[60]

EU SLUIT MIGRATIEDEAL MET TUNESIE/MAFFIAORGANISATIE IN

WERKING/ZO ZIJN ONZE EU WAARDEN

ASTRID ESSED

9 AUGUSTUS 2023

https://www.astridessed.nl/eu-sluit-migratiedeal-met-tunesie-maffiaorganisatie-in-werking-zo-zijn-onze-eu-waarden/

ZIE OOK

UITPERS.BE

EU IS MET TUNESIE DEAL NIET AAN PROEFSTUK

ASTRID ESSED

https://www.uitpers.be/eu-is-met-tunesie-deal-niet-aan-proefstuk/

Ik zeg het onomwonden, ik beschouw de EU als een maffieuse organisatie, zeker waar het vluchtelingen betreft. De EU is zelfs erger. Want een Maffia-organisatie doet zich niet beter voor dan zij is.
Terwijl de EU schermt met Verdragen [1] en zogenaamde Waarden [2], die zelfs het Papier waarop zij gedrukt zijn, niet waard zijn!
Want wat voor ”Europese Waarden” [3] leeft de EU na bij het sluiten van de migratiedeal met Tunesie [4]?

Maar eerst naar een paar eerder door de EU gesloten ”Migratiedeals” en wat daarvan terecht is gekomen

EU-deal met Libië

In 2017 sloot Italië (met de EU als Speler op de achtergrond, die de deal grotendeels financierde [5]] een deal met Libië met als doel de migratiestroom via Libië terug te dringen. In feite was het een financiële en technische ondersteuning voor de Libische kustwacht,
die als een soort Middellandse Zee Politieagent als taak had om bootjes met migranten op weg naar Europa tegen te houden. [6]
Nou was dat sluiten van een deal met Libië al heel raar, onder andere, omdat het land op dat moment een ongeordende bende was, waar
milities, die ook weer een link met mensensmokkel hadden [7] [en zo misbruik maakten van kwetsbare migranten, elkaar de tent uitvochten [8], waarbij ook nog eens twee verschillende regeringen met elkaar op de vuist waren (9)

And to add insult to injury had (waarschijnlijk nog) ”heeft] Libië ook nog eens slavenmarkten (10), iets wat Italië en de EU geweten moeten
hebben [de deal kwam rond in de tijd van de bekendmaking van die slavenmarkten] [11]. En als de EU en Italië het tijdens het sluiten al niet wisten, dan hadden ze direct de deal moeten beëindigen, toen ze op de hoogte raakten! NIET gedaan……
EU waarden he, laat me niet lachen (12)
En daarbij komt ook nog, dat in detentiecentra in Libië, waarheen de migranten, die door de EU/Libie deal zijn tegengehouden, teruggebracht worden, al jaren sprake is van folteringen, verkrachtingen, noem de ellende maar op! [13]
Maar dat is nog niet alles. Want de EU investeerde [14] [en investeert nog steeds] [15] in de Libische kustwacht, die bootjes met migranten moet onderscheppen en ze terugbrengt naar Libië, waar ze dus terechtkomen in de hierboven genoemde folter-detentiekampen.
Bij deze praktijken zijn ook allerlei Libische milities betrokken. [16] Ik citeer hier uit een schocking Verhaal van een man uit Gambia, die
vastzat in zo’n folterkamer. ”They beat me with a rubber hose, becau se they want money to release me. They call the family while beating [you] so the family send money.”[17]  En verder [uit Amnesty’s Statement]: ”After his family paid the ransom he was taken to Tripoli by an assigned driver who demanded further payment. “I had to stay with him until I pay the money back, otherwise he will sell me.” [18]

Een Partner voor de Bokkenwagen dus, Libie. En de EU, die dondersgoed op de hoogte is van de Libische praktijken [19], gaat er gewoon mee door [20]
Zijn dat de ”EU Waarden” ? [21]

