decade, based in part on how frequently Rafah is open.

In recent years, travel companies have offered an additional “VIP” tanseeq, which expedites travel without delays in transit between Rafah and Cairo, offers flexibility on travel date, and ensures better treatment by authorities. The cost was $700, as of January 2022.

The Cairo-based company offering the VIP tanseeq services, Hala Consulting and Tourism Services, has strong links with Egypt’s security establishment and is staffed largely by former Egyptian military officers, a human rights activist and a journalist who have investigated these issues told Human Rights Watch. This allows the company to reduce processing times and delays at checkpoints during the journey between Rafah and Cairo. The activist and journalist both asked that their names be withheld for security reasons.  

The company is linked to prominent Egyptian businessman Ibrahim El-Argani, who has close ties with Egypt’s president, Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi. Ergany heads the Union of Sinai Tribes, which works hand-in-hand with the Egyptian military and intelligence agencies against militants operating in North Sinai. Ergany, one of Egypt’s few businessmen able to export products to Gaza from Egypt, owns the Sinai Sons company, which has an exclusive contract to handle all contracts related to Gaza reconstruction efforts. Human Rights Watch wrote to El-Argani to solicit his perspectives on these issues, but had received no response at this writing.

A 34-year-old computer engineer and entrepreneur said that he sought to travel in 2019 to Saudi Arabia to meet an investor to discuss a potential project to sell car parts online. He chose not to apply to travel via Erez, as he had applied for permits eight times between 2016 and 2018 and had either been rejected or not heard back.

He initially registered via the formal Ministry of Interior process and received approval to travel after three months. However, on the day assigned for his exit via Rafah, an Egyptian officer there said he found his reason for travel not sufficiently “convincing” and denied him passage. A few months later, he tried to travel again for the same purpose, this time opting for tanseeq and paying $400, and, this time, he successfully reached Saudi Arabia within a week of seeking to travel.

He said that he would like to go on vacation with his wife, but worries that Egyptian authorities will not consider vacation a sufficiently compelling reason for travel and that his only option will be to pay hundreds or thousands of dollars to do tanseeq.

A 73-year-old man sought to travel via Rafah in February 2021, with his 46-year-old daughter, to get knee replacement surgery in al-Sheikh Zayed hospital in Cairo. He said Gaza lacks the capacity to provide such an operation. The man and his daughter are relatives of a Human Rights Watch staff member. They applied via the Interior Ministry process and received approval in a little over a week.

After they waited for several hours in the Egyptian hall in Rafah on the day of travel, though, Egyptian authorities included the daughter’s name among the 70 names of people who were not allowed to cross that day, the daughter said. The father showed the border officials a doctor’s note indicating that he needed someone to travel with him given his medical situation, but the officer told him, “You either travel alone or go back with her to Gaza.” She said she returned to Gaza, alongside 70 other people, and her father later traveled on his own.

Five people who did manage to travel via Rafah said that they experienced poor conditions and poor treatment, including intrusive searches, by the Egyptian authorities, with several saying that they felt Egyptian authorities treated them like “criminals.” Several people said that Egyptian officers confiscated items from them during the journey, including an expensive camera and a mobile phone, without apparent reason.

Upon leaving Rafah, Palestinians are transported by bus to Cairo’s airport. The trip takes about seven hours, but several people said that the journey took up to three days between long periods of waiting on the bus, at checkpoints and amid other delays, often in extreme weather. Many of those who traveled via Rafah said that, during this journey, Egyptian authorities prevented passengers from using their phones.

The parents of a 7-year-old boy with autism and a rare brain disease said they sought to travel for medical treatment for him in August 2021, but Egyptian authorities only allowed the boy and his mother to enter. The mother said their journey back to Gaza took four days, mostly as a result of Rafah being closed. During this time, she said, they spent hours waiting at checkpoints, in extreme heat, with her son crying nonstop. She said she felt “humiliated” and treated like “an animal,” observing that she “would rather die than travel again through Rafah.”

A 33-year-old filmmaker, who traveled via Rafah to Morocco in late 2019 to attend a film screening, said the return from Cairo to Rafah took three days, much of it spent at checkpoints amid the cold winter in the Sinai desert.

A 34-year-old man said that he planned to travel in August 2019 via Rafah to the United Arab Emirates for a job interview as an Arabic teacher. He said, on his travel date, Egyptian authorities turned him back, saying they had met their quota of travelers. He crossed the next day, but said that, as it was a Thursday and with Rafah closed on Friday, Egyptian authorities made travelers spend two nights sleeping at Rafah, without providing food or access to a clean bathroom.

The journey to Cairo airport then took two days, during which he described going through checkpoints where officers made passengers “put their hands behind their backs while they searched their suitcases.” As a result of these delays totaling four days since his assigned travel date, he missed his job interview and found out that someone else was hired. He is currently unemployed in Gaza.

Given the uncertainty of crossing at Rafah, Gaza residents said that they often wait to book their flight out of Cairo until they arrive. Booking so late often means, beyond other obstacles, having to wait until they can find a reasonably priced and suitable flight, planning extra days for travel and spending extra money on changeable or last-minute tickets. Similar dynamics prevail with regard to travel abroad via Erez to Amman.

Human Rights Watch interviewed four men under the age of 40 with visas to third countries, whom Egyptian authorities allowed entry only for the purpose of transit. The authorities transported these men to Cairo airport and made them wait in what is referred to as the “deportation room” until their flight time. The men likened the room to a “prison cell,” with limited facilities and unsanitary conditions. All described a system in which bribes are required to be able to leave the room to book a plane ticket, get food, drinks, or a cigarette, and avoid abuse. One of the men described an officer taking him outside the room, asking him, “Won’t you give anything to Egypt?” and said that others in the room told him that he then proceeded to do the same with them

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”The United Nations reported that Israeli attacks killed 260 people in Gaza, at least 129 of them civilians, including 66 children. ”

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

GAZA: ISRAEL’S MAY AIRSTRIKES ON

HIGH RISES

APPARENTLY UNLAWFUL ATTACKS CAUSE

MAJOR LASTING HARM

23 AUGUST 2021

The Israeli military’s airstrikes that destroyed four high-rise buildings in Gaza City during the May 2021 fighting apparently violated the laws of war and may amount to war crimes, Human Rights Watch said today. The attacks also damaged neighboring structures, made several dozen families homeless, and shuttered scores of businesses that provided livelihoods to many people.

Between May 11 and 15, Israeli forces attacked the Hanadi, al-Jawhara, al-Shorouk, and al-Jalaa towers in the densely populated al-Rimal neighborhood. In each case, the Israeli military warned tenants of impending attacks, allowing for their evacuation. Three buildings were immediately leveled while the fourth, al-Jawhara, sustained extensive damage and is slated to be demolished. Israeli authorities contend that Palestinian armed groups were using the towers for military purposes, but have provided no evidence to support those allegations.

“The apparently unlawful Israeli strikes on four high-rise towers in Gaza City caused serious, lasting harm for countless Palestinians who lived, worked, shopped, or benefitted from businesses based there,” said Richard Weir, crisis and conflict researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The Israeli military should publicly produce the evidence that it says it relied on to carry out these attacks.”

The Israeli military stated that during the hostilities with Palestinian armed groups in Gaza from May 10 to 21, its forces attacked about 1,500 targets with air- and ground-launched munitions. The United Nations reported that Israeli attacks killed 260 people in Gaza, at least 129 of them civilians, including 66 children. Local authorities in Gaza said that 2,400 housing units were made uninhabitable, while over 50,000 units were damaged, and over 2,000 industrial, trade, and service facilities were destroyed or partially damaged.

Palestinian armed groups launched over 4,360 rockets indiscriminately toward Israel, resulting in the deaths of 12 civilians in Israel, including 2 children, and a soldier, according to Israeli authorities. Human Rights Watch separately reported on Israeli airstrikes that killed scores of Palestinian civilians and Palestinian armed group rocket attacks in violation of the laws of war.

Between May and August, Human Rights Watch interviewed by phone 18 Palestinians who were witnesses and victims of the attacks on the towers, including residents, business owners, and employees, as well as those in affected neighboring structures. Human Rights Watch also reviewed video footage and photographs taken after the attacks, and statements by Israeli and Palestinian officials and Palestinian armed groups.

The towers contained scores of businesses, offices of news agencies, and many homes. Jawad Mahdi, 68, an owner of  al-Jalaa tower who lived there with dozens of family members, said, “All these years of hard work, it was a place of living, safety, children and grandchildren, all our history and life, destroyed in front of your eyes … It’s like someone ripping your heart out and throwing it.”

The long-term effects of the attacks extend beyond the immediate destruction of the buildings, Human Rights Watch said. Many jobs were lost with the closure of their companies and many families were displaced.

Mohammed Qadada, 31, the head of a digital marketing company located in Hanadi tower, said that the 30 employees affected include people who “have families of their own, who were just entering into marriage, who support their older parents, who have sick members of the family who need financial support.” He said they “won’t find work again because the equipment that they had allowed them to do rendering, designing, producing, [has] all been destroyed. So how can they do the work?”

Israel has asserted that the high-rise buildings housed offices of Palestinian armed groups, including the headquarters of certain units, military intelligence, and in one tower, offices for “the most valuable Hamas technological equipment” for use against Israel. Any information to support these claims has not been made public.  

Human Rights Watch found no evidence that members of Palestinian groups involved in military operations had a current or long-term presence in any of the towers at the time they were attacked. Even if there were such a presence, the attacks appeared to cause foreseeably disproportionate harm to civilian property.

Under international humanitarian law, or the laws of war, warring parties may target only military objectives. In doing so, they must take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians, and unless circumstances do not permit, provide effective advance warnings of attacks. Deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian objects are prohibited, including reprisals against civilians. The laws of war also prohibit indiscriminate attacks, which include attacks that do not target a specific military objective or do not distinguish between civilians and military targets. Attacks in which the expected harm to civilians and civilian property is disproportionate to the anticipated military gain are also prohibited.

Personnel or equipment being used in military operations are subject to attack, but whether that justifies destroying an entire large building where they might be present depends on the attack not inflicting disproportionate harm on civilians or civilian property. The proportionality of the attack is even more questionable because Israeli forces have previously demonstrated the capacity to strike specific floors or parts of structures. However, these attacks completely flattened three of the buildings, evidently by attacking their structural integrity. Regarding al-Jalaa tower, the Israeli military said that because armed groups had occupied multiple floors, the entire tower needed to be destroyed.

The deployment of Palestinian armed groups in the towers, if true, would go against requirements to take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians under their control and to avoid placing military objectives in densely populated areas. Israel has repeatedly accused Palestinian armed groups of deploying among civilians and – without providing evidence, using them as “human shields” – the war crime of intentionally co-locating military forces with civilians to deter targeting those forces.  

Individuals who order or commit serious violations of the laws of war with criminal intent – that is, deliberately or recklessly – are responsible for war crimes. A country responsible for laws-of-war violations is obligated to make full reparation for the loss or injury caused, including compensation for individuals harmed.

The 14-year Israeli closure of Gaza, along with Egyptian border restrictions, has devastated the economy in Gaza. Restrictions on the entry of goods broadly deemed to be “dual-use,” for example, have sharply reduced the population’s access to construction material and certain medical equipment. Unless lifted or substantially eased, the sweeping restrictions on the movement of people and goods will hamper reconstruction efforts.

On May 27, the UN Human Rights Council established a Commission of Inquiry to address violations and abuses in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and Israel, including by advancing accountability for those responsible and justice for victims. The commission should examine unlawful attacks committed by Israeli forces and Palestinian armed groups during the May fighting. It should also analyze the larger context, including the Israeli government’s discriminatory treatment of Palestinians.

“Throughout the May hostilities, unlawful Israeli strikes not only killed many civilians, but also destroyed high-rise towers, wiping out scores of businesses and homes, upending the lives of thousands of Palestinians,” Weir said. “Donor funding alone will not rebuild Gaza. The crushing closure of the Gaza Strip needs to end, along with the impunity that fuels ongoing serious abuses.”

May Hostilities

The May 2021 fighting followed efforts by Jewish settler groups to evict and confiscate the property of longtime Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem. Palestinians held demonstrations around East Jerusalem, and Israeli security forces fired teargas, stun grenades, and rubber-coated steel bullets, injuring hundreds of Palestinians.

On May 10, Palestinian armed groups in Gaza started to launch rockets toward Israeli population centers. The Israeli military attacked the densely populated Gaza Strip with missiles, rockets, and artillery. Many of the attacks by the Israeli military and Palestinian armed groups used explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas. A ceasefire went into effect on May 21.

The May hostilities, like those in 2008, 2012, 2014, 2018, and 2019, among others, took place amid Israel’s sweeping closure of the Gaza Strip, which began in 2007. They also took place in a context of discriminatory efforts to remove Palestinians from their homes in occupied East Jerusalem, policies and practices among the Israeli government’s crimes against humanity of apartheid and persecution, as Human Rights Watch has documented.

Human Rights Watch on May 30 requested permits for senior researchers to enter Gaza to conduct research on the fighting, but Israeli authorities on July 26 rejected the request. Israeli authorities have since 2008 refused access to Human Rights Watch international staff to enter Gaza, except for a single visit in 2016.

On July 13, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Spokesperson responded to a June 4 Human Rights Watch letter asking detailed questions about the attacks, saying that the Israeli military “strikes military targets exclusively, following an assessment that the potential collateral damage resulting from the attack is not excessive in relation to the expected military advantage.” The military added that it was making inquiries and investigating “various incidents” in order “to assess whether the obligatory rules had been breached and to draw conclusions.”

Attacks on High-Rise Buildings

The strikes on the four towers that Human Rights Watch investigated were just a small fraction of the Israeli military’s attacks in Gaza during the May fighting.

In each instance, the Israeli military warned residents of the impending attack by calling a building manager, security guard, or tenant, waited for individuals to evacuate, then launched smaller munitions that were either non-explosive or had small explosive yields – which the Israeli military calls “a knock on the roof” – and then carried out airstrikes. Three of the four buildings were immediately leveled. Although no deaths or injuries of fighters or civilians were reported, the attacks destroyed civilian property worth millions of US dollars.

Human Rights Watch research into the attacks on the four towers found no evidence that members of Palestinian groups involved in military operations were in the buildings or had a long-term presence. One businessman said that Hamas had offices in Hanadi tower, but he could not identify who the tenants were or what they did, or that they had any links to Hamas’s armed wing. Under the laws of war, civilian officials not involved in military operations are not subject to attack. Media offices are civilian objects unless they are taking a direct part in the hostilities by communicating military information.

The destruction of businesses and residences in the towers may have long-term implications for the enjoyment of basic rights of those affected, including access to an adequate standard of living, such as water, food, and housing, and loss of livelihoods. The displacement of families can impair their physical security, access to health care, and family life. The destruction of a dozen offices of media outlets undermines the collection and dissemination of information in Gaza.

The size of the blast following the munitions impact and subsequent detonation, as captured in videos either distributed by the Israeli military or circulated online and reviewed by Human Rights Watch, appear consistent with the use of munitions with large high-explosive warheads. These explosive weapons produced wide-area effects, resulting in the complete destruction or serious damage to each of the towers and damage to surrounding areas, including to homes, businesses, and infrastructure.

The Hanadi Tower

At about 6 p.m. on May 11, the Israeli military called the security guard at Hanadi tower to notify him that the 13-story tower would be attacked and that occupants should evacuate, said Maher Awad Kamal Safadi, 36, a local resident and business owner. Israeli forces then struck the building and area around it with multiple small munitions, according to Safadi and a video posted online prior to the attack. Then, at around 7:30 p.m., at least one munition hit the side of the building at its base. Seconds later, at least one more munition struck the opposite side at its base and the building quickly collapsed, causing damage to surrounding businesses and homes.

The attack caused no casualties, but its owner, Ahmed Abu Jaber, said that the building and contents destroyed were worth millions of dollars. Damage to a nearby hotel caused hundreds of thousands of dollars in loss.   

Following the attack, the Israeli military released multiple statements, images, and a video of the strike. The statements acknowledged the attack and said that Hamas used the building for “military research and development” and that it housed “Hamas military intelligence offices.” One statement posted on the Israeli military’s website said the building housed “multiple military units used by Hamas” and included a “headquarters” for research and development, military intelligence, and “more,” but did not further clarify.  

The media reported that the building housed offices of the political leadership of Hamas. A journalist familiar with the tower, who did not wish to be identified, said: “There are political meeting offices for Hamas parliament members and spokespersons in the tower.” While one business owner in the tower said there were Hamas offices in the tower, he was unaware of their purpose.

Hamas, the de facto authority in Gaza, is a group that includes both a political party and an armed wing. Mere membership or affiliation with Hamas is not a sufficient basis for determining someone to be a lawful military target. The laws of war allow the targeting of military commanders in the course of armed conflict, provided that such attacks otherwise comply with the laws that protect civilians. Political leaders not taking part in military operations, as well as civilians, would not be legitimate targets of attack.

Three of the tower’s business owners described the effects of the attack. Nihad Abdellatif Taha, 45, a computer engineer, said damages to his programming and digital marketing company, Portals, headquartered in the tower, were about US$30,000:  

I had 36 employees and we were renting two apartments – 360 square meters with furniture, offices, meeting rooms, surveillance cameras – all of this is gone, in addition to very important documents, all the company’s papers are gone, including stamps and the employees’ contracts – all gone.

Mohammed Qadada, 31, founder and chief executive officer of Planet for Digital Solutions, said that when it moved into the tower in 2017, he invested about $40,000 in renovations, furniture, and new equipment, including workstations, laptops, and printers. All of it was destroyed: “It was May 22 when I went to the tower for the first time [since its destruction]. Everything was gone, I saw rubble, I saw remnants of an office, I saw people’s stuff strewn around, I saw people’s memories, I saw everything fallen.”

As of late May, the company’s 30 employees had all been unemployed since the attack.

Maher Awad Kamal Safadi, 36, who owned Friends Gym on the ground floor of Hanadi tower, said that months earlier he had invested over $10,000 in new exercise equipment. “I had a sauna, jacuzzi, Moroccan bath, a fitness room and a weight room, bathrooms, and a full restaurant with fridges and a gas stove” – all of which were destroyed. He said the attack cost the gym’s six employees their jobs and that he would need $150,000 to replace the equipment.

The buildings immediately adjacent to Hanadi tower, particularly to the north, suffered serious damage. Satellite imagery recorded on May 14 shows damage to the southern and western facades of the Handouqa apartment building and the Gaza International Hotel, both a few meters north of Hanadi tower. Images published on May 12 show serious damage to the facades of the two buildings. 

Imad Handouqa, 54, the owner of the Handouqa apartment, which had 10 floors and 25 residential apartments, said it was no longer habitable. He said that part of Hanadi tower fell on the building, damaging its foundations and causing some apartment ceilings to come down on the rooms. He said the total value of the structure was about $1.3 million.

The owner of the Gaza International Hotel, Abu Ahmed Jaber, in a video posted on the hotel’s Facebook page, said the damage to the hotel amounts to nearly half a million dollars.

The attack also damaged critical electrical delivery lines for Gaza City and the area immediately around the tower, Gaza’s electricity company said.

al-Jawhara Tower

On the evening of May 11, the Israeli military called residents living next to the tower to inform the tenants of the 11-story Jawhara tower that the primarily commercial building would be targeted and to evacuate. At approximately 10 p.m., Israeli aircraft launched small munitions, striking the roof and the ground near the tower. At around 2 a.m. on May 12, larger air-dropped munitions struck the building, severely damaging it.

Mohammad Atta Hassan Jaarour, 71, a founder and co-owner who lived on the building’s seventh floor, said the damage, including to the foundational pillars, left the building structurally unsound. “The whole building is destroyed,” he said. “It’s still standing, but it’s a skeleton, all the ground floors and the two underground floors all exploded.”

Residents and tenants said the strike caused extensive damage to their apartments, businesses, equipment, and the surrounding neighborhood. One said that the strikes were so intense that “most of the surrounding buildings – the fronts of the buildings and the glass – were destroyed.”

Following the attack, the Israeli military issued a statement saying that the building housed a “headquarters belonging to the Hamas terror organization’s intelligence unit, Hamas Judea and Samaria [West Bank] Headquarters, Public Relations department and the Gaza Brigade.” The Israeli military also released a video of the attack showing at least two munitions striking the building within seconds of one another.

Six days later, the Israeli military released a statement and images, saying it attacked another building that it also said was the Hamas headquarters for the West Bank.

Ahmed Zaeem, a co-owner of al-Jawhara who lived in the building with his parents, wife, and four children and had been there for 17 years, said the tower contained 64 units on eight floors, two underground floors, and a floor dedicated to a shopping mall. “The 64 units include residences, law offices, media outlets, engineering firms, development agencies, [and information technology] companies,” Zaeem said. “There’s also a dentist. There were no less than 20 stores on the bottom three commercial floors.” Six of the 64 units were residential.

Zaeem said the overall economic loss was $5-7 million to rebuild the building, which did not include the losses in the commercial units and the residential apartments. He said he personally lost about $1.5 million in property he owned in the tower. Jaarour estimated that he lost $1.2 million. “If we had the money, I think we could rebuild it in four to five years,” Jaarour said, citing the Israeli closure and restrictions on the entry of building materials.

Both co-owners described the loss of businesses in which they had invested. Jaarour cited Magic Pizza, which he said had new appliances and furniture and employed about a dozen people: “We were so happy and had been waiting a long time to get it running. In one moment, all of these things turned into an illusion.”

Zaeem and his family ran several offices and stores in the tower, including the Elaine Center women’s clothing shop. He said his wife had invested $20,000 in equipment for a new photography studio, Studio Wateen Photographer, which had been set to open soon.

The building also contained SMT Solutions, an information technology company that provides internet to areas throughout Gaza. A post on the company’s Facebook page on May 13 said that the fiber optic networks, data center, and the company’s headquarters were destroyed in the attack and would take six months to repair.

The tower also housed the Young Journalists Radio Club, Gaza’s only radio broadcast for children. Ghassan Radwan, 51, owner of the radio club, said it had eight people working at the radio station and more than 20 children who ran the programming and did the broadcasting. Everything in their office was destroyed and to rebuild the network would cost about $70,000, but that would require overcoming the restrictions on the entry of communications equipment due to the Israeli closure and Egyptian restrictions.

The official Palestinian news agency, Wafa, listed the offices of 11 media outlets in the building: London-based Qatari broadcaster Al-Araby TV; news website and newspaper Felestin; Iraqi broadcaster Al-Etejah TV; Al-Kofiya TV; Jordanian broadcaster Al-Mamlaka; Sabq24 News Agency; news website Al-Bawaba 24; the production company Watania News Agency; the local photo agency APA Images; Al-Nujaba TV; and the Syrian state-owned broadcaster Syria TV. However, Human Rights Watch was not able to independently verify whether Al-Nujaba TV, Syria TV, and APA Images were located in the tower.  

The tower also contained the offices of the media rights group Forum of Palestinian Journalists, and the Palestinian Forum for Democratic Dialogue and Development.

When Zaeem visited his home in the tower after the attack, he found it destroyed: “The furniture was ripped, the curtains, things turned over – everything was broken. The bathroom doors were all broken, the tiles came off the floors, the roof on the apartments are weak and would leak if there’s any water.” In early June, Zaeem said he and his family were living with a friend while looking for somewhere new to live.

al-Shorouk Tower 

On the afternoon of May 12, the Israeli military phoned the 14-story Shorouk tower’s security guard, who then informed the tenants that the building would be attacked and that they needed to evacuate. Approximately 30 minutes after the phone warning, Israeli aircraft launched lower-yield explosive munitions against the structure. A few minutes later, Israeli aircraft struck the tower with multiple, large air-dropped munitions, critically damaging the structure, causing two parts of the building to collapse but leaving the center – and tallest part of the building – standing. About 10 minutes later, Israeli aircraft attacked the remaining part of structure, using two large, air-dropped munitions, causing the final element to collapse onto nearby shops and homes.

No one was killed or injured as a result, but the owners of the tower and businesses in the building, as well as adjacent buildings, described destruction and damage to scores of businesses and at least a half-dozen homes.  

Following the attack, the Israeli military released a graphic of the building and a statement that said “[t]he building housed Hamas military intelligence offices, as well as infrastructure used by the terror organizations to communicate tactical-military information.”

Ahmed Masoud al-Mughanni, 60, chairman of the building’s board of directors, said that the building had 50 offices and a coffee shop – “doctors, lawyers, journalists’ offices” – and empty residential apartments. He estimated that the cost of rebuilding the tower would be between $2 and $3.5 million and take several years.

The attack destroyed the offices of several media outlets in the building: Al-Aqsa TV and Al-Aqsa Radio; the Palestine Media Production Company; Al-Quds Today; and a Palestinian Authority-affiliated newspaper, Al-Hayat al-Jadida.

The Palestine Media Production Company rented five apartments on floors 5, 9, and 13. Ismail Abdelghani Ismail Jabr, 27, whose father owns the company, said the company had been operating in the building since 1994 and employed 17 people at the time of the attack. Jabr and Mohammad al-Buhaisi, 30, a producer, said the company produces television and video reports, films, and stories for numerous foreign news outlets. Just prior to the attack, they managed to remove equipment from one of their two studios, but the remainder of their equipment was destroyed, along with eight years of archived material.

Witnesses to the attack said that when the tower came down, it damaged numerous shops and homes in the area, including the al-Sousi shopping complex, a nearby restaurant, and the Hassania building.

Ahmed Ayman Mohammad Omar al-Sousi, 27, who lived in the building next to al-Shorouk tower with his extended family of 42 in six separate apartments, said they owned and operated 10 ground-floor stores that sold accessories, clothing, and embroidery. He said that when the central part of al-Shorouk tower collapsed, it fell on their businesses and residences: “The amount of damage in the area from the tower falling is horrific. Flames lit up in the area – our building was on fire. The 10 stores and five storage rooms were all burned.”

Because it was Eid season, the stores and storage rooms were full of merchandise, all of which was destroyed, he said.

Al-Sousi said the fires caused by the explosions burned for three days and did the most damage. He estimated that the destruction of the store he owned with his father caused losses of about $120,000. All seven people employed at the shop, including several family members, lost their jobs. As of early June, he said the employees from the nine other stores were also out of work.

Along with the businesses, four of the six apartments where the al-Sousi family lived were also destroyed or seriously damaged either by the collapsing tower or the resulting fire. “The tower is now on our house – how are we going to lift it,” al-Sousi said. Al-Sousi’s extended family members all had to find new homes.

al-Jalaa Tower

On the afternoon of May 15, a man who identified himself as “Danny” from the Israeli military spoke in Arabic on the phone to the nephew of Jawad Mahdi, 68, the owner of the 14-story Jalaa tower. His voice was captured on a cell phone threatening a reprisal attack: “Because they [Palestinian armed groups] shot at Israel and they shot at Tel Aviv, we are now going to hit and strike the entire tower.” The phone was handed over to Madhi. “Danny” told Mahdi to inform the tenants that the building would be targeted and to evacuate all the floors.

Human Rights Watch sent questions to the Israeli military inquiring as to the authenticity of the recording and whether the statements made reflected Israeli military policy, but, as of the date of publication, have not received a response.

At about 3 p.m., Israeli aircraft fired small munitions at the building. Within minutes, Israeli aircraft attacked the tower using at least two air-dropped munitions near the base of the building on two sides and it immediately collapsed.

No one was killed or injured because everyone had evacuated, but residents and tenants say that in addition to the destruction of the building, they lost everything in their homes and businesses, including equipment and records. The building housed bureaus of Al Jazeera English and the Associated Press.  

Following the attack, the Israeli military posted an image and video, and issued several statements that sought to justify it. Israeli military officials and politicians, including then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, also issued statements or addressed the media on the subject. These statements changed over time, describing the threats posed by the alleged militant presence as increasingly serious.

On the day of the attack, the Israeli military stated that the building “contained military assets belonging to the intelligence offices of the Hamas terror organization.” Later that day, it said it “housed the Hamas Research and Development unit, which is responsible, among other things, for terror activity carried out against the State of Israel.” The same statement added that this unit included “subject matter experts (SMEs) which constitute a unique asset to the Hamas terrorist organization. These SMEs operate the most valuable Hamas technological equipment against Israel.” The then-military spokesperson, Lt. Col. Jonathan Conricus, told Reuters later that day that the offices occupied by Palestinian armed groups were located on multiple floors.

On May 16, the Israeli military’s official Twitter account stated in a post that the tower was an “important base of operations for Hamas’ military intel” and that, along with gathering intelligence, it “manufactured weapons and positioned equipment to hamper IDF operations.” In a second post, minutes later, it said that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad removed equipment following the military’s warning to tenants and residents, though it did not specify which equipment.

On May 17, then-Prime Minister Netanyahu said on the US-television network CBS that the building had “an intelligence office for the Palestinian terrorist organization housed in that building that plots and organizes attacks against Israeli citizens.” An unnamed senior Israeli military official later told the New York Times in an article published on May 21 that the building contained electronic jamming equipment. Israel has provided no evidence to support any of these allegations.

Tenants, residents, and the owner of the building have rejected Israeli claims that armed groups had a presence in the building.

The Associated Press’s president and CEO, Gary Pruitt, said: “We have had no indication Hamas was in the building or active in the building. This is something we actively check to the best of our ability. We would never knowingly put our journalists at risk.”

Mahdi, who is also a resident, said that the building was worth about $5 million and that he estimated another $2 million in furniture and appliances were destroyed.

A list that Mahdi produced for receiving compensation from authorities in Gaza for damage to the tower shows over 50 individual businesses and offices on five floors and the two rooftops. Residences filled the other five floors, many of them inhabited by Mahdi’s relatives. He said that 30 families were living in the building at the time of the attack, a total of about 130 people. Mahdi said he and his extended family owned 10 units.

Fares al-Ghoul, 30, who works for al-Mayadeen Media Group, which had offices in al-Jalaa tower, said that he was in his office on the third floor with five colleagues when the superintendent told them to evacuate:

I didn’t know what to do. Imagine the situation, the superintendent comes to you crying, saying “Quick! Quick! Get out! They’re going to bomb the building.” So, the five others and I took the equipment we could and left behind equipment worth $200,000, because we just didn’t have enough time.

The equipment destroyed included a satellite transmitter, which he said costs around $120,000, and is extremely difficult to replace because of the Israeli closure of Gaza. Wael Dahdouh, 51, an Al Jazeera correspondent and the Gaza office head, said that he estimated their losses at about $1 million.

Ramy Haddad, 46, the head of the Central Blood Lab, part of the Palestine Future Foundation for Childhood, offers tests and regular follow-ups for patients of thalassemia, a rare blood disorder. The lab had several pieces of special equipment to run these tests, all of which were destroyed. Haddad estimated the losses at $70,000 and said it would be difficult to replace some of the specialized medical equipment due to Israel’s entry restrictions.

Several engineering and consulting firms also occupied offices in the building. Khaled Omar Abu Sultan, 58, director of Ro’yatak, an engineering consulting and management business housed in the tower since 2020, said the firm designed hospitals, schools, roads, and other infrastructure. At the time of the attack, he and his employees were at home and did not have time to retrieve anything from the office. He estimates the losses in office equipment at about $15,000: “The main loss is a large archive of projects – our plans, files, references and documents. We had printers and equipment for photographing maps.” Sultan said they had to stop work on all current projects until they can buy new equipment.

Khaled Majed Abu Rahma, 30, works with his father at Al-Burj for Engineering Consultations and Design, which has been in al-Jalaa tower for 15 years. He said the firm makes engineering plans and employs 10 engineers, including those with specialties in civil, architecture, mechanical, and electrical engineering. The firm helped to plan homes, villas, and multi-story buildings in Gaza. “We lost everything – the whole office, the furniture, the files,” he said. “We didn’t take anything.”

Rahma estimated that the apartment, which they owned, cost $72,000 and the equipment and furniture lost was a little over $19,000. All 10 engineers lost their jobs as a result of the attack.

The attack also damaged civilian structures around the building. Mahdi said: “The surrounding buildings and homes suffered a great deal of damage, some were destroyed … The Al-Mushtaha building near us suffered the most damage.” He said that the front of the adjacent building owned by the Anan family also suffered damage.

Al-Ghoul said that the buildings next to the tower, including the Watan tower and Anan building, and across the street were also damaged.

Dahdouh said that the whole block was evacuated, but when residents of other buildings tried to return, they found their homes damaged and could not go back right away.

The destruction of al-Jalaa tower left the 30 families who lived in it homeless and seeking shelter elsewhere. Mahdi said that “Our family got separated – each one of us went to a separate house. We found two homes to rent – we’re waiting for another five homes so we can all be together.”   

Long-term, “Reverberating” Effects, and Gaza’s Closure

In addition to the damage and destruction to the towers and their offices and residences, the attacks can be expected to have various “reverberating” effects – harm to civilians and civilian objects caused by the attack that are not direct or immediate. These include displacement and a reduced standard of living and impaired access to shelter, health care, and basic services such as electricity, all of which affect the enjoyment of basic human rights.

In Gaza, these effects are exacerbated by the generalized closure that Israel has imposed on Gaza since 2007 – policies that Egypt, which borders Gaza to the south, does little to alleviate by maintaining its restrictions. The Israeli closure, along with Egyptian border restrictions, has devastated Gaza’s economy. Eighty percent of Gaza’s people rely on humanitarian aid and more than half live below the poverty line. In 2020, the unemployment rate was above 40 percent.