De EU-deal met Turkije

Wat de EU-Turkije deal betreft, die ongeveer diezelfde tijd gesloten werd [in 2016] [22], was het al evenzeer doffe ellende.
Niet met slavenmarkten en folter-vluchtelingendetentie centra, maar met overvolle vluchtelingenkampen onder
mensonwaardige omstandigheden. [23] Want wat behelsde die EU Turkije deal?
Die Deal moest ervoor zorgen, dat vluchtelingen [van wie door de oorlog in Syrie grote aantallen naar Europa kwamen en er in Europa een politieke crisis ontstond] niet meer naar Europa kwamen. In ruil daarvoor kreeg Turkije van de EU miljarden euro’s
om de omstandigheden van vluchtelingen in Turkije te verbeteren en zou Turkije de grenzen strenger bewaken. Vluchtelingen, die Europa toch bereikten, zouden na een korte procedure [die zou bepalen, of ze echt niet naar Turkije terug konden], teruggestuurd worden naar Turkije en voor iedere teruggestuurde vluchteling zou een vluchteling in een Turks vluchtelingenkamp worden opgenomen [24]
Dat was dus de Deal:
Vluchtelingenwerk legt uit, waarom dat alles misliep [25], nog afgezien van het feit, dat het het recht op asiel zwaar onder druk zette [26] Ook mensenrechtenorganisatie Amnesty International. liet zich in haar kritiek, 7 jaar na het sluiten van de Deal,
niet onbetuigd! [27]

De Deal met Tunesie:

Het noemen van deze mislukte EU deals was nodig om te laten zien, hoe de EU in de praktijk met mensenrechten omgaat, ondanks alle schoonklinkende EU Waarden [28] Het Drama rond de EU deal met Tunesië is het volgende dieptepunt.

Net als met de Rampendeals met Libie en Turkije is weer het doel van de Deal met Tunesie: Het terugdringen van de migratiestroom [29]
Waarbij als hoofdmotivatie: Migratie kost geld.

Zo’n EU deal om de ”migratiestroom tegen te houden” is een onding. Omdat het het fundamentele recht op asiel [dus ook het
recht om asiel aan te vragen] ondergraaft. Een recht, dat zelf is verankerd in EU Verdragen [33]. Zogenaamd is de strijd tegen ”mensensmokkelaars” [34], in werkelijkheid tegen de vluchtelingen zelf. Want als dat niet zo is, waarom dan niet legale mogelijkheden aan de vluchtelingen geboden om Europa te bereiken [als ze dat dan perse willen, uit wetenschappelijk onderzoek blijkt, dat dat maar
voor een kleine groep geldt] [35], zoals Amnesty International allang bepleit [36].

De inhoud

Globaal genomen komt het erop neer, dat in ruil voor bijna 1 miljard euro’s Tunesië zich ertoe verbindt, om de migrantenbootjes, die de oversteek naar Europa wagen, tegen te gaan. [39] Daarnaast verbindt de EU [onderhandelingspartners waren premier Rutte, de Italiaanse premier Meloni met een fascistische achtergrond [40] en Ursula von der Leyen, voorzitter van de Europese Commissie] zich ertoe, geld te steken in de Tunesische economie en duurzame energieprojecten. [41]

Natuurlijk is deze bijna miljard deal geen leuke gift aan Tunesië, alleen in ruil voor wat grensbewaking en tegenhouden van migrantenbootjes, dat begrijpt ieder weldenkend mens: In de eerste plaats is het een LENING, geen gift [43] In de tweede plaats is die bijna miljard lening gekoppeld aan het feit, of Tunesië een eventuele lening van het IMF loskrijgt [44]

Natuurlijk heeft de EU een fel voordeel bij die deal [anders sloten zij die niet], want niet alleen willen ze zo migranten tegenhouden, ze zijn fel op het financieel ondersteunen van de slecht draaiende Tunesische economie, omdat ze vrezen, dat als Tunesië omvalt, er een chaos ontstaat en er nog meer migranten richting Europa komen. [45]

Met wie is die deal gesloten en hoe zit het met de EU-waarden?

Volgens Rutte en zijn EU Brothers wordt bij iedere deal, die wordt gesloten ivm migratie, gekeken naar de internationale Verdragen
[Ik citeer RTL Nieuws]: “Als we afspraken maken met landen binnen en buiten Europa, dan kijken we altijd of die afspraken in lijn zijn met internationale verdragen”, aldus Rutte.” [46] Welnu, laten we dan maar eens kijken, met wie die ”migratiedeal” gesloten is en met welke internationaleVerdragen de Deal al dan niet in lijn is.
En let wel: EU Verdragen zijn ook internationale Verdragen en eerstens moet zo’n Deal ook daarmee in lijn zijn.
Ik heb reeds opgemerkt, dat het sluiten van een deal met onverschillig welk Staatshoofd, met als oogmerk, migranten tegen te houden, in strijd is met het in het EU Handvest vastgelegde recht op asiel [wat natuurlijk inhoudt, dat je asiel ook moet kunnen aanvragen] [47]

Dat is dus de Eerste Schending van de EU Waarden. Maar er komen meer . Want de Deal is gesloten met een president, voor wie Mensenrechtenverdragen, EU Waarden en wat dies meer zij, minder waard zijn dan het papier waarop ze zijn gedrukt.