Israeli authorities justify the Gaza closure on security grounds. But the ban on the movement of more than two million people, with narrow exceptions, based on generalized threats, and the sweeping restrictions on the entry and exit of goods, violates Israel’s obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law to ensure that the needs of the population are met.

Israeli authorities, for example, severely restrict the entry of so-called “dual-use” items that could be used for military purposes, such as the construction of tunnels or fortifications. However, the “dual-use” list includes both overly broad categories and items that are vital to meet the needs of Gaza’s population, including “communications equipment,” “steel elements and construction products,” “drilling equipment,” and certain medical equipment .

These restrictions have sharply reduced the population’s access to construction material and other goods vital to the rebuilding of Gaza and its infrastructure. The Israeli military argues that armed groups in Gaza use cement to build tunnels and estimate that constructing a kilometer of tunnel requires a few hundred tons of cement. But people in Gaza need over a million tons of cement annually to build and maintain homes, schools, health clinics, the water system, and other vital infrastructure.

The recent destruction and damage to tens of thousands of residential and commercial buildings and infrastructure caused by Israeli strikes increases the need for building materials to repair and rebuild these structures. The Israeli authorities should not restrict an overwhelmingly civilian good, badly needed for rebuilding, because armed groups may use a small fraction of it to build tunnels or for other military purposes.

The general inaccessibility of building materials means that any reconstruction efforts will require substantial time to complete. In interviews with investors and owners at three of the four towers, all said that because of Israel’s closure it would take years just to rebuild the structures. Several owners of businesses that rely on specialized equipment the entry of which is severely restricted, such as broadcasting equipment, expressed concern that rebuilding would be complicated and slow.

On August 13, the Israeli army announced that, in light of the stable security situation at the moment, it would expand the list of goods allowed to enter Gaza, including to allow in “goods and equipment for humanitarian projects.” Palestinian authorities said on August 17 that, according to information they received from Israeli authorities, “construction materials for the private sector and related to humanitarian projects only” would be among the items permitted to enter Gaza. Israeli authorities reportedly allowed some items in on August 19, but it remains unclear to what extent this marks a change in policy and how long these measures will remain in place.

The Israeli government should allow the entry into Gaza of concrete and other materials needed for the reconstruction of civilian infrastructure, subject to, at most, narrowly tailored restrictions based on particularized security assessments.

Unless the closure is lifted or substantially eased, the long-term and reverberating effects of the destruction of the towers and other civilian infrastructure will be exacerbated.

Lack of Accountability

Israeli and Palestinian authorities have a long track record of failing to credibly investigate alleged war crimes by their forces in Gaza. On May 12, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicated that it was monitoring the situation in Gaza. The prosecutor’s office should include in its Palestine investigation apparently unlawful Israeli attacks in Gaza, as well as Palestinian rocket attacks that struck population centers in Israel.

Judicial authorities in other countries should also investigate and prosecute under national laws those credibly implicated in serious crimes in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and in Israel under the principle of universal jurisdiction.

Warring parties should refrain from using explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas because of the foreseeable indiscriminate harm to civilians. Countries should support a strong political declaration that addresses the harm that explosive weapons cause to civilians and commit to avoid using those with wide-area effects in populated areas.

EINDE BERICHT HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

OCHA

GAZA STRIP: ESCALATION OF HOSTILITIES 10-21 MAY 2021

[9]

” The attacks also damaged neighboring structures, made several dozen families homeless, and shuttered scores of businesses that provided livelihoods to many people.”

…

….

” Three of the four buildings were immediately leveled. Although no deaths or injuries of fighters or civilians were reported, the attacks destroyed civilian property worth millions of US dollars.”

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

GAZA: ISRAEL’S MAY AIRSTRIKES ON

HIGH RISES

APPARENTLY UNLAWFUL ATTACKS CAUSE

MAJOR LASTING HARM

23 AUGUST 2021

ZIE VOOR GEHELE TEKST, NOOT 8

[10]

”The 14-year Israeli closure of Gaza, along with Egyptian border restrictions, has devastated the economy in Gaza. Restrictions on the entry of goods broadly deemed to be “dual-use,” for example, have sharply reduced the population’s access to construction material and certain medical equipment. Unless lifted or substantially eased, the sweeping restrictions on the movement of people and goods will hamper reconstruction efforts.”

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

GAZA: ISRAEL’S MAY AIRSTRIKES ON

HIGH RISES

APPARENTLY UNLAWFUL ATTACKS CAUSE

MAJOR LASTING HARM

23 AUGUST 2021

ZIE VOOR GEHELE TEKST, NOOT 8

”(Gaza) – Israel’s sweeping restrictions on leaving Gaza deprive its more than two million residents of opportunities to better their lives, Human Rights Watch said today on the fifteenth anniversary of the 2007 closure. The closure has devastated the economy in Gaza, contributed to fragmentation of the Palestinian people, and forms part of Israeli authorities’ crimes against humanity of apartheid and persecution against millions of Palestinians.”

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

GAZA: ISRAEL’S ”OPEN-AIR PRISON” AT 15

Israel, Egypt Movement Restrictions Wreak Havoc on Palestinian Lives

14 JUNE 2022

(Gaza) – Israel’s sweeping restrictions on leaving Gaza deprive its more than two million residents of opportunities to better their lives, Human Rights Watch said today on the fifteenth anniversary of the 2007 closure. The closure has devastated the economy in Gaza, contributed to fragmentation of the Palestinian people, and forms part of Israeli authorities’ crimes against humanity of apartheid and persecution against millions of Palestinians.

Israel’s closure policy blocks most Gaza residents from going to the West Bank, preventing professionals, artists, athletes, students, and others from pursuing opportunities within Palestine and from traveling abroad via Israel, restricting their rights to work and an education. Restrictive Egyptian policies at its Rafah crossing with Gaza, including unnecessary delays and mistreatment of travelers, have exacerbated the closure’s harm to human rights.

“Israel, with Egypt’s help, has turned Gaza into an open-air prison,” said Omar Shakir, Israel and Palestine director at Human Rights Watch. “As many people around the world are once again traveling two years after the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, Gaza’s more than two million Palestinians remain under what amounts to a 15-year-old lockdown.”

Israel should end its generalized ban on travel for Gaza residents and permit free movement of people to and from Gaza, subject to, at most, individual screening and physical searches for security purposes.

Between February 2021 and March 2022, Human Rights Watch interviewed 20 Palestinians who sought to travel out of Gaza via either the Israeli-run Erez crossing or the Egyptian-administered Rafah crossing. Human Rights Watch wrote to Israeli and Egyptian authorities to solicit their perspectives on its findings, and separately to seek information about an Egyptian travel company that operates at the Rafah crossing but had received no responses at this writing.

Since 2007, Israeli authorities have, with narrow exceptions, banned Palestinians from leaving through Erez, the passenger crossing from Gaza into Israel, through which they can reach the West Bank and travel abroad via Jordan. Israel also prevents Palestinian authorities from operating an airport or seaport in Gaza. Israeli authorities also sharply restrict the entry and exit of goods.

They often justify the closure, which came after Hamas seized political control over Gaza from the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in June 2007, on security grounds. Israeli authorities have said they want to minimize travel between Gaza and the West Bank to prevent the export of “a human terrorist network” from Gaza to the West Bank, which has a porous border with Israel and where hundreds of thousands of Israeli settlers live.

This policy has reduced travel to a fraction of what it was two decades ago, Human Rights Watch said. Israeli authorities have instituted a formal “policy of separation” between Gaza and the West Bank, despite international consensus that these two parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory form a “single territorial unit.” Israel accepted that principle in the 1995 Oslo Accords, signed with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Israeli authorities restrict all travel between Gaza and the West Bank, even when the travel takes place via the circuitous route through Egypt and Jordan rather than through Israeli territory.

Due to these policies, Palestinian professionals, students, artists, and athletes living in Gaza have missed vital opportunities for advancement not available in Gaza. Human Rights Watch interviewed seven people who said that Israeli authorities did not respond to their requests for travel through Erez, and three others who said Israel rejected their permits, apparently for not fitting within Israeli’s narrow criteria.

Walaa Sada, 31, a filmmaker, said that she applied for permits to take part in film training in the West Bank in 2014 and 2018, after spending years convincing her family to allow her to travel alone, but Israeli authorities never responded to her applications. The hands-on nature of the training, requiring filming live scenes and working in studios, made remote participation impracticable and Sada ended up missing the sessions.

The “world narrowed” when she received these rejections, Sada said, making her feel “stuck in a small box.… For us in Gaza, the hands of the clock stopped. People all over the world can easily and quickly book flight and travel, while we … die waiting for our turn.”

The Egyptian authorities have exacerbated the closure’s impact by restricting movement out of Gaza and at times fully sealing its Rafah border crossing, Gaza’s only outlet aside from Erez to the outside world. Since May 2018, Egyptian authorities have been keeping Rafah open more regularly, making it, amid the sweeping Israeli restrictions, the primary outlet to the outside world for Gaza residents.

Palestinians, however, still face onerous obstacles traveling through Egypt, including having to wait weeks for permission to travel, unless they are willing to pay hundreds of dollars to travel companies with significant ties to Egyptian authorities to expedite their travel, denials of entry, and abuse by Egyptian authorities.

Sada said also received an opportunity to participate in a workshop on screenwriting in Tunisia in 2019, but that she could not afford the US$2000 it would cost her to pay for the service that would ensure that she could travel on time. Her turn to travel came up six weeks later, after the workshop had already been held.

As an occupying power that maintains significant control over many aspects of life in Gaza, Israel has obligations under international humanitarian law to ensure the welfare of the population there. Palestinians also have the right under international human rights law to freedom of movement, in particular within the occupied territory, a right that Israel can restrict under international law only in response to specific security threats.

Israel’s policy, though, presumptively denies free movement to people in Gaza, with narrow exceptions, irrespective of any individualized assessment of the security risk a person may pose. These restrictions on the right to freedom of movement do not meet the requirement of being strictly necessary and proportionate to achieve a lawful objective. Israel has had years and many opportunities to develop more narrowly tailored responses to security threats that minimize restrictions on rights.

Egypt’s legal obligations toward Gaza residents are more limited, as it is not an occupying power. However, as a state party to the Fourth Geneva Convention, it should ensure respect for the convention “in all circumstances,” including protections for civilians living under military occupation who are unable to travel due to unlawful restrictions imposed by the occupying power. The Egyptian authorities should also consider the impact of their border closure on the rights of Palestinians living in Gaza who are unable to travel in and out of Gaza through another route, including the right to leave a country.

Egyptian authorities should lift unreasonable obstacles that restrict Palestinians’ rights and allow transit via its territory, subject to security considerations, and ensure that their decisions are transparent and not arbitrary and take into consideration the human rights of those affected.

“The Gaza closure blocks talented, professional people, with much to give their society, from pursuing opportunities that people elsewhere take for granted,” Shakir said. “Barring Palestinians in Gaza from moving freely within their homeland stunts lives and underscores the cruel reality of apartheid and persecution for millions of Palestinians.”

Israel’s Obligations to Gaza under International Law

Israeli authorities claim “broad powers and discretion to decide who may enter its territory” and that “a foreigner has no legal right to enter the State’s sovereign territory, including for the purposes of transit into the [West Bank] or aboard.” While international human rights law gives wide latitude to governments with regard to entry of foreigners, Israel has heightened obligations toward Gaza residents. Because of the continuing controls Israel exercises over the lives and welfare of Gaza’s inhabitants, Israel remains an occupying power under international humanitarian law, despite withdrawing its military forces and settlements from the territory in 2005. Both the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross, the guardians of international humanitarian law, have reached this determination. As the occupying power, Israel remains bound to provide residents of Gaza the rights and protections afforded to them by the law of occupation. Israeli authorities continue to control Gaza’s territorial waters and airspace, and the movement of people and goods, except at Gaza’s border with Egypt. Israel also controls the Palestinian population registry and the infrastructure upon which Gaza relies.

Israel has an obligation to respect the human rights of Palestinians living in Gaza, including their right to freedom of movement throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory and abroad, which affects both the right to leave a country and the right to enter their own country. Israel is also obligated to respect Palestinians’ rights for which freedom of movement is a precondition, for example the rights to education, work, and health. The UN Human Rights Committee has said that while states can restrict freedom of movement for security reasons or to protect public health, public order, and the rights of others, any such restrictions must be proportional and “the restrictions must not impair the essence of the right; the relation between the right and restriction, between norm and exception, must not be reversed.”

While the law of occupation permits occupying powers to impose security restrictions on civilians, it also requires them to restore public life for the occupied population. That obligation increases in a prolonged occupation, in which the occupier has more time and opportunity to develop more narrowly tailored responses to security threats that minimize restrictions on rights. In addition, the needs of the occupied population increase over time. Suspending virtually all freedom of movement for a short period interrupts temporarily normal public life, but long-term, indefinite suspension in Gaza has had a much more debilitating impact, fragmentating populations, fraying familial and social ties, compounding discrimination against women, and blocking people from pursuing opportunities to improve their lives.

The impact is particularly damaging given the denial of freedom of movement to people who are confined to a sliver of the occupied territory, unable to interact in person with the majority of the occupied population that lives in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and its rich assortment of educational, cultural, religious, and commercial institutions.

After 55 years of occupation and 15 years of closure in Gaza with no end in sight, Israel should fully respect the human rights of Palestinians, using as a benchmark the rights it grants Israeli citizens. Israel should abandon an approach that bars movement absent exceptional individual humanitarian circumstances it defines, in favor of an approach that permits free movement absent exceptional individual security circumstances.

Israel’s Closure

Most Palestinians who grew up in Gaza under this closure have never left the 40-by-11 kilometer (25-by-7 mile) Gaza Strip. For the last 25 years, Israel has increasingly restricted the movement of Gaza residents. Since June 2007, when Hamas seized control over Gaza from the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA), Gaza has been mostly closed.

Israeli authorities justify this closure on security grounds, in light of “Hamas’ rise to power in the Gaza Strip,” as they lay out in a December 2019 court filing. Authorities highlight in particular the risk that Hamas and armed Palestinian groups will recruit or coerce Gaza residents who have permits to travel via Erez “for the commission of terrorist acts and the transfer of operatives, knowledge, intelligence, funds or equipment for terrorist activists.” Their policy, though, amounts to a blanket denial with rare exceptions, rather than a generalized respect for the right of Palestinians to freedom of movement, to be denied only on the basis of individualized security reasons.  

The Israeli army has since 2007 limited travel through the Erez crossing except in what it deems “exceptional humanitarian circumstances,” mainly encompassing those needing vital medical treatment outside Gaza and their companions, although the authorities also make exceptions for hundreds of businesspeople and laborers and some others. Israel has restricted movement even for those seeking to travel under these narrow exceptions, affecting their rights to health and life, among others, as Human Rights Watch and other groups have documented. Most Gaza residents do not fit within these exemptions to travel through Erez, even if it is to reach the West Bank.

Between January 2015 and December 2019, before the onset of Covid-19 restrictions, an average of about 373 Palestinians left Gaza via Erez each day, less than 1.5 percent of the daily average of 26,000 in September 2000, before the closure, according to the Israeli rights group Gisha. Israeli authorities tightened the closure further during the Covid-19 pandemic – between March 2020 and December 2021, an average of about 143 Palestinians left Gaza via Erez each day, according to Gisha.

Israeli authorities announced in March 2022 that they would authorize 20,000 permits for Palestinians in Gaza to work in Israel in construction and agriculture, though Gisha reports that the actual number of valid permits in this category stood at 9,424, as of May 22.

Israeli authorities have also for more than two decades sharply restricted the use by Palestinians of Gaza’s airspace and territorial waters. They blocked the reopening of the airport that Israeli forces made inoperable in January 2002, and prevented the Palestinian authorities from building a seaport, leaving Palestinians dependent on leaving Gaza by land to travel abroad. The few Palestinians permitted to cross at Erez are generally barred from traveling abroad via Israel’s international airport and must instead travel abroad via Jordan. Palestinians wishing to leave Gaza via Erez, either to the West Bank or abroad, submit requests through the Palestinian Civil Affairs Committee in Gaza, which forwards applications to Israeli authorities who decide on whether to grant a permit.

Separation Between Gaza and the West Bank

As part of the closure, Israeli authorities have sought to “differentiate” between their policy approaches to Gaza and the West Bank, such as imposing more sweeping restrictions on the movement of people and goods from Gaza to the West Bank, and promote separation between these two parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The army’s “Procedure for Settlement in the Gaza Strip by Residents of Judea and Samaria,” published in 2018, states that “in 2006, a decision was made to introduce a policy of separation between the Judea and Samaria Area [the West Bank] and the Gaza Strip in light of Hamas’ rise to power in the Gaza Strip. The policy currently in effect is explicitly aimed at reducing travel between the areas.”

In each of the 11 cases Human Rights Watch reviewed of people seeking to reach the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, for professional and educational opportunities not available in Gaza, Israeli authorities did not respond to requests for permits or denied them, either for security reasons or because they did not conform to the closure policy. Human Rights Watch also reviewed permit applications on the website of the Palestinian Civil Affairs Committee, or screenshots of it, including the status of the permit applications, when they were sent on to the Israeli authorities and the response received, if any.

Raed Issa, a 42-year-old artist, said that the Israeli authorities did not respond to his application for a permit in early December 2015, to attend an exhibit of his art at a Ramallah art gallery between December 27 and January 16, 2016.

The “Beyond the Dream” exhibit sought to highlight the situation in Gaza after the 2014 war. Issa said that the Palestinian Civil Affairs committee continued to identify the status of his application as “sent and waiting for response” and he ended up having to attend the opening of the exhibit virtually. Issa felt that not being physically present hampered his ability to engage with audiences, and to network and promote his work, which he believes limited his reach and hurt sales of his artwork. He described feeling pained “that I am doing my own art exhibit in my homeland and not able to attend it, not able to move freely.”

Ashraf Sahweel, 47, chairman of the Board of Directors of the Gaza Center for Art and Culture, said that Gaza-based artists routinely do not hear back after applying for Israeli permits, forcing them to miss opportunities to attend exhibitions and other cultural events. A painter himself, he applied for seven permits between 2013 and 2022, but Israeli authorities either did not respond or denied each application, he said. Sahweel said that he has “given up hope on the possibility to travel via Erez.”

Palestinian athletes in Gaza face similar restrictions when seeking to compete with their counterparts in the West Bank, even though the Israeli army guidelines specifically identify “entry of sportspeople” as among the permissible exemptions to the closure. The guidelines, updated in February 2022, set out that “all Gaza Strip residents who are members of the national and local sports teams may enter Israel in transit to the Judea and Samaria area [West Bank] or abroad for official activities of the teams.”

Hilal al-Ghawash, 25, told Human Rights Watch that his football team, Khadamat Rafah, had a match in July 2019 with a rival West Bank team, the Balata Youth Center, in the finals of Palestine Club, with the winner entitled to represent Palestine in the Asian Cup. The Palestinian Football Federation applied for permits for the entire 22-person team and 13-person staff, but Israeli authorities, without explanation, granted permits to only 4 people, only one of whom was a player. The game was postponed as a result.

After Gisha appealed the decision in the Jerusalem District Court, Israeli authorities granted 11 people permits, including six players, saying the other 24 were denied on security grounds that were not specified. Al-Ghawash was among the players who did not receive a permit. The Jerusalem district court upheld the denials. With Khadamat Rafah prevented from reaching the West Bank, the Palestine Football Federation canceled the Palestine Cup finals match.

Al-Ghawash said that West Bank matches hold particular importance for Gaza football players, since they offer the opportunity to showcase their talents for West Bank clubs, which are widely considered superior to those in Gaza and pay better. Despite the cancellation, al-Ghawash said, the Balata Youth Center later that year offered him a contract to play for them. The Palestinian Football Federation again applied for a permit on al-Ghawash’s behalf, but he said he did not receive a response and was unable to join the team.

In 2021, al-Ghawash signed a contract with a different West Bank team, the Hilal al-Quds club. The Palestinian Football Federation again applied, but this time, the Israeli army denied the permit on unspecified security grounds. Al-Ghawash said he does not belong to any armed group or political movement and has no idea on what basis Israeli authorities denied him a permit.

Missing these opportunities has forced al-Ghawash to forgo not only higher pay, but also the chance to play for more competitive West Bank teams, which could have brought him closer to his goal of joining the Palestinian national team. “There’s a future in the West Bank, but, here in Gaza, there’s only a death sentence,” he said. “The closure devastates players’ future. Gaza is full of talented people, but it’s so difficult to leave.”

Palestinian students and professionals are frequently unable to obtain permits to study or train in the West Bank. In 2016, Augusta Victoria Hospital in East Jerusalem agreed to have 10 physics students from Al-Azhar University in Gaza come to the hospital for a six-month training program. Israeli authorities denied five students permits without providing a rationale, two of the students said.

The five other students initially received permits valid for only 14 days, and then encountered difficulties receiving subsequent permits. None were able to complete the full program, the two students said. One, Mahmoud Dabour, 28, said that when he applied for a second permit, he received no response. Two months later, he applied again and managed to get a permit valid for one week. He received one other permit, valid for 10 days, but then, when he returned and applied for the fifth time, Israeli authorities rejected his permit request without providing a reason. As a result, he could not finish the training program, and, without the certification participants receive upon completion, he said, he cannot apply for jobs or attend conferences or workshops abroad in the field.

Dabour said that the training cannot be offered in Gaza, since the necessary radiation material required expires too quickly for it to be functional after passing through the time-consuming Israeli inspections of materials entering the Gaza Strip. There are no functioning devices of the kind that students need for the training in Gaza, Dabour said.

One of the students whose permit was denied said, “I feel I studied for five years for nothing, that my life has stopped.” The student asked that his name be withheld for his security.

Two employees of Zimam, a Ramallah-based organization focused on youth empowerment and conflict resolution, said that the Israeli authorities repeatedly denied them permits to attend organizational training and strategy meetings. Atta al-Masri, the 31-year-old Gaza regional director, said he has applied four times for permits, but never received one. Israeli authorities did not respond the first three times and, the last time in 2021, denied him a permit on the grounds that it was “not in conformity” with the permissible exemptions to the closure. He has worked for Zimam since 2009, but only met his colleagues in person for the first time in Egypt in March 2022.

Ahed Abdullah, 29, Zimam’s youth programs coordinator in Gaza, said she applied twice for permits in 2021, but Israeli authorities denied both applications on grounds of “nonconformity:”

This is supposed to be my right. My simplest right. Why did they reject me? My colleagues who are outside Palestine managed to make it, while I am inside Palestine, I wasn’t able to go to the other part of Palestine … it’s only 2-3 hours from Gaza to Ramallah, why should I get the training online? Why am I deprived of being with my colleagues and doing activities with them instead of doing them in dull breakout rooms on Zoom?

Human Rights Watch has previously documented that the closure has prevented specialists in the use of assistive devices for people with disabilities from opportunities for hands-on training on the latest methods of evaluation, device maintenance, and rehabilitation. Human Rights Watch also documented restrictions on the movement of human rights workers. Gisha, the Israeli human rights group, has reported that Israel has blocked health workers in Gaza from attending training in the West Bank on how to operate new equipment and hampered the work of civil society organizations operating in Gaza.

Israeli authorities have also made it effectively impossible for Palestinians from Gaza to relocate to the West Bank. Because of Israeli restrictions, thousands of Gaza residents who arrived on temporary permits and now live in the West Bank are unable to gain legal residency. Although Israel claims that these restrictions are related to maintaining security, evidence Human Rights Watch collected suggests the main motivation is to control Palestinian demography across the West Bank, whose land Israel seeks to retain, in contrast to the Gaza Strip.

Egypt

With most Gaza residents unable to travel via Erez, the Egyptian-administered Rafah crossing has become Gaza’s primary outlet to the outside world, particularly in recent years. Egyptian authorities kept Rafah mostly closed for nearly five years following the July 2013 military coup in Egypt that toppled President Mohamed Morsy, whom the military accused of receiving support from Hamas. Egypt, though, eased restrictions in May 2018, amid the Great March of Return, the recurring Palestinian protests at the time near the fences separating Gaza and Israel.

Despite keeping Rafah open more regularly since May 2018, movement via Rafah is a fraction of what it was before the 2013 coup in Egypt. Whereas an average of 40,000 crossed monthly in both directions before the coup, the monthly average was 12,172 in 2019 and 15,077 in 2021, according to Gisha.

Human Rights Watch spoke with 16 Gaza residents who sought to travel via Rafah. Almost all said they opted for this route because of the near impossibility of receiving an Israeli permit to travel via Erez.

Gaza residents hoping to leave via Rafah are required to register in advance via a process the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has deemed “confusing” and “obscure.” Gaza residents can either register via the formal registration process administered by Gaza’s Interior Ministry or informally via what is known as tanseeq, or travel coordination with Egyptian authorities, paying travel companies or mediators for a place on a separate list coordinated by Egyptian authorities. Having two distinct lists of permitted travelers coordinated by different authorities has fueled “allegations of the payment of bribes in Gaza and in Egypt to ensure travel and a faster response,” according to OCHA.

The formal process often takes two to three months, except for those traveling for medical reasons, whose requests are processed faster, said Gaza residents who sought to leave Gaza via Rafah. Egyptian authorities have at times rejected those seeking to cross Rafah into Egypt on the grounds that they did not meet specific criteria for travel. The criteria lack transparency, but Gisha reported that they include having a referral for a medical appointment in Egypt or valid documents to enter a third country.

To avoid the wait and risk of denial, many choose instead the tanseeq route. Several interviewees said that they paid large sums of money to Palestinian brokers or Gaza-based travel companies that work directly with Egyptian authorities to expedite people’s movement via Rafah. On social media, some of these companies advertise that they can assure travel within days to those who provide payment and a copy of their passport. The cost of tanseeq has fluctuated from several hundred US dollars to several thousand dollars over the last decade, based in part on how frequently Rafah is open.

In recent years, travel companies have offered an additional “VIP” tanseeq, which expedites travel without delays in transit between Rafah and Cairo, offers flexibility on travel date, and ensures better treatment by authorities. The cost was $700, as of January 2022.

The Cairo-based company offering the VIP tanseeq services, Hala Consulting and Tourism Services, has strong links with Egypt’s security establishment and is staffed largely by former Egyptian military officers, a human rights activist and a journalist who have investigated these issues told Human Rights Watch. This allows the company to reduce processing times and delays at checkpoints during the journey between Rafah and Cairo. The activist and journalist both asked that their names be withheld for security reasons.  

The company is linked to prominent Egyptian businessman Ibrahim El-Argani, who has close ties with Egypt’s president, Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi. Ergany heads the Union of Sinai Tribes, which works hand-in-hand with the Egyptian military and intelligence agencies against militants operating in North Sinai. Ergany, one of Egypt’s few businessmen able to export products to Gaza from Egypt, owns the Sinai Sons company, which has an exclusive contract to handle all contracts related to Gaza reconstruction efforts. Human Rights Watch wrote to El-Argani to solicit his perspectives on these issues, but had received no response at this writing.

A 34-year-old computer engineer and entrepreneur said that he sought to travel in 2019 to Saudi Arabia to meet an investor to discuss a potential project to sell car parts online. He chose not to apply to travel via Erez, as he had applied for permits eight times between 2016 and 2018 and had either been rejected or not heard back.

He initially registered via the formal Ministry of Interior process and received approval to travel after three months. However, on the day assigned for his exit via Rafah, an Egyptian officer there said he found his reason for travel not sufficiently “convincing” and denied him passage. A few months later, he tried to travel again for the same purpose, this time opting for tanseeq and paying $400, and, this time, he successfully reached Saudi Arabia within a week of seeking to travel.

He said that he would like to go on vacation with his wife, but worries that Egyptian authorities will not consider vacation a sufficiently compelling reason for travel and that his only option will be to pay hundreds or thousands of dollars to do tanseeq.

A 73-year-old man sought to travel via Rafah in February 2021, with his 46-year-old daughter, to get knee replacement surgery in al-Sheikh Zayed hospital in Cairo. He said Gaza lacks the capacity to provide such an operation. The man and his daughter are relatives of a Human Rights Watch staff member. They applied via the Interior Ministry process and received approval in a little over a week.

After they waited for several hours in the Egyptian hall in Rafah on the day of travel, though, Egyptian authorities included the daughter’s name among the 70 names of people who were not allowed to cross that day, the daughter said. The father showed the border officials a doctor’s note indicating that he needed someone to travel with him given his medical situation, but the officer told him, “You either travel alone or go back with her to Gaza.” She said she returned to Gaza, alongside 70 other people, and her father later traveled on his own.

Five people who did manage to travel via Rafah said that they experienced poor conditions and poor treatment, including intrusive searches, by the Egyptian authorities, with several saying that they felt Egyptian authorities treated them like “criminals.” Several people said that Egyptian officers confiscated items from them during the journey, including an expensive camera and a mobile phone, without apparent reason.

Upon leaving Rafah, Palestinians are transported by bus to Cairo’s airport. The trip takes about seven hours, but several people said that the journey took up to three days between long periods of waiting on the bus, at checkpoints and amid other delays, often in extreme weather. Many of those who traveled via Rafah said that, during this journey, Egyptian authorities prevented passengers from using their phones.

The parents of a 7-year-old boy with autism and a rare brain disease said they sought to travel for medical treatment for him in August 2021, but Egyptian authorities only allowed the boy and his mother to enter. The mother said their journey back to Gaza took four days, mostly as a result of Rafah being closed. During this time, she said, they spent hours waiting at checkpoints, in extreme heat, with her son crying nonstop. She said she felt “humiliated” and treated like “an animal,” observing that she “would rather die than travel again through Rafah.”

A 33-year-old filmmaker, who traveled via Rafah to Morocco in late 2019 to attend a film screening, said the return from Cairo to Rafah took three days, much of it spent at checkpoints amid the cold winter in the Sinai desert.

A 34-year-old man said that he planned to travel in August 2019 via Rafah to the United Arab Emirates for a job interview as an Arabic teacher. He said, on his travel date, Egyptian authorities turned him back, saying they had met their quota of travelers. He crossed the next day, but said that, as it was a Thursday and with Rafah closed on Friday, Egyptian authorities made travelers spend two nights sleeping at Rafah, without providing food or access to a clean bathroom.

The journey to Cairo airport then took two days, during which he described going through checkpoints where officers made passengers “put their hands behind their backs while they searched their suitcases.” As a result of these delays totaling four days since his assigned travel date, he missed his job interview and found out that someone else was hired. He is currently unemployed in Gaza.

Given the uncertainty of crossing at Rafah, Gaza residents said that they often wait to book their flight out of Cairo until they arrive. Booking so late often means, beyond other obstacles, having to wait until they can find a reasonably priced and suitable flight, planning extra days for travel and spending extra money on changeable or last-minute tickets. Similar dynamics prevail with regard to travel abroad via Erez to Amman.

Human Rights Watch interviewed four men under the age of 40 with visas to third countries, whom Egyptian authorities allowed entry only for the purpose of transit. The authorities transported these men to Cairo airport and made them wait in what is referred to as the “deportation room” until their flight time. The men likened the room to a “prison cell,” with limited facilities and unsanitary conditions. All described a system in which bribes are required to be able to leave the room to book a plane ticket, get food, drinks, or a cigarette, and avoid abuse. One of the men described an officer taking him outside the room, asking him, “Won’t you give anything to Egypt?” and said that others in the room told him that he then proceeded to do the same with them.

[11]

TELEGRAAF

ISRAEL PLANT BIJNA 4500 NIEUWE HUIZEN OP

WESTELIJKE JORDAANOEVER

JERUZALEM – Israël wil bijna 4500 nieuwe woningen bouwen voor kolonisten op de Westelijke Jordaanoever. De regering heeft de plannen donderdag goedgekeurd volgens Peace Now, een groep die tegen de Israëlische nederzettingen is. Wanneer de bouw van de huizen zal beginnen is nog niet bekend.

De minister van Binnenlandse Zaken Ayelet Shaked reageerde door het “een feestelijke dag voor de nederzettingen op Judea en Samaria” te noemen, de Bijbelse benamingen voor het gebied op de Westelijke Jordaanoever.

Internationale kritiek

Vorige week kondigde Shaked al aan met plannen voor nieuwe woningen te komen. Dat kwam haar op veel internationale kritiek te staan, onder anderen van de Amerikaanse president Joe Biden.

De Palestijnse autoriteiten roepen de internationale gemeenschap op “stappen tegen Israël te ondernemen om de nederzettingen en agressie tegen het Palestijnse volk te stoppen”. De meeste landen beschouwen de Israëlische nederzettingen op de Westelijke Jordaanoever als illegaal. In de nederzettingen wonen naar schatting 470.000 Israëliërs.

EINDE BERICHT

THE RIGHTS FORUM

ISRAEL KONDIGT BOUW VAN NOG EENS 2860 WONINGEN

IN ILLEGALE NEDERZETTINGEN AAN

29 OCTOBER 2021

De overgrote meerderheid van de woningen komt diep in bezet Palestijns gebied. Het besluit volgt op de aanbesteding van 1.355 woningen voor kolonisten eerder deze week.