President Saied

De Tunesische president, waarmee de Onzalige Groep Rutte, Von der Leyen en Meloni de EU/Tunesie Deal hebben gesloten, is
een Kwaaie hoor! Niet alleen heeft hij in snel tempo een groot aantal democratische rechten in Tunesie ontmanteld, de premier ontslagen, steeds meer macht naar zich toegetrokken en journalisten en andere critici monddood gemaakt en gearresteerd [48] Kijk eens met hoeveel EU Waarden DAT allemaal in strijd is! [49]

Alsof dat nog niet alles was, startte Saied een haatcampagne tegen Afrikaanse migranten [Tunesië was voor velen een doorvoerland geworden, al dan niet op weg naar Europa] [50], om de aandacht af te leiden van zijn dictatoriale wanbeleid en de slechte economische situatie in Tunesië [51]

Haatcampagne en ‘Omvolking’

”“The undeclared goal of the successive waves of illegal immigration is to consider Tunisia a purely African country that has no affiliation to the Arab and Islamic nations,” [52] Deel uit hatespeech president Saied

Het wordt niet alleen in het Westen uit de Kast gehaald, die racistisch-fascistische omvolkingstheorie, die inhoudt, dat volgens een ”vooropgezet plan” [of planning], de eigen, witte bevolking wordt vervangen door niet witte mensen, waarmee tegenwoordig vaak [niet altijd] Afrikaanse migranten-vluchtelingen worden bedoeld [53] . Voorbeeld in het Westen/in Nederland is FVD politicus Thierry Baudet, die niet wil, dat Europa ”Afrikaniseert” [54]

Fatale gevolgen

In februari hield president Saied dus een haatzaaiende, ophitsend-racistische toespraak, waarin beweerd werd, dat immigratie vanuit sub-Sahara Afrika erop gericht was om de ”demografische samenstelling” [55] van Tunesië te veranderen. Een typische ”omvolkings” toespraak dus [56]
De gevolgen waren fataal, omdat er een ware geweldsgolf tegen Afrikaanse migranten uitbrak, waarbij mensen werden mishandeld, huizen en bezittingen werden vernield, er zelfs doden vielen en dat alles culmineerde in deportaties naar de grens met Libie [ook zo’n Parel der Mensenrechten, zie EU Libie deal] [57], waar mensen in de woestijn werden achtergelaten zonder eten, drinken en medische
hulp. [58]

Deze mensonwaardige toestanden zijn uitgebreid gedocumenteerd tegen de hiertegen fel protesterende mensenrechten
organisaties Amnesty International en Human Rights Watch [59] en uiteraard protesteerde de Afrikaanse Unie tegen de hatespeech van president Saied [60] Een Gezicht van de horrordeportaties naar de woestijn werden Matyla Dosso [30 jaar] en haar dochter Marie [6 jaar], die door het demonisch-racistische Tunesische beleid zijn omgekomen in de woestijn.
Lees onder noot 61 hun dramatische Verhaal.

Terecht stelde Flor Didden, als beleidsmedewerker verbonden aan pro vluchtelingen organisatie 11.11.11 [actief in Belgie [62], dat de EU de Deal met Tunesie direct dient op te schorten. [63] Vind ik ook, sterker nog, er had nooit zo’n Deal moeten komen! [64] Maar hebben jullie gelezen of gehoord, dat de EU zich iets heeft aangetrokken van deze Woestijndoden? Ikke niet.

Epiloog

Nog afgezien van het feit, dat deals om vluchtelingen tegen te houden nooit gesloten zouden mogen worden [het tast het ook in het EU Handvest erkende recht op asiel aan, lees artikel 18], sluit de EU, met als voortrekkers [demissionair] premier Rutte en de Italiaanse premier
Meloni met haar fascistische achtergrond, een deal met een bijna dictator als de Tunesische president Saied, die de bevolking ophitst tegen Afrikaanse vluchtelingen in een fascistische toespraak, daardoor pogroms initieert, Afrikaanse vluchtelingen zonder eten en drinken
achterlaat in de woestijn, zijn eigen bevolking onderdrukt, alle vrijheden crusht….moet ik doorgaan?

De EU is erger dan de Maffia, want die doet zich niet beter voor. Maar de EU leeft de eigen Verdragen niet eens na en gaat in zee met politieke gangsters, die mensen laten sterven in de woestijn.