Israël gaat nog eens 2.860 woningen bouwen in bezet Palestijns gebied. Woensdag kregen dertig afzonderlijke uitbreidingsplannen groen licht van de autoriteiten. Dat schrijft Peace Now, de Israëlische waakhond die het illegale nederzettingenproject op de voet volgt. Met deze stap schaadt Israël opnieuw de Palestijnse rechten, de eigen belangen en de kans op vrede, concludeert de organisatie terecht.

De facto annexatie

Negentig procent van de woningen zal worden gebouwd in Israëlische kolonies (‘nederzettingen’) diep op de bezette Westelijke Jordaanoever. Peace Now spreekt van ‘een enorme expansie van geïsoleerde nederzettingen’. Zo krijgt de nederzetting Kedumim 377 nieuwe woningen, Har Bracha 286, Eli 628 en Revava 399. Daarnaast hebben vier plannen, samen goed voor 113 woningen, betrekking op Givat Ze’ev, een van de nederzettingen die Jeruzalem en Ramallah van elkaar scheiden.

Opvallend is verder dat woensdag twee zogenoemde ‘buitenposten’ met terugwerkende kracht werden ‘geregulariseerd’ – Israëlische newspeak voor het tot officiële nederzetting bevorderen van een door kolonisten gestichte gemeenschap die ook onder Israëlisch recht illegaal is. Het gaat om de buitenposten Mitzpe Danny, die voortaan als de nederzetting Michmash East door het leven gaat, en het vlakbij het met ontruiming bedreigde bedoeïenendorp Khan al-Ahmar gebouwde Haroeh Haivri, dat voor een daar gevestigd opleidingsinstituut 24 woningen mag bijbouwen, waaronder 14 voor de huisvesting van zeventig studenten.

De uitbreidingen volgen het bekende patroon van de Israëlische kolonisering, zoals door ons eerder beschreven. Vanuit aanvankelijk geïsoleerde nederzettingen op strategische locaties maakt Israël zich stapsgewijs meester van steeds meer Palestijns land, ten koste van de rechtmatige bewoners. Om deze de facto annexatie nog schrijnender te maken zijn veel van de inwoners van de nederzettingen Amerikanen, Nederlanders en andere buitenlanders, niet zelden christenen die tot het jodendom zijn overgegaan om zich met een Israëlisch paspoort in bezet gebied te kunnen vestigen.

Aanbesteding 1.355 woningen

Afgelopen zondag besteedde Israël al de bouw van 1.355 woningen aan, zoals wij eerder meldden. Aannemers die geïnteresseerd zijn om de woningen te bouwen kunnen inschrijven op dertien goedgekeurde plannen. Ook in dit geval zal ruim negentig procent van de woningen verrijzen in nederzettingen diep in Palestijns gebied.

Daarnaast werd de bouw van 83 woningen in Givat Hamatos aanbesteed, de nederzetting in het zuiden van bezet Oost-Jeruzalem waar Europese diplomaten eind vorig jaar door kolonisten werden verjaagd. De diplomaten protesteerden tegen de door Israël aangekondigde uitbreiding van Givat Hamatos met circa 2.600 woningen, een uitbreiding die volgens de EU een definitieve nagel aan de doodskist van de tweestatenoplossing zou vormen. De protesten hadden geen resultaat, evenmin als de harde kritiek van de VN, afgelopen zomer, op goedgekeurde plannen voor de uitbreiding van andere nederzettingen in Oost-Jeruzalem en op de Westoever.

Wie mocht hebben gehoopt dat de in juni aangetreden regering van Naftali Bennett, naar eigen zeggen een ‘regering van verandering’, een minder agressieve Palestinapolitiek zou voeren dan de voorafgaande kabinetten-Netanyahu, kwam bedrogen uit. Het beleid van Bennett is minstens zo grimmig, zoals afgelopen week ook bleek uit het op de Israëlische terrorismelijst plaatsen van zes Palestijnse maatschappelijke organisaties.

‘Zionistische onderneming’

De komende weken en maanden krijgen nog meer plannen voor grote bouwprojecten in Palestijns gebied definitief vorm. Daaronder plannen voor 3.500 woningen in het E1-gebied, alsmede voor een nieuwe nederzetting met duizenden woningen in het E2-gebied en een nieuwe nederzetting met negenduizend woningen in de wijk Atarot in Oost-Jeruzalem.

Zondag maakte minister van Huisvesting en Woningbouw Ze’ev Elkin bovendien bekend de komende vijf jaar 1.500 woningen te willen bouwen in 21 nederzettingen in de Jordaanvallei. Voor het project heeft zijn ministerie een budget van ruim zestig miljoen euro vrijgemaakt. In navolging van zijn collega van Binnenlandse Zaken Ayelet Shaked plaatste Elkin de illegale kolonisering – onder het oprichtingsverdrag van het Internationaal Strafhof een oorlogsmisdaad – in het kader van het zionisme: ‘Het versterken en uitbouwen van de nederzettingen in Judea and Samaria [de bijbelse benaming voor de Westelijke Jordaanoever] is een noodzakelijk en uiterst belangrijk deel van de zionistische onderneming.’

De ‘vervolmaking van het zionistische project’ is ook de drijfveer van Naftali Bennett, de kolonistenvoorman die het tot premier schopte. Bennett is een fanatiek tegenstander van een Palestijnse staat en wil van vredesbesprekingen met de Palestijnen niets weten. Twee weken geleden kondigde hij aan ook de illegale Israëlische kolonies op de bezette Syrische Hoogvlakte van Golan (Jawlan) te zullen uitbreiden en het aantal kolonisten te zullen verviervoudigen.

Europees en Amerikaans protest

Donderdag veroordeelden twaalf EU-lidstaten, waaronder Nederland, de aangekondigde bouw van de 2.860 woningen in een gezamenlijke verklaring. Met zijn nederzettingen­politiek schendt Israël het internationaal recht en ondermijnt het pogingen om tot de tweestatenoplossing te komen, stellen de twaalf. Zij manen Israël de bindende resolutie 2334 van de VN-Veiligheidsraad uit 2016 alsnog te gehoorzamen. Daarin wordt onder meer van Israël geëist dat het de vestiging van kolonisten en de bouw en uitbreiding van nederzettingen in Oost-Jeruzalem en op de Westoever direct staakt, en een eind maakt aan de confiscatie van Palestijns land, de sloop van Palestijnse woningen en de verdrijving van Palestijnen.

Ook de Britse minister voor het Midden-Oosten en Afrika kwam donderdag met een verklaring waarin Israël wordt gemaand de kolonisering te staken. Een dag eerder al reageerden de Amerikanen in harde bewoordingen. Nog voor de vergadering waarin de Israëlische autoriteiten groen licht voor de nieuwbouw gaven, maande minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Antony Blinken Israëls minister van Defensie Benny Gantz telefonisch de bijeenkomst af te gelasten, schrijft de krant Haaretz. Zet Israël de bouw toch door, dan kan het op ‘een harde Amerikaanse reactie’ rekenen, aldus Blinken.

Gantz geloofde het wel en liet de vergadering doorgaan, met dezelfde zorgeloosheid waarmee hij een week eerder de zes Palestijnse maatschappelijke organisaties op de terrorismelijst plaatste. Israël weet dat het kritiek op dergelijke maatregelen krijgt en er een enkele keer met consequenties wordt gedreigd, maar heeft geleerd dat de buitenwereld alleen blaft en nooit bijt.

Medeplichtig

Israël weet dat het een hele reeks bindende VN-resoluties aan de laars kan blijven lappen omdat het door de internationale gemeenschap consequent wordt uitgezonderd van sancties. Keer op keer heeft die gemeenschap Israël nieuwe grenzen laten overschrijden en zich bereid getoond de eigen verplichtingen – om de internationale rechtsorde te handhaven en de Palestijnen in bescherming te nemen – te negeren. Met die opstelling heeft de internationale gemeenschap zich medeplichtig gemaakt aan de kolonisering en de militaire bezetting, het apartheidsregime en de grootschalige schendingen van de mensenrechten waarmee die gepaard gaat.

Het internationale beleid is hypocriet, betoogden wij onlangs, en als dat ergens duidelijk valt te zien is het in Den Haag. Nederland is wereldkampioen bezorgdheid uitspreken en waarschuwen voor de gevaren die de kolonisering inhoudt voor de tweestatenoplossing, de formule voor vrede die al 25 jaar door Den Haag wordt gepredikt. In de praktijk echter is straffeloosheid de norm en laat het Israël zijn gang gaan. Erger, Nederland draagt concreet bij aan de levensvatbaarheid van de illegale nederzettingen, zoals wij in ons betoog beschreven.

Geregeld hebben fracties in de Tweede Kamer gesteld dat sancties tegen Israël nu toch echt in beeld kwamen, om het daar vervolgens bij te laten. Een bekend voorbeeld is toenmalig buitenlandwoordvoerder van het CDA Pieter Omtzigt, die in juni 2013 met betrekking tot de nederzettingen sprak van een ‘rode lijn’ die Israël niet mocht passeren zonder sancties over zich af te roepen. Een ander voorbeeld is de motie die het CDA in juni 2016 samen met de PvdA en D66 indiende, waarin de regering werd opgeroepen om, ‘wanneer partijen afzien van constructieve deelname aan vredesbesprekingen en ondermijnend beleid blijven voeren, concrete maatregelen te nemen, bijvoorbeeld door opschorting van bilaterale of Europese samenwerkingsovereenkomsten’.

Inmiddels is Omtzigts ‘rode lijn’ uit 2013 met circa 150 duizend kolonisten overschreden en heeft Israël opnieuw een toonbeeld van ondermijnend beleid als premier. In Den Haag is geen politicus die kan uitleggen hoe de gepropageerde tweestatenoplossing nog gerealiseerd zou kunnen worden. De Palestijnen op de Westoever en in Oost-Jeruzalem en Gaza leven inmiddels 54 jaar onder een wrede bezetting – een bezetting waaronder geen van onze politici ook maar een dag zou willen leven, en waaronder geen van hen de Israëli’s 54 jaar zou laten leven. Maar voor Palestijnen gelden andere regels. Hun rechten doen er niet toe. Niet alleen in Israël, ook in Den Haag worden zij beschouwd als children of a lesser God.

Kruispunt

In Brussel staan de Palestijnse rechten evenmin op de agenda. Riep het Europees Parlement onlangs nog op tot harde maatregelen tegen de Verenigde Arabische Emiraten – onder meer een internationale boycot van de wereldtentoonstelling Expo Dubai – vanwege systematische schendingen van de mensenrechten, als het om de aanzienlijk zwaardere en langduriger schendingen van Israël gaat is het stil. Liever bijt Brussel zich vast in de vraag of het taalgebruik in Palestijnse schoolboeken wel vredelievend genoeg is. O wee als daar lelijke dingen in staan over de Israëlische overheersing, dan zal de EU toch echt genoodzaakt zijn subsidie in te houden. Israël daarentegen werd eerder deze week toegelaten tot het prestigieuze Europese onderzoeksprogramma Horizon Europe 2021-2027, dat het land naar verwachting 360 miljoen euro meer oplevert dan het bedrag dat het er zelf aan bijdraagt.

Met de nieuwe Israëlische uitbreiding van de nederzettingen en het op de terrorismelijst plaatsen van de zes Palestijnse organisaties staan Den Haag en Brussel voor de zoveelste keer op een kruispunt. Treffen zij nu wél sancties tegen Israël, of volharden zij in hun medeplichtigheid aan een wrede overheersing die iedere hoop op vrede tot een utopie maakt?

EINDE BERICHT

[12]

”En zoals u zult weten, zijn kolonisten bewoners van in bezet gebied gestichtenederzettingen, die illegaal zijn volgens het Internationaal Recht [4] EN regelrechte landdiefstal, omdat zij worden gebouwd op gestolenPalestijns land of, zoals in het geval van Oost-Jeruzalem bij die uitgezettePalestijnse families, gestolen Palestijnse huizen.Waarbij Israelische kolonisten vaak ook nog eens verantwoordelijk zijnvoor bijna dagelijks geweld tegen de bezette Palestijnse bevolking! [5]”

SUPERMARKT VOMAR, STOP MET DE VERKOOP VAN ISRAELISCHE

PRODUCTEN!

ASTRID ESSED

4 SEPTEMBER 2021

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ISRAELISCHE NEDERZETTINGEN, ILLEGAAL VOLGENS HET INTERNATIONAAL RECHT

”It is unlawful under the Fourth Geneva Convention for an occupying power to transfer parts of its own population into the territory it occupies. This means that international humanitarian law prohibits the establishment of settlements, as these are a form of population transfer into occupied territory”

ICRC.ORG [INTERNATIONALE RODE KRUIS]

WHAT DOES THE LAW SAY ABOUT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SETTLEMENTS

05-10-2010 FAQ

When a territory is placed under the authority of a hostile army, the rules of international humanitarian law dealing with occupation apply. Occupation confers certain rights and obligations on the occupying power.

• International Review of the Red Cross, No 885, special issue on Occupation
• Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 49.  

Prohibited actions include forcibly transferring protected persons from the occupied territories to the territory of the occupying power. 
It is unlawful under the Fourth Geneva Convention for an occupying power to transfer parts of its own population into the territory it occupies. This means that international humanitarian law prohibits the establishment of settlements, as these are a form of population transfer into occupied territory. Any measure designed to expand or consolidate settlements is also illegal. Confiscation of land to build or expand settlements is similarly prohibited. 

ZIE OOK

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”The establishment of the settlements contravenes international humanitarian law (IHL), which states that an occupying power may not relocate its own citizens to the occupied territory or make permanent changes to that territory, unless these are needed for imperative military needs, in the narrow sense of the term, or undertaken for the benefit of the local population.”

BTSELEM.ORG

SETTLEMENTS

From 1967 to the end of 2017, more than 200 Israeli settlements were established in the West Bank. They include:

• 131 settlements officially recognized by the Israeli Ministry of the Interior;
• About 110 settlements built without official authorization but with governmental support and assistance (known as “illegal outposts”);
• Several settlement enclaves inside the city of Hebron;
• 11 neighborhoods in the areas of the West Bank that Israel annexed to the municipal jurisdiction of Jerusalem in 1967, and several settlement enclaves within Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.

Another 16 settlements that had been established in the Gaza Strip, and four in the northern West Bank, were dismantled in 2005 as part of the Disengagement Plan.

Settlements are the single most important element shaping life in the West Bank. Their destructive impact on the human rights of Palestinians far exceeds the hundreds of thousands of dunams seized to build them.

More than 620,000 Israeli citizens currently reside in settlements. Of these, about 209,270 live in the parts of the West Bank that Israel annexed to the municipal jurisdiction of Jerusalem (according to Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research figures from late 2016), and 413,400 live throughout the rest of the West Bank (according to Central Bureau of Statistics figures from late 2017).

The settlements are the single most important factor in shaping life in the West Bank. Their destructive impact on the human rights of Palestinians extends far beyond the hundreds of thousands of dunams [1 dunam = 1,000 sq. meters], including farmland and grazing areas, that Israel appropriated from Palestinians in order to build them. More land has been expropriated to pave hundreds of kilometers of roads for settler use only; roadblocks, checkpoints, and other measures that limit Palestinian movement only have been erected based on the location of settlements; Palestinian landowners have been effectively denied access to much of their farmland, both within settlements and outside them; and the winding route of the Separation Barrier, which severely violates the rights of Palestinians living near it, was established inside the West Bank in order to leave as many settlements as possible – and large tracts of land for expanding them – on the western side of the barrier.

All the settlement practices in the West Bank share the same objective, although those employed in the urban areas of Hebron and East Jerusalem – where Palestinians have also been dispossessed of their homes and of other structures – take a different form. 

In the early years of the occupation, the main ploy that Israel used to take over land for building settlements was to seize the land “for military purposes”. Military seizure orders were issued for some 31,000 dunams, most of which were earmarked for building settlements. In June 1979, the military issued a seizure order for privately-owned land near Nablus, which was slated for establishing the settlement of Elon Moreh. Several Palestinians petitioned Israel’s High Court of Justice (HCJ), arguing that the seizure violated international law, since it served a civilian purpose of building a settlement rather than true military needs. The court had rejected this argument in previous petitions, accepting the state’s claim that settlements contribute to security.

In this case, however, top security officials stated that building a settlement at that location would serve no military purpose. Also, some of the settlers joined the proceedings as respondents, explaining to the court that it was their intention to settle in the area permanently, for religious and political reasons, rather than to promote security. Given these unique circumstances, the court could not rule that the establishment of the settlement would serve military needs – although it did not rule out such a possibility in general. The justices restricted their decision to the specific case of Elon Moreh, ruling that the land seizure was meant to serve a civilian rather than military purpose and therefore breached international law. The court did not completely deny the possibility of seizing private land for building settlements, but held that when the dominant reason for issuing a seizure order is the establishment of a civilian settlement rather than military considerations, the order is unlawful.

This ruling made it difficult for Israel to continue seizing Palestinian land as it had done until that point. Instead, it required the state to obtain agreement between top security officials on the military advantage of every planned settlement, and to ensure that the settlers kept their intentions to themselves. To circumvent this, the government announced that it would thereafter build settlements only on land that had been declared state land.

However, when the state sought such land, it discovered that only some 687,000 dunams were considered state land at the time, mostly in the Jordan Valley and in the Judean Desert. This frustrated the governmental plan to build settlements along the central mountain ridge of the West Bank. Therefore, the state came up with a new system for declaring state land.

This system was founded on rewriting legal provisions and applying a completely different approach to the Ottoman Land Code, which governs land ownership in the West Bank, than the standard interpretation applied until then. The new approach made it much easier to declare state land, even when the land in question was considered private or collective Palestinian property under British and later Jordanian rule. One method for achieving this was requiring Palestinians to regularly cultivate farmland as a prerequisite to acquiring ownership rights; another was to disregard the provisions of local law, which grants Palestinian communities collective rights to use grazing areas and other public land. By employing these new tactics, from 1979 to 2002 Israel declared more than 900,000 dunams as state land. There are now some 1,200,000 dunams of state land in Area C, constituting 36.5% of Area C and 22% of the entire West Bank. An additional 200,000 dunams of state land are located in areas A and B, where planning is in the hands of the Palestinian Authority.

A comparative survey carried out by B’Tselem in the area of Ramallah revealed massive differences between the amount of land that Jordan defined as government property in areas registered before the occupation, and the amount that Israel declared state land in areas that the Jordanians had not managed to register prior to 1967. The results of the survey indicate that a significant proportion of the land that Israel declared as state land is actually private Palestinian property that was taken from its lawful owners through legal maneuvering, in breach of both local and international law.

This process of land takeover also contravenes basic tenets of due process and natural justice. In many cases, the Palestinian residents were not aware that their land had been registered as state property and when they found out, it was too late to appeal. The burden of proof always lies with Palestinians claiming ownership; even if landowners did manage to prove their ownership over the land, in some cases it was registered state land based on the claim that it had been handed over to a settlement “in good faith”.

Even if all the declarations of state land were lawful, public land – including the land declared as government property prior to 1967 – is meant to serve the population of the occupied territory, i.e. the Palestinian public, not the State of Israel or its citizens. However, Israel prohibits Palestinian use of this land almost entirely and considers it Israeli property. In keeping with this policy, Israel has allocated to settlement vast tracts of this “state land”, stretching far beyond their built-up sections. The lands allocated to settlements have been declared closed military zones and are off limits to Palestinians, except by special permit. In contrast, Israeli citizens, Jews from around the world and tourists can enter them freely.

At present, settlements cover 538,130 dunams – almost 10% of the West Bank. Their regional councils control another 1,650,370 dunams, including vast open areas that have not been attached to any particular settlement. This brings the total area under the direct control of settlements to 40% of the West Bank, and 63% of Area C.

Along with this governmental land grab, settlers have exploited the forced separation between Palestinians and their land to build houses, outposts and roads, sow fields and groves, graze livestock and take over natural water sources – all outside the vast areas already allocated to the settlements. This is attended by routine violence against Palestinians. These actions play a major role in the implementation of Israel’s policy in the West Bank by complementing official measures. The settlers’ apparently independent actions serve as a privatized system for taking over land, allowing Israel to establish and expand entire settlement blocs through an unofficial sidetrack while formally disavowing these actions.

Unlike the restrictive planning policy enforced upon Palestinian communities, Israeli settlements are fully represented in the planning process, enjoying detailed outline plans and advanced infrastructure. Although the state uses the same professional and legal terms to refer to both Israeli and Palestinian construction in the West Bank with– such as building and planning laws, urban master plans, planning procedures and illegal construction – it applies them very differently in practice. When it comes to Israeli settlements, the state turns a blind eye and offers support and retroactive approval, all as part of an overarching policy to de facto annex parts of the West Bank to Israel’s sovereign territory. Palestinian communities, on the other hand, are subjected to painstaking bureaucracy, stalled plans and widespread demolitions, in keeping with Israel’s policy to prevent Palestinian development in the West Bank and continue dispossessing Palestinians of their land.

The establishment of the settlements contravenes international humanitarian law (IHL), which states that an occupying power may not relocate its own citizens to the occupied territory or make permanent changes to that territory, unless these are needed for imperative military needs, in the narrow sense of the term, or undertaken for the benefit of the local population.

The existence of settlements also leads to the violation of many human rights of Palestinians, including the rights to property, equality, an adequate standard of living and freedom of movement. In addition, the radical changes that Israel has made to the map of the West Bank preclude any real possibility of establishing an independent, viable Palestinian state in fulfilment of the right to self-determination. Although the West Bank is not part of Israel’s sovereign territory, Israeli has applied most of its domestic laws to the settlements and their residents. As a result, the settlers enjoy almost all the same privileges as citizens living within Israel. Meanwhile, Palestinians continue to live under martial law and are thereby systematically deprived of their rights and denied the ability to have any real impact on policymaking with respect to the territory in which they live. In creating this reality, Israel has formed a regime in which a person’s rights depend on his or her national identity.

Israel has refrained from formally annexing the West Bank (except in East Jerusalem). In practice, however, it treats the settlements established throughout Area C as extensions of its sovereign territory and has virtually eliminated the distinction for Israeli citizens – while concentrating the Palestinian population in 165 disconnected “islands” (Areas A and B). This double movement, of Israeli settlers taking over more and more West Bank land and Palestinians being pushed aside, has been a consistent mainstay of Israeli policy in the West Bank since 1967, with all Israeli legislative, legal, planning, funding and defense bodies working towards that end.

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BTSELEM.ORG

SETTLER VIOLENCE =STATE VIOLENCE

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CONTINUING STORY/DE NOS EN DE FASCISTISCHE ISRAELISCHE 

REGERING/ASTRID ESSED ZIT DE NOS OP DE HUID!

20 JANUARI 2023

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ZIE EERDERE BRIEVEN ASTRID ESSED AAN SUPERMARKT

VOMAR

[24]

HETZE PVV LEIDER WILDERS TEGEN VLUCHTELINGEN/”TESTOSTERONBOMMEN”

ASTRID ESSED

4 OCTOBER 2020

WILDERS SPREEKT OVER ”OMVOLKING”/VLUCHTELINGEN

ALS ”HYENA’S EN ”ACHTERLIJKE ISLAMITISCHE ZANDBAKLANDEN”

ASTRID ESSED

5 NOVEMBER 2021

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NOS

ELF MAN OPGEPAKT NA BESTORMING WORDEN

10 OCTOBER 2015

[21]

ZIE NOOT 20

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FASCISME IN UITVOERING/OVER DE UITSPRAKEN VAN

PVV’ER MARKUSZOWER EN EEN PASSIEVE TWEEDE KAMERVOORZITTER

ASTRID ESSED

1 MEI 2022

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”

REPUBLIEK ALLOCHTONIE

NIEUWE PLEK IN HATECRIME TEGEN MOSKEEEN

14 APRIL 2021

Brandstichting bij een moskee in aanbouw in Gouda, shockerende en grievende dreigbrieven in de brievenbus bij een flink aantal islamitische gebedshuizen verspreid over het hele land en onvervalste doodsbedreigingen aan het adres van de bezoekers van moskee Omar Ibn Al Khattab in Almere. Begin april tekent zich een nieuwe piek van gewelddadige anti-islam voorvallen in Nederland af. Roemer van Oordt deed een rondje langs de velden en schetst de achtergronden.

1) Waarom nu?
Een ingewikkelde vraag. Vaak zijn pieken in (gewelddadige) discriminatoire voorvallen bij moskeeën terug te leiden naar specifieke gebeurtenissen. In Nederland was het bijvoorbeeld flink raak na de moord op Theo van Gogh in 2004 en als reactie op een reeks internationale aanslagen uit naam van de islam in 2015 en 2016. Maar daar is momenteel geen sprake van. Soms gaat het om zogenaamd Copycat gedrag. Aandacht in de media voor anti-islamacties in Europa of elders lokt een andere daad uit. Ook daarvan nu geen spoor. Het zou kunnen dat er een verband is met aandacht voor de islam in verband met de aanvang van de voor moslims bijzonder betekenisvolle maand Ramadan, maar dat blijft gissen.
 
2) Waar en wat?
Nu verspreid over het hele land. In de praktijk gaat het vaak om doelwitten die herkenbaar zijn als moskee, dus met minaretten en koepels. Ook zijn moskeeën in aanbouw regelmatig de klos, zoals bij de brandstichting op 3 april in Gouda. Gelukkig voorkwam een passerende taxichauffeur die getuige was van het voorval erger door direct de brandweer te bellen. De materiële schade valt in het niet bij de zware aantasting van het gevoel van veiligheid bij bestuur en bezoekers. 

De eind maart en begin april breed gedeelde dreigbrief werd onder meer afgeleverd bij moskeeën in Amsterdam. Rotterdam, Culemborg, Deventer, Vaassen, Enschede, Utrecht, IJmuiden, Groningen, Almere, Leeuwarden, Apeldoorn, Steenwijk en Middelburg, Dat zijn gebedshuizen die daar direct, via hun koepelorganisatie of in de loop van de afgelopen week bij navraag door mij mee naar buiten zijn gekomen.

De brief bevatte een luier met daarop de tekst ‘Paascadeau voor de jankerds in onze maatschappij!!’ In de envelop zaten verder zowel een afbeelding van de profeet Mohamed met een hoofddeksel in de vorm van een brandende bom vergezeld van het opschrift ‘Muhammed terrorist’ als versnipperde bladzijden uit de Koran.

Deze vorm van hatecrime herinnert aan de meest recente Nieuwjaarswens in de vorm van een puzzel van de extreemrechtse formatie Pegida die in de brievenbus viel bij een groot aantal moskeeën, waarop een dameshak een Koran doorboort en de tekst ‘NO ISLAM JUST FREEDOM’ valt te lezen.

Opvallend daarbij is dat door Pegida en andere extreemrechtse splinters nooit verwezen wordt naar (individuele) moslims maar altijd naar de islam (als religie). Dat is niet zomaar. Hoe schokkend, kwetsend en beledigend ook, als er niets gezegd wordt over de aanhangers van de islam (moslims), maar alleen over de islam zelf is dat volgens het Openbaar Ministerie (OM) geen groepsbelediging of discriminatie en dus niet strafbaar. 

Dat geldt dus nadrukkelijk niet voor de anonieme dreigbrief die moskee Omar Ibn Al Khattab ontving. Zoals bestuurslid Fariz Akkouh mij telefonisch liet weten: ‘daar zit geen woord Chinees bij’.

3) Daders?
Dit keer anoniem, dus niet opgeëist door georganiseerde verbanden. De dreigbrieven werden gelet op de poststempels verstuurd vanuit een tweetal grote steden. De opgepakte brandstichter in Rotterdam is volgens de politie ‘een verwarde man’. Het moskeebestuur gelooft daar geen snars van, net zomin als de bonte reeks bestuurders en vertegenwoordigers van islamitische (koepel)organisaties die ik er naar vroeg. Steevast is hun antwoord iets in de trend van: ‘als een moslim betrokken is bij een gewelddadig voorval is het een terrorist, niet-moslims zijn op een of andere manier altijd verward’.

Extreemrechts
Anders dan nu, wordt de afgelopen jaren veel van de hatecrime tegen moskeeën uitgevoerd of opgeëist door de kleine harde kernen van Pegida Nederland en andere radicaal- en extreemrechtse formaties in Nederland, waaronder Rechts in Verzet en Identitair Verzet. Zij kiezen bewust en gericht voor maximale media-exposure. Tekenend is verder dat doelen die worden uitgekozen meestal al onder het kritische vergrootglas van politiek en samenleving liggen. Er wordt daarbij handig ingespeeld op de sterk gepolitiseerde en versimplificeerde discussie over zaken als salafisme, opruiend prekende imams, buitenlandse financiering van moskeeën en ‘de lange arm van Ankara’. Hiermee proberen ze de aandacht af te leiden van hun ideologische drijfveren en achtergronden, die inmiddels vooral sterk islamofoob en xenofoob zijn, maar hun oorsprong meer dan eens vinden in het antisemitisme.
Vaak refereren ze aan het breder levende idee over de onmacht en het gebrek aan daadkracht bij de politiek. ‘De tijd van toekijken is afgelopen en hopen op doortastende daden van onze politici is voorbij….Wij stappen in waar de overheid faalt’, of ‘Dit is nog maar het begin, we beginnen klein, wij trappen af, u hoort nog vaker van ons en wij gaan hier een verzetsvoorbeeld voor Nederland neerzetten’, zijn veelgebruikte teksten bij hun acties tegen (de bouw van) moskeeën.. Ook wanneer er openlijk gedreigd wordt met dit soort heftigere en meeromvattende herhaling van de acties, blijft het OM bij het standpunt dat er geen sprake is van strafbare feiten. De doelen die deze extreemrechtse organisaties nastreven staan haaks op onze grondwet en beperken de rechten van bijna een miljoen Nederlanders, waaronder geloofsvrijheid en het recht om instituties op te zetten om het geloof te belijden. Ondanks hun geringe actieve aanhang, dragen ze met deze strategie wel fors bij aan het voeden van anti-islam en xenofoob sentiment in de Nederlandse samenleving.

4) Melden en de publiciteit zoeken of juist niet? Wat is er zichtbaar?
Bij afwegingen om hatecrime al dan niet te melden of aan te geven spelen bij nogal wat plaatselijke moskeebestuurders angst voor represailles, groeiende gevoelens van onveiligheid onder de bezoekers, slechte ervaringen met de politie of andere betrokken instanties en het idee dat er toch niets mee gebeurt of dat het inmiddels ‘gewoon’ wordt gevonden een belangrijke rol. Wat we te horen en te zien krijgen is dus zonder twijfel slechts een beperkt deel van het verhaal. Dat maar een zeer beperkt deel van de aangiftes door het OM in behandeling werd genomen, helpt daarbij ook niet. Maar het moet gezegd dat bij een ander deel van de bestuurders de meldings- en aangiftebereidheid – al dan niet ingegeven door een uniforme beleidslijn van koepelorganisaties of door materiële afwegingen (waaronder verzekeringsclaims) – aanzienlijk hoger ligt.

Afhankelijk van eerdere ervaringen zoeken moskeeën (pro)actief naar aandacht van de media. Op de onderliggende vraag om dat wel of niet te doen is moeilijk eenduidig antwoord te geven. Aan de ene kant kan je beweren dat media-aandacht precies is wat de daders willen en dat je zeker de kleine, harde kern van georganiseerd extreemrechts daarmee in de kaart speelt. Anderzijds is aandacht voor het onderwerp nodig om het blijvend en met prioriteit op de politieke agenda te krijgen. Soms wordt in overleg met de politie in verband met het onderzoek besloten om af te zien van media-aandacht of om daar juist gebruik van te maken.  

En ook nu blijken de meningen daarover verdeeld. Sommige bestuurders die ik de afgelopen dagen sprak zijn voor. Bijvoorbeeld Fariz Akkouh van moskee Omar Ibn Alkhattab:

De kans op herhaling is dan volgens mij kleiner. Ze hebben het nieuws gehaald met hun actie en zullen geen aanleiding hebben om het nog een keer te doen. Als er niets over naar buiten komt is hun doel niet bereikt en slaan ze mogelijk op nieuw toe.  

In dezelfde stad deed Hassan Fadili, voorzitter van moskee Abou Baker Assadik, het niet:

We hebben dit keer besloten de media er niet bij te halen. Je geeft de daders dan toch de aandacht die ze niet verdienen. En voorbeeld doet volgen. Aangifte doen bij de politie van de ontvangen dreigbrief vonden we genoeg. En natuurlijk nemen we al tijden lang onze eigen veiligheidsmaatregelen. Het was wel vervelend dat het via andere kanalen toch nog voordat wij zelf onze bezoekers over het voorval hadden kunnen informeren bij de media belandde.

Dit zijn overigens mannen die weten waar ze het over hebben. Ze waren naast ontvangers van doorlopende hatemails – die ze naar eigen zeggen al lang van zich af laten glijden – eerder respectievelijk onder meer doelwit van bezoekjes van Geert Wilders en demonstraties en acties van Rechts in Verzet.