ASTRID ESSED

ZIE VOOR NOTEN

EU sluit migratiedeal met Tunesie/Maffiaorganisatie in werking/Zo zijn onze EU Waarden

EINDE

NRC/INGEZONDEN STUK ASTRID ESSED OVER DE EU

MIGRATIEDEAL MET TUNESIE ”GEEN ENKEL RESPECT”

https://www.astridessed.nl/nrc-ingezonden-stuk-astrid-essed-over-de-eu-migratiedeal-met-tunesie-geen-enkel-respect/

”EU DEALS MET MAURETANIE EN EGYPTE

Ondanks de mislukte deal met de president van Tunesië sloot de EU dit jaar alweer deals met Mauritanië en Egypte – twee landen met autocratische regimes en een slechte reputatie op het gebied van mensenrechten en vluchtelingenbescherming.”

VLUCHTELINGENWERK

DIT IS WAAROM HET EUROPEES MIGRATIEPACT NIKS OPLOST

10 APRIL 2024

https://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/nl/artikelen/nieuws/dit-waarom-het-europees-migratiepact-niks-oplost

Het asiel- en migratiepact is een gemiste kans om te komen tot een eerlijk en humaan vluchtelingenbeleid in Europa. De overeenkomst bedreigt de veiligheid en waardigheid van mensen op de vlucht. Daarom is het nu zaak de uitwerking kritisch te volgen.

Griekenland is een mooi land, maar voor mij is het de plek waar ik alles heb verloren.’ Yara* vluchtte als meisje van dertien met haar ouders, broertje en zusjes naar Europa. De boot leed schipbreuk. Yara was de enige van haar gezin die het ongeluk overleefde – een nachtmerrie die vanaf toen haar leven volledig beheerste. Totdat ze op haar zestiende voor het eerst naar Stockholm kon, naar de tante van haar moeder. ‘Mijn eigen bloed! Ik voelde me in Zweden weer levend, voor het eerst. Ik kon opnieuw beginnen.’ Ze ging er samen met achternichtjes naar school, leerde skiën en zwemmen. Maar het keiharde Europese asielsysteem maakte een einde aan deze gelukkige tijd: Yara werd in 2020 teruggestuurd naar Griekenland.

In datzelfde jaar werd Europa opgeschrikt door de verwoestende brand in het beruchte, overvolle vluchtelingenkamp Moria in Griekenland. Femke de Vries, belangenbehartiger Europees asielbeleid bij VluchtelingenWerk herinnert het zich goed. ‘No more Morias! Met die hartenkreet kondigde Eurocommissaris Ylva Johansson een nieuw, humaner systeem aan. We dachten dat de landen aan de buitengrens zoals Griekenland en Italië zouden worden ontlast en er een eerlijkere verdeling van vluchtelingen zou komen binnen de EU. Maar de laatste jaren is de toon verhard, en wat er nu ligt is het tegenovergestelde.’

Het Europees migratiepact kwam eind 2023 tot stand na jarenlang onderhandelen tussen de Europese Commissie, de lidstaten en het Europees Parlement. Het plan om asielzoekers na aankomst eerlijk over de landen te verdelen sneuvelde: de ‘Dublin’-regel dat asielzoekers in het eerste land van aankomst asiel moeten aanvragen staat er weer in. ‘Terwijl al heel lang duidelijk is dat de grenslanden het helemaal niet aankunnen,’ zegt De Vries. ‘En dat leidt weer tot gigantisch veel illegale en gewelddadige pushbacks op land en op zee: het kort na aankomst oppakken en uitzetten van vluchtelingen of het voorkomen dat ze een landsgrens bereiken. De Verenigde Naties en de Raad van Europa hebben zich hier heel kritisch over uitgelaten.’

De grensprocedure is in de eerste plaats bedoeld voor ‘kansarme’ asielzoekers. Daaronder vallen volgens het pact mensen uit ‘veilige landen’, een begrip dat ruim wordt uitgelegd. De Vries: ‘Marokko zal eronder vallen, terwijl lhbtiq+-personen daar grote problemen hebben, en ook Tunesië, waar oppositieleden vervolgd worden.’ Bovendien kun je naar een ‘veilig derde land’ worden teruggestuurd. ‘Dat is een land waar je niet vandaan komt, maar waar je bijvoorbeeld onderweg hebt verbleven.’