Naast het landelijke Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid (CMO) treden ook diverse (Neder) Turkse en Marokkaanse islamitische koepelorganisaties naar aanleiding van deze nieuwe piek aan voorvallen actief naar buiten. De net aangetreden woordvoerder Ömer Karaca van Milli Görüş Noord-Nederland lichtte mij zondag tijdens een training die ik gaf aan het nieuwe, en zo bleek op alle fronten door vrouwen gedomineerde, niet-gescheiden om de vergadertafel gepositioneerde federatiebestuur het beleid toe.

Vanaf nu is de regel om bij vermoeden van hatecrime tegen onze instituties altijd aangifte te doen bij te politie en ook publiek te gaan. We zorgen er voor dat alles gedeeld wordt met de politie en met gremia die bovenop dit soort zaken zitten, zoals Republiek Allochtonië. We adviseren ook alle andere religieuze organisaties met klem om aangifte te doen bij vernieling en bedreiging, ongeacht de grootte van de materiële en immateriële schade.

Bij de aan de koepel verbonden Westermoskee in Amsterdam ging op 15 december 2020 een steen door een ruit. Aanvankelijk dacht het moskeebestuur dat het om vandalisme ging, maar nadat camerabeelden uitwezen dat de vermoedelijke dader een nazigroet uitbracht, gaat men er vanuit dat de vernieling in hun woorden ‘een haatdragend en islamofoob karakter heeft’. Een persbericht volgde, waarin werd aangegeven dat het een maand eerder al raak was in Utrecht en Zaandam.

Regionale koepels, zoals de Raad van Marokkaanse Moskeeën Noord-Holland, kwamen ook naar buiten met een persbericht. Daarin worden de autoriteiten op milde toon aangezet om nog meer actie te ondernemen. De secretaris van de koepel, Mohamed El Fakiri van moskee Al Mohsinien uit Langedijk is wel wat gewend. Hij heeft inmiddels maar liefst 22 camera’s aangeschaft om de zaak onder controle te houden. Dat heeft gewerkt, merkt hij: 

We hebben geen last meer. Vroeger was het steeds raak. Stenen door ruiten, poging tot brandstichting, bekladding. Het ging vooral om extreemrechtse jongens bij ons uit de buurt. Die hebben we jaren geleden samen met de politie een keer uitgenodigd om te praten. Ook dat heeft wel geholpen denk ik.

Een van de bij de Noord-Hollandse Raad aangesloten moskeeën ontving onlangs de envelop met luier en hatepost. De altijd goedlachse voorzitter Lahcen Farah van de duidelijk als zodanig te herkennen moskee El Oumma in Amsterdam somt de reeks haat- en dreigbrieven en mails van het afgelopen jaar nog even rustig op. ‘We doen altijd aangifte, maar horen of zien er helaas weinig van terug’. 

5) Impact en maatregelen
Niet alleen in Rotterdam, maar ook in Almere zit de schrik er flink in. Bestuurder Fariz Akkouh van moskee Omar Ibn Al Khattab lichtte te bezoekers zelf in:

Ze zijn natuurlijk heel erg geschrokken van de inhoud van de brief, maar vragen zich vooral ook af wat er mogelijk verder gaat gebeuren. Het zijn nogal heftige dreigementen. Het is voor ons daarom ook moeilijk te vatten dat de politie na de aangifte niet regelmatig patrouilleert bij onze moskee. Gewoon bijvoorbeeld tijdens het vrijdaggebed even laten zien dat er op onze veiligheid gelet wordt, dat ze het serieus nemen. We hebben de woordvoerder van de burgemeester gesproken. Die vindt het ook allemaal heel erg, maar verder horen we niets meer. 

Stadsgenoot Hassan Fadili van moskee Abou Bakr Assadik valt hem bij:

We verwachten meer van de lokale autoriteiten. Van de burgemeester en van zijn ambtelijk apparaat. Ze moeten de juiste ondersteuning bieden, en onze veiligheid beschermen door meer zichtbaar te zijn in de omgeving van de moskeeën.

Belangrijk probleem blijft dat dit soort acties doorgaans zowel politiek als maatschappelijk worden beoordeeld als incidenten en niet gezien worden als onderdeel van een breder fenomeen dat vraagt om beleid. Naast het ontbreken van strafrechtelijke veroordelingen is er tegen deze trend weinig weerwoord van bijvoorbeeld bestuurders en politici. In de praktijk is slechts mondjesmaat sprake van consequente, unanieme en onvoorwaardelijke veroordelingen van discriminatoire, beledigende, intolerante en gewelddadige handelingen en uitingen tegen moslims of islamitische instituties.

De politieke ambities op dat vlak zijn niet alleen beperkt, maar ook nog eens voorwaardelijk. Ze worden doorgaans in één adem genoemd met de aanpak van – al dan niet veronderstelde – problemen binnen ‘de moslimgemeenschap’. Teken aan de want: sinds 9/11 is er in Den Haag honderden keren gesproken over moskeeën, waarbij het bijna altijd ging over de moskee als potentiële bron van dreiging en radicalisering en zelden of nooit over de moskee als doelwit van geweld. In de optiek van veel slachtoffers en hun vertegenwoordigers gaat het weldegelijk om een georganiseerde, vaak door extreemrechts geclaimde trend, waarvan de impact op de gemeenschap groot is.

Muhsin Köktas, voorzitter van het CMO, overlegde mij gisteren een lijst van incidenten die de afgelopen 2 jaar werden gemeld door de ruim 150 moskeeën die aangesloten zijn bij de Islamitische Stichting Nederland (ISN). Dat zijn er nogal wat.

We drukken alle moskeeën op het hart niet alleen bij ons te melden maar vooral ook aangifte te doen. Maar dat gaat niet altijd naar wens. Politie, justitie en politiek moeten actiever worden. Deze trend vraagt om meer bescherming, aangiftes moeten prioriteit krijgen en daders moeten gevonden, vervolgd en bestraft worden

Saïd Bouharrou van de Landelijke Raad van Marokkaanse Moskeeën vindt het eng dat je niet weet of het één mafketel is of een gecoördineerde actie. Net als Köktas pleit hij voor de aanstelling van een coördinator die moslimgerelateerde haatincidenten onderzoekt. Ook wil hij dat er voorrang wordt gegeven aan aanvallen en bedreigingen op moskeeën die gebaseerd zijn op moslimhaat en stelt hij zwaardere straffen voor, om het signaal af te geven dat het niet wordt getolereerd. Bouharrou acht het gezamenlijk met de overheid opgestelde veiligheidsprotocol voor moskeeën (Handreiking Veilige Moskee; RvO) ontoereikend. ‘We moeten niet wachten tot er doden vallen’, zegt hij bij de NOS

Per app laat Saïd Bouharrou mij weten:

Als samenleving zien we veiligheid als een grondrecht maar gaan eraan voorbij dat dit niet in de grondwet is verankerd. Misschien wordt het tijd om veiligheid wel expliciet te verankeren in de grondwet zodat een burger of gemeenschap zo nodig daarop een beroep kan doen richting de overheid. Het kabinet doet te weinig als het gaat om het waarborgen van de veiligheid van Nederlandse moslims en hun moskeeën. We hebben verschillende voorstellen aangedragen. Maar de overheid is aan zet. En hard gaat het niet helaas.

6) Hoe verder? Veel steunbetuigingen uit joodse hoek
De bestuurders die ik de afgelopen week sprak zijn alles behalve jankerds, klagers of mensen die in een slachtofferrol kruipen. Maar teleurstelling en onbegrip over het uitblijven van concrete actie druipt er wel van af. In eerder onderzoek concludeerde Ineke van der Valk al dat veel moskeeën weliswaar melding doen bij de politie, maar over het algemeen teleurgesteld zijn over de bagatelliserende en depolitiserende reactie van politie en overheden.

Gelukkig is het niet allemaal kommer en kwel. Naast nare berichten op Facebook ontving de moskee in aanbouw Assalam (Vrede) in Gouda donaties en steunbetuigingen van alle kanten. De Liberaal Joodse Gemeente Amsterdam stak een hart onder riem van alle getroffen moskeeën en hun bezoekers met een mooie en krachtige steunbetuiging. Ook het Centraal Joods Overleg (CJO) spreekt in een brief aan CMO-voorzitter Muhsin Köktas nadrukkelijk afschuw uit over de bedreiging van islamitische instellingen. Er gaat vanuit de joodse gemeenschap een petitie ter ondertekening rond onder de titel ‘Geen ruimte voor islamofobie’. Daarin worden maatschappelijke organisaties, de politiek, actiegroepen, en individuen opgeroepen om zich uit te spreken tegen moslimhaat en de bedreigingen en geweld tegen de islamitische gemeenschap in Nederland af te keuren. Ook het Veiligheidspact tegen Discriminatie, kwam met een verklaring die bestuurders en politici oproept de vrijheden, rechten en veiligheid van moslims en hun instituties actief te beschermen. Het Pact bezoekt binnenkort een van de getroffen moskeeën in Amsterdam.

Die inlevende reacties zijn mooi. Maar de aanpak van dit maatschappelijke probleem vraag om veel meer en dat wordt door slechts enkele  politici structureel geagendeerd.
  

Mohamed Atrar van de koepel Moskee Alert in Amsterdam is zoals altijd klip en klaar:

We vragen niet veel, niet om een uitzonderingspositie, we vragen om gelijke behandeling. En dus om meer aandacht en vooral actie van lokale en nationale overheden als het gaat om al die narigheid tegen moskeeën. En dan is er nog heel veel wat niet naar buiten komt. Maar wat we vooral ook willen is om een keer te horen dat de islam, moslims en hun organisaties, hun moskeeën horen bij dit land en er onderdeel van zijn….

Lees ook: Overzicht haatincidenten gericht tegen moskeeen update april 2021

Deze maand verschijnt van de hand van Ineke van de Valk, Ewoud Butter en mijzelf de 4e Monitor Moslimdiscriminatie. Speciale aandacht is er voor discriminatie van moslims op de arbeidsmarkt, maar er wordt zoals altijd ook uitgebreid ingegaan op hatecrime tegen moskeeën en op radicaal- en extreemrechts in Nederland.

REPUBLIEK ALLOCHTONIE

OVERZICHT HAATINCIDENTEN, GERICHT TEGEN MOSKEEEN/

UPDATE APRIL 2021

Overzicht haatincidenten gericht tegen moskeeën, update april 2021

In achtergronden door Ewoud Butter op 05-04-2021 | 12:06

Sinds 2010 houd ik op Republiek Allochtonië een lijst bij met haatincidenten gericht tegen moskeeën. In dit artikel geef ik een update van deze lijst naar aanleiding van de recente brandstichting afgelopen week in Gouda en de dreigbrieven die moskeeën met pasen in Alkmaar, Culemborg, Deventer, Enschede, Almere, Amsterdam en Rotterdam ontvingen.

Korte historische schets

In 1976 werd voor de eerste keer in Nederland een moskee in brand  gestoken. Begin jaren ’90 waren er incidenten na het uitbreken van de Eerste Golfoorlog (1990-1991). In 1992 was er sprake van een forse toename. Het Parool publiceerde op 12 november 1993 het artikel ‘Twaalf maanden racisme’, waarin gemeld werd dat de Centrale Recherche Informatiedienst (CRI) van 1 januari 1992 tot juli 1993 337 politiemeldingen had genoteerd van acties die gericht waren tegen Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond. Hieronder viel ook geweld gericht tegen moskeeën: zo waren moskeeën in Vaassen, Utrecht, Sliedrecht, Huizen en meerdere moskeeën in Rotterdam doelwit geweest van vandalisme en bekladding met racistische leuzen, was er sprake van vernielingen bij moskeeën in Nijkerk, Arnhem en IJmuiden, van brandstichting in een toekomstige moskee in Nijmegen en van een bommelding bij een moskee in Maastricht. 

Aan het begin van deze eeuw was er tot twee keer toe een forse toename van het aantal haatincidenten gericht tegen moslims en moskeeën: na de aanslagen van 11 september 2001 en na de moord op Theo van Gogh (2004). In het najaar van 2001 waren moskeeën volgens onderzoekster Ineke van der Valk vijftig keer doelwit geweest van verschillende vormen van geweld. Na de moord op Theo van Gogh op 2 november 2004 was er opnieuw sprake van een enorme toename van geweld gericht tegen enkele kerken, maar vooral tegen islamitische scholen en moskeeën. Alleen al tussen 2 november 2004 (de dag dat Van Gogh vermoord werd) en 30 november 2004 registreerde de Monitor Racisme en Extreemrechts 174 incidenten waarbij in 106 gevallen sprake was van islamofoob geweld dat in 47 gevallen gericht was tegen een moskee. 

Kijk voor een uitgebreidere versie van dit historisch overzicht, inclusief de reactie van de politiek, naar deze update.

Update van de lijst met haatincidenten gericht tegen moskeeen

Deze lijst publiceer ik, sinds maart 2010. De lijst is samengesteld op grond van vooral mediaberichten en eerdere blogs op Republiek Allochtonië, Frontaal Naakt (t/m 2009) en de database van Rechtspraak.nl.

Vooral sinds 2015 krijg ik zo nu en dan ook rechtstreeks meldingen van onderzoekers (Ineke van der Valk), individuen, moskeeen of moskeekoepels. Iedere lezer wordt van harte uitgenodigd te aanvullingen of correcties te mailen. 

Op de lijst plaats ik anti-islam incidenten met een duidelijk gewelddadig karakter (brandstichting, molotovcocktails, berdreiging e.d.) en incidenten die bedoeld zijn om de bezoekers van een moskee te belemmeren in het recht dat ze hebben om gebruik te maken van hun godsdienstvrijheid.
Incidenten die duidelijk gerelateerd zijn aan conflicten tussen Turkse politieke/religieuze stromingen  of Turks-Koerdische conflicten beschouw ik niet als anti-islam maar (meestal) anti Turkse regering. 
Inhoudelijke kritiek op de islam mag en komt niet in aanmerking voor deze lijst. Het plaatsen van varkenskoppen of het bekladden of besmeuren van een moskee beschouw ik echter niet als een serieuze bedoelde vorm van islamkritiek of een poging daartoe en komt wel op de lijst. 

Wat betreft demonstraties van extreemrechtse organisaties: met de nationale ombudsman Reinier van Zutphen (zie de Volkskrant) vind ik dat iedere groep het recht heeft om te demonstreren. En net als Berend Roorda van de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen vind ik dat ook‘ shockeren onder het recht op demonstreren valt. (in de Volkskrant). Hoewel de demonstraties van extreemrechtse organisaties geregeld binnen de kaders van de wet vallen, neem ik ze meestal toch op. Reden hiervoor is dat de doelen die deze extreemrechtse organisaties nastreven haaks staan op de grondwet zoals de beperking van rechten, waaronder de geloofsvrijheid, van een deel van de bevolking. Pegida is helder over haar doel:

Pegida is niet de enige extreemrechtse organisatie die, in de woorden van de NCTV, ‘intimiderende protestacties’ organiseert bij moskeeen. Ook andere extreemrechtse organisaties als Voorpost, Identitair Verzet en Rechts in Verzet lieten de afgelopen jaren van zich horen. Met deze acties maken deze organisaties gebruik van een politiek klimaat waarin het niet meer uitzonderlijk is geworden om ervoor te pleiten elementaire grondrechten aan een specifieke groep Nederlanders (moslims) te ontzeggen. Ze proberen op deze manier ook sahlonfähig te worden. 

Topje van de ijsberg

De lijst hieronder is bij lange na niet compleet. Heel veel incidenten halen namelijk nooit de media. Daarnaast hebben verschillende moskeeën het beleid, soms in overleg met de politie, om met dergelijke incidenten niet naar buiten te treden. De gedachte hierachter is dat de daders met media-aandacht krijgen wat ze zoeken. Ook bestaat de angst dat het tot kopieergedrag en dus tot meer bedreigingen of geweld leidt. En verder spelen angst voor onrust bij de achterban, gebrek aan vertrouwen in instanties zoals de politie en het OM en gewenning een rol. 
In eerder onderzoek concludeerde Ineke van der Valk al dat veel moskeeën weliswaar melding doen bij de politie, maar over het algemeen teleurgesteld zijn over de bagatelliserende en depolitiserende reactie van politie en overheden. 
 

Lijst met incidenten
 

2001

• In het najaar van 2001 waren moskeeën volgens onderzoekster Ineke van der Valk vijftig keer doelwit van verschillende vormen van geweld (Van der Valk (2012), Islamofobie en Discriminatie. Amsterdam: Pallas)

2003

• 21 mei 2003 Brandstichting moskee Vianen
• 17 juni 2003 Brandstichting islamitische school Eindhoven

2004

• 5 april 2004 Brandstichting moskee Panningen
• 2 november 2004 – februari 2005  Ineke van der Valk telde in deze periode (pdf, blz. 77) 45 geweldsincidenten tegen moskeeen, waaronder 18 (pogingnen) tot brandstichting.

2005

• 26 maart 2005 Brandstichting Bedir-school Uden
• 26 maart 2005 Brandstichting moskee Oldenzaal
• 12 juni 2005: Brandstichting Mevlana moskee Rotterdam
• 15 juni 2005 Brandstichting moskee Rotterdam

2006

• 10 juni 2006 Brandstichting moskee Vlaardingen
• 15 december 2006 Brandstichting moskee Maastricht

2007

• 22 januari 2007 Molotovcocktail in islamitische gebedsruimte in Edam-Volendam
• 24 maart 2007 Brandstichting moskee Huizen
• 20 oktober 2007 Brandstichting moskee Leeuwarden
• 13 juli 2007 Moskeeën Haarlem beklad met leuzen ‘fuck Allah’; ‘Allah moet dood’
• 22 juli 2007 Molotovcocktails moskee Haarlem
• Wintermaanden 2007/08 Bekladding, ingegooide ruiten, brandbommen, moskee Zeist

2008

• 19 maart 2008 Molotovcocktail moskee Huizen

2009

• 8 mei 2009 Molotovcocktail moskee Zoetermeer
• 14 februari 2009 Steen door ruit tijdens ochtendgebed, moskee Drachten
• 6 maart 2009 Hakenkruizen en leuzen op moskee Zeist
• 27 juni 2009 Turks verenigingsgebouw en moskee beklad met leuzen ‘Sieg Heil’ en ‘Geert Wilders’
• 2 augustus 2009 Varkenskop moskee Ede
• 19 november 2009 Molotovcocktail moskee Zoetermeer

2010

• 4 januari 2010: brandstichting moskee Arnhem
• 18 maart 2010: Moskee met bloed besmeurd
• 7 april 2010: Leuzen en vernielingen moskee Veenendaal
• 17 mei 2010:  Tegenstanders moskee hangen dood schaap op in Roosendaal
• 3 juni 2010: Ridderkerkse moskee keer op keer beklad
• 3 augustus 2010: Poging tot brandstichting moskee Arnhem
• 19 augustus 2010: vrouwen bij moskee met bier bekogeld
• 28 augustus 2010: Moskee in Zoetermeer beklad.
• 27 september 2010: brandstichting bij Groningse moskee
• 10 oktober 2010: Moskee in Dordrecht beschoten
• 9 december 2010: Amsterdamse moskeeen vrezen aanslagen

2011

• 24 januari 2011: Vandalisme bij moskee Nieuwegein
• 2 april 2011: Moskee weer doelwit van vandalen
• 5 juni 2011; poging tot brandstischtng moskee Enkhuizen
• 14 september 2011: Moskeebezoekers bedreigd door actiecomité Hillegom

2012

• 7 april 2012: brandstichting moskee Nieuwerkerk
• 20 juli 2012: School in Enkhuizen die moskee zou gaan huisvesten in brand gestoken

2013

1. 6 april 2013: Moskee Enkhuizen in brand gestoken (molotov cocktail volgens melding moskee)
2. 14 april 2013: In tuin van Merkez moskee in Doetinchem bekladding: Mohammed is dood, Jezus leeft (melding moskee)
3. 22 juli 2013: Varkenskop bij Arrahmaanmoskee in Boskoop
4. 10 augustus 2013: Ertugrulgazi moskee in Haakbergen; moskee bekogeld met eieren (melding door moskee)
5. 18 augustus 2013: Brand moskee in Deventer; onduidelijk of sprake was van brandstichting
6. 30 augustus 2013: op dak van moskee is molotovcocktail-achtige bom gegooid van Mevlana moskee in Assen (melding door moskee)
7. 15 september 2013: Mevlana moskee in Assen beklad met hakenkruizen en verschillende teksten waaronder ACAB (melding door moskee)
8. 20 spetmber 2013: ruiten van Kubamoskee in IJmuiden met steoeptegels ingegooid. (melding door moskee)
9. 20 december 2013: Twee varkenskoppen bij moskee Geleen

2014

1. 15 februari 2014: bij moskee Abdulkadir Geylani moskee is racistisch teken achter gelaten (melding van moskee)
2. 6 maart 2014: ruiten ingegooid van Yunus Emre moskee in Almelo
3. 9 juni 2014: brandstichting Anadolu mskee in Rotterdam
4. 14 juni 2014: Varkenskop bij moskee in IJmuiden
5. 23 juni 2014; Moskeegangers IJmuiden verijdelen aanslag rechtsextremisten
6. 28 juni 2014: Moskee beklad met hakenkruis
7. 27 oktober 2014: Jongens proberen moskee in Etten-Leur in brand te steken
8. 14 december 2014; Raam van moskee Enschede opgeblazen met vuurwerkbom

2015

1. 3 januari 2015: Moskeeen schakelen burgerwacht na bedreigingen
2. 8 januari 2015: Moskee in Vlaardingen aangevallen met brandbom
3. 12 januari 2015: Rotterdam ISN Laleli moskee, Een glazen pot met verf gegooid tegen de voordeur van de moskee (melding moskee)
4. 17 januari 2015: Stinkbom tegen Haagse moskee
5. 19 januari 2015: Rotterdamse moskee bedreigd
6. 31 januari 2015: Almelo ISN Yunus Emre moskee, Om 4 uur ’s-morgens hebben 2 personen het raam aan de zijkant van moskee kapot gemaakt. (melding moskee)
7. 7 februari 2015: Activisten (rechts-extremistische) Identitair Verzet bezetten moskee in aanbouw
8. 26 april 2015: Hakenkruizen op poort van moskee Arrahman in Breda
9. 23 juni 2015: moskee Roermond bedreigd met aanslag
10. 27 juni 2015: Purmerend ISN Waterland Kultur Merkezi; Op de ramen zijn door onbekenden anti-islam leuzen geplaatst. De politie en gemeente zijn geïnformeerd. (melding moskee)
11. 23 september 2015: Zwolle ISN Ulu moskee, Een ruit van de voordeur is met steen kapot gegooid (melding moskee)
12. 25 september 2015: Meerdere ruiten moskee Terhaarkade (Leiden) ingegooid
13. 29 september 2015: Bekladding moskee in Delft; tekst tegen kindhuwelijken op fietspad gespoten
14. 19 oktober 2015: Moskee aan Terhaarkade beklad met anti-islamgraffiti
15. 11 november 2015; Assen ISN Mevlana moskee; Door het raam van de jongerenruimte is een baksteen gegooid.(melding moskee)
16. 14 november 2015: Poging brandstichting moskee in Roosendaal
17. 14 november 2015: Steen door ruit moskee Bergen op Zoom
18. 25 november 2015: Leerdam ISN Anadolu moskee; Op binnenplaats van de moskee is fles sterke drank gegooid (melding moskee)

2016

1. 6 januari 2016: Doodsbedreigingen voor bestuursleden As Soennah moskee Den Haag
2. 6 januari 2016: Gorinchem, er wordt een steen naar de moskee gegooid. De ruit van de voordeur raakt beschadigd.
3. 25  januari 2016: Varkenskop gevonden bij moskee in Mijdrecht
4. 30 januari 2016: Moskeegangers Nijkerk opgeschrikt door varkensoor
5. 11 februai 2016: Almelo ISN Yunus Emre moskee; Per post Koranpagina’s met verbrande zijkanten ontvangen (melding van moskee)
6. 12 februari 2016: Hoogvliet ISN Merkez moskee; Op de buitenkant van de moskee is de tekst Geen Moskee geschreven (melding moskee)
7. 14 februari 2016: Drunen ISN Hacı Bayram moskee; Per post Koranpagina’s met verbrande zijkanten ontvangen (melding van moskee)
8. 16 februari 2016: Wijkgebouw in Hoogvliet beklad met ‘geen moskee’
9. 25 februari 2016: Moskeeen doen samen aangifte:  Een groot aantal Marokkaanse moskeeën ontvangt pamflet met afbeelding van een adelaar op een hakenkruis ; in totaal werden door 39 moskeeen in o.a. Rotterdam, Den Haag, Leiden, Arnhem,Maastricht, Sittard, Breda, Tilburg en Delft aangiften gedaan (bron: 3e monitor moslimdiscriminatie, blz
10. 28 februari 2016: busje van Masjied Bouw, een bedrijf dat zich bezig houdt met de bouw van een moskee werd ‘s nacht in brand gestoken.
11. 2 maart 2016: Molotovcocktail op moskee Enschede (daders veroordeeld voor daad met terroristisch oogmerk)
12. 11 maart 2016: Amsterdamse moskee meldt haat niet
13. 12 april 2016: ISN moskee in Rotterdam beklad met anti islamleuzen (melding bij ISN)
14. 20 maart 2016: Varkenskop aangetroffen bij moskee Lansingerland
15. 6 maart 2016: ISN moskee in Rotterdam beklad met anti islamleuzen (melding bij ISN)
16. 22 juni 2016: ISN Ayasofya moskee in Sneek ontvangt brief met bedreigingen (melding bij ISN)
17. 4 juli: ISN moskee in Rotterdam beklad met anti islamleuzen (melding bij ISN)
18. 22 juli: ISN merkez moskee in Hoogvliet met anti islamleuzen beklad (melding bij ISN) 
19. 27 juli: ISN merkez moskee in Hoogvliet met anti islamleuzen beklad (melding bij ISN) 
20. 25 augustus 2016: Vernieling bij moskee in Maassluis
21. 10 september 2016: stenen door ruiten van moskeeen in Zwijndrecht (onduidelijk of het om moslimhaat gaat); melding bij ISN
22. 18 september 2016: Tuig sloopt moskee in Medemblik
23. 19 september 2016: Moskee Poelenburg bedreigd met dreigbrief
24. 19 september 2016: Opnieuw geweld en bedreiging tegen [3] moskeeen (waaronder hierboven genoemde Poelenburg)
25. 22 oktober 2016: graffiti op de muur van moskee in Dongen
26. 1 november 2016: Moskeeen in Alblasserdam (HDV Yunus Emre Camii), Almelo (HDV Yunus Emre Camii), Doesburg (HDV Anadolu Camii), Maassluis (HDV Yeni Camii), Groningen (HDV Eyüp Sultan Camii) en Ijmuiden (HDV Kuba Camii) hebben een brief met anti islamitische/moslim en anti Erdogan uitspraken ontvangen (meldingen moskeeen bij iSN)

2017

1. 11 januari 2017: Varkenskop bij moskee in Berkel en Rodenrijs
2. 26 februari 2017: Ruiten vernield bij moskee in Kampen (kan ook vandalisme zijn geweest)
3. 27 februari 2017: Molukse moskee in Waalwijk beklad met Fuck Allah en Fuck Isis
4. 5 maart 2017: Moskee Nieuwegein bedreigd; dader veroordeeld 
5. 24 maart 2017: Moskee in Assen beplakt met posters en kwetsende teksten
6. 28 maart 2017: Anti-islam spandoeken op bouwplaats moskee Weesp
7. 7 april 2017: Moskee in Heemskerk doelwit van brandstichting
8. 2 mei 2017: Spandoeken tegen komst moskee in Tilburg
9. 26 juni 2017 Haagse As Soennah moskee bedreigd met aanslag 
10. 17 juli 2017: Anti-islam actie bouwplaats moskee Veghel
11. 22 juli 2017: Varkenskop neergelegd bij moskee in Boskoop
12. 2 september 2017: Extreemrechtse beweging bezet moskee in Venlo
13. 30 oktober 2017: Deur moskee Barneveld beklad met hakenkruis en haattaal
14. 12 november 2017: Pegida besprenkelt bouwlocatie moskee Enschede met varkensbloed

2018

1. 18 januari 2018: Onthoofde en met bloed besmeurde pop bij Emir Sultan Moskee in Amsterdam
2. 3 februari 2018: Moskee in aanbouw in den Haag beklad
3. 7 februari 2018: Ruiten ingegooid bij Marokkaanse moskee Roosendaal (onduidelijk of hier sprake was van haatmisdrijf)
4. 10 februari 2018: Brandstichting bij islamitisch centrum in Drachten 
5. 10 maart 2018: Tientallen kruizen op bouwterrein moskee
6. 12 april 2018: Rechts in Verzet plaatst spandoeken en borden bij moskeeen in Enschede
7. 12 april 2018: Rechts in Verzet plaatst spandoeken tegen moskee in Houten 
8. 6 juni 2018: Actiegroep plaatst spandoeken tegen moskee in Assendelft
9. 7 juni 2018: Pegida blaast barbecue op laatste moment af na verzet van buurt
10. 2 juli 2018: Rechts in Verzet plaatst spandoeken tegen moskee Oosterhout
11. 22 augustus 2018: Nijmegen Rechtsaf voert actie bij moskee. Politie grijpt in. 
12. 9 september 2018: Stenen door ruit Yunus Emre moskee Alblasserdam
13. 1 oktober 2018: Pegida demonstreert met gruwelijke video voor moskee in Enschede
14. 25 september 2018: Moskee in Nieuwerkerk aan den Ijssel besmeurd met tomatensaus
15. 8 oktober 2018: Demonstratie Pegida in Utrecht vroegtijdig beeindigd
16. 28 oktober 2018: Identitair Verzet protesteert bij moskee Leiden, ME ingezet
17. 16 november 2018: Spandoek en poort op slot bij moskee in Geleen door Identitair Verzet 
18. 17 november 2018: Posters tegen islamisering bij moskee Ede
19. 24 november 2018: Opnieuw posters bij Turkse moskee Ede 

2019

1. 3 maart 2019: Kwetsend spandoek en poppen geplaatst bij Haagse As Soennah moskee
2. 8 april 2019: Moskee mikpunt van racistische aanval; De daders, een vader en zijn zoon, zouden een racistisch motief hebben gehad voor hun aanval. Bron: AD/Groene Hart via Nexis 
3. 23 april 2019: brandstichting moskee Leeuwarden; veroordeling dader op 3 oktober
4. 28 april 2019: Mishandeling met racistisch karakter bij moskee Waddinxveen
5. 22 juni 2019: Pegida-aanhangers opgepakt bij manifestatie bij Al Fourqaan moskee
6. 26 juni 2019: Vlak na aanslag in Utrecht belt Cornelis H. met Ulu-moskee: ‘Zat die Turk bij jullie? Jullie zullen branden’ (artikel in AD over veroordeling man die Ulu moskee in Utrecht bedreigde)
7. 17 juli 2019: Veenendaalse moskee beklad met maandverband en smerigheid
8. 16 september 2019: Poster-actie tegen Abou Bakr moskee
9. 18 oktober 2019: Moskee Geleen doelwit extreemrechtse actiegroep
10. 29 oktober 2019: Blauwe Moskee doet aangifte na bedreiging
11. 12 november 2019: Lugubere vondst in brievenbus Zeister moskee: dreigbrief met getekende galg
12. 14 november 2019: Na Zeist krijgen ook moskeeen in andere steden (Vlissingen en Oosterhout) dreigbrief met galg in de bus

2020

1. 8 februari 2020: Morbide dreigbrief schokt Gouds moskeeen Nour en Al Fath; vandaag een brief, morgen een galg? (het gaat om een brief die al in november 2019 werd bezorgd; zie ook de meldingen van 12 en 14 november 2019)
2. 18 juni 2020: Online haat tegen Blauwe Moskee heeft aandacht van politie
3. (4 september 2020: Demonstratie Pegida in Apeldoorn op laatste moment verboden na dreiging vernietiging Koran); deze staat tussen haakjes, omdat ik doorgaans afgelaste demonstraties niet in de lijst opneem; omdat er behalve een demonstratie ook gedreigd werd een Koran te vernietigen staat deze er tussen haakjes bij
4. 13 september 2020: Sympathisanten van extreemrechtse Rechts in Verzet bekladden straat en stoep als protest tegen te bouwen moskee in Enschede
5. 11 november 2020: Ruit Turks-Nederlandse moskee Zaandam ingegooid
6. 14 december 2020: Moskee en twee synagogen in Utrecht beklad met hakenkruizen 
7. 15 december 2020: Steen door ruit Westermoskee in Amsterdam. Dader brengt nazi-groet
8. 29 december 2020: Pegida stuurt volgens Turkse pers oudejaarskaarten (in puzzelvorm) naar zo’n 100 moskeeen. Op de kaart wordt Koran vertrapt. De actie wordt op de facebookpagina van Pegida bevestigd. 

2021

1. 3 april 2021: Man aangehouden voor brandstichting moskee in Gouda
2. 4 april 2021: Dreigbrief bezorgd bij moskeeen in Alkmaar, Culemborg, Deventer en Enschede en in Almere. Daarnaast is de brief bij moskeeen in Amsterdam en Rotterdam bezorgd, in ieder geval bij de Blauwe Moskee in Amsterdam. 
3. 9 april 2021: Dreigbrief aan moskee in Almere: ‘Mensen van de islam moeten levend verbrand worden’