In het pact staat ook dat zo’n derde land in principe ‘veilig’ is als de EU er een overeenkomst mee heeft gesloten. De Vries: ‘Maar of de EU een overeenkomst sluit met een derde land zegt weinig over de daadwerkelijke bescherming voor vluchtelingen in dat land. Ook hoeft zo’n land het Vluchtelingenverdrag niet meer ondertekend te hebben om als ‘veilig’ te worden aangemerkt. Dat baart ons zorgen.’

EU DEALS MET MAURETANIE EN EGYPTE

Ondanks de mislukte deal met de president van Tunesië sloot de EU dit jaar alweer deals met Mauritanië en Egypte – twee landen met autocratische regimes en een slechte reputatie op het gebied van mensenrechten en vluchtelingenbescherming.

Naast ‘veiligelanders’ kunnen ook asielzoekers die met valse of zonder documenten reizen naar de grensprocedure worden verwezen. De Vries: ‘Maar veel asielzoekers hebben geen geldig document bij zich – soms nooit gehad, soms kwijtgeraakt of afgenomen. Dat geldt bijvoorbeeld ook voor veel Syrische en Afghaanse vluchtelingen. Zij lopen dus óók het risico op detentie.’

Tineke Strik, hoogleraar migratierecht aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen en Europarlementariër voor GroenLinks, deelt de zorgen. Ook betwijfelt ze of mensen in de grensprocedure wel een eerlijke kans krijgen. ‘Velen komen getraumatiseerd aan en gevangenschap is heel stressvol. Hoe vind je de rust en de hulp om goed je verhaal te kunnen doen? En na een afwijzing heb je maar vijf dagen om in beroep te gaan. Tijdens die procedure kun je al worden uitgezet.’ Dat dit laatste te voorkomen is met een spoedprocedure stelt haar niet gerust: ‘Hoe ga je die voeren? Er zijn veel te weinig advocaten, en in bijvoorbeeld Griekenland mogen veel hulporganisaties niet eens de kampen en detentiecentra in om mensen te helpen.’

Om het beeld nog somberder te maken: het pact beschrijft ook dat landen zich niet hoeven te houden aan allerlei beschermende regels in het geval van – vaag omschreven – crisissituaties. Als een land bijvoorbeeld vluchtelingen gebruikt om een EU-land onder druk te zetten (denk aan Belarus, dat doelbewust vluchtelingen de grens met Polen overstuurde), dan mag dat EU-land alle binnenkomende mensen gevangenzetten. De wereld op zijn kop: vluchtelingen worden gestraft omdat een land zich misdraagt.

Het pact biedt nauwelijks oplossingen voor de huidige problemen, zegt Strik. ‘Je moet uitgaan van vluchtelingenbescherming en gedeelde verantwoordelijkheid. Dan bouw je aan onderling vertrouwen en kunnen landen elkaar aanspreken op hun verantwoordelijkheid. Maar de lidstaten wilden dit niet en maakten in de laatste onderhandelingsfase handig gebruik van de druk die bij het Europees Parlement leefde om vóór de Europese verkiezingen de kiezer iets te “leveren”. En de grenslanden namen de zware taken voor lief omdat ze rekenen op steun voor grensbewaking en deals die vluchtelingen weghouden.’

Toch ziet Strik ook een lichtpuntje in het pact: ‘Er is een begin van verplichte solidariteit tussen de landen: de niet-grenslanden moeten een beperkt aantal asielzoekers overnemen van de grensstaten. Ze kunnen die verplichting ook afkopen met 20.000 euro per vluchteling, maar als er problemen ontstaan omdat landen te weinig asielzoekers overnemen, mogen ze geen doorgereisde asielzoekers meer terugsturen.’ Minder fraai is dat het ‘afkoopgeld’ gebruikt kán worden voor betere opvang, maar evengoed voor strengere grensbewaking.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

EU/TUNESIE:

DRIE ARGUMENTEN TEGEN DE TUNESIE DEAL

29 JUNI 2023

https://www.amnesty.nl/actueel/drie-argumenten-tegen-de-tunesie-deal

Na jaren van politieke impasse gaan de Europese leiders samenwerken in het Migratie Pact en de Tunesië-deal – zelf noemen ze dat een doorbraak. Op dit moment vergadert de EU-top over de verdere uitwerking. Amnesty International maakt zich grote zorgen: de afspraken doen geen recht aan internationale verdragen en verplichtingen van zowel Nederland als de EU.

Tunesië is door haar ligging het land waar veel vluchtelingen, migranten en asielzoekers aankomen en doorheen reizen op weg naar Europa. Dat laatste willen Europese leiders zoveel mogelijk voorkomen. De EU is bereid Tunesië meer dan een miljard euro te bieden om de economie en de overheidsfinanciën van het land te ondersteunen. Hieronder valt ook 100 miljoen euro om Tunesië te helpen bij het beheersen van irreguliere migratie. Amnesty International ziet een fiks aantal rode vlaggen bij de Tunesië-deal. Zo is de reputatie van de Tunesische president Kaies Saied verontrustend.

‘Afspraken maken met een repressieve leider kun je geen doorbraak noemen’, zegt Dagmar Oudshoorn van Amnesty International Nederland. ‘Het is uiterst kwalijk dat Nederland hiermee in heeft gestemd en zelfs een leidende rol lijkt te spelen. Onze regering moet de mensenrechten serieus nemen.’

In aanloop naar de EU-top op 29 en 30 juni heeft EU-vertegenwoordiger Joseph Borell beloofd dat de mensenrechten centraal staan in de Tunesië-deal. Als de EU die belofte wil houden, raadt Amnesty International aan de volgende punten heel serieus te nemen. Hier volgen drie redenen waarom een deal met Tunesië een bijzonder slecht idee is:

1. Migratie-deals met repressieve regeringen leiden vaak tot voorzienbare mensenrechtenschendingen

De geschiedenis toont aan dat wanneer staten met repressieve regeringen of een zwakke rechtsstaat belast worden met het controleren van migratie, de rechten van migranten, asielzoekers en vluchtelingen maar al te vaak in het gedrang komen. Dat hebben we al eerder gezien bij de steun voor de regering van Libië in Tripoli en de kustwacht maar ook bij de EU-Turkije deal. Nederland en andere Europese landen hebben hier niets van geleerd. Ondanks de zichtbare gevolgen en het leed in de Griekse kampen, zien verschillende landen de deal met Turkije spijtig genoeg als een succes. Amnesty heeft de risico’s van migratiedeals als deze herhaaldelijk gedocumenteerd en stelt Nederland aansprakelijk voor de mensenrechtenschendingen als gevolg van de EU-Turkije deal.

Evident is dat de mensenrechtensituatie is verslechterd sinds president Kaies Saied in 2021 ingrijpende noodbevoegdheden opeiste. Tunesië erkent daarnaast weliswaar het recht op politiek asiel, maar het land heeft geen duidelijke wettelijke kaders om de rechten van migranten en asielzoekers te beschermen.

2. Tunesië heeft een slechte mensenrechten-reputatie

Sinds zijn machtsovername in 2021, heeft Kaies Saied decreten uitgevaardigd die de vrijheid van meningsuiting bedreigen en hem invloed geven op de rechtsspraak. Ook heeft hij een nieuwe grondwet aangenomen die hem bijna ongecontroleerde macht geeft om te regeren. De racistische en xenofobe toespraak van Kaies Saied op 21 februari 2023 was specifiek gericht tegen zwarte migranten uit Sub Sahara Afrika. Dit leidde tot een golf van racistische aanvallen op zwarte mensen in Tunesië. Bovendien gebruiken de Tunesische autoriteiten steeds vaker onderdrukkende, vaag geformuleerde wetten om dissidenten en oppositieleden te arresteren en in sommige gevallen te vervolgen. Er zijn inmiddels ten minste 21 mensen gearresteerd.

Het is nog niet duidelijk hoe de EU kan beïnvloeden waar het geld in Tunesië precies naartoe gaat, en hoe het wordt besteed. Maar de regering versterken, betekent waarschijnlijk ook de president meer macht geven.

3. Een deal is in het voordeel van mensensmokkelaars

Zowel de EU als Tunesië geven aan dat een van de doelstellingen van de deal het bestrijden van mensensmokkelaars en –handelaars is. Maar de ervaring leert dat als regeringen barrières opwerpen voor migratie, het de smokkelaars zijn die daarvan profiteren en een deal zoals deze de mensensmokkelaars juist in de kaart speelt. Migranten rekenen dan namelijk steeds meer op hun diensten. Zij nemen ook meer risico’s en komen daarbij soms om het leven.

Het valt nog te bezien hoe de EU en Tunesië mensensmokkel gaan aanpakken. In de verklaring van 11 juni en in de opmerkingen van voorzitter Von der Leyen op dezelfde dag wordt gesproken in termen van afschrikking. Er wordt niets gezegd over het creëren van nieuwe legale migratieroutes, wat de oplossing zou zijn om mensensmokkel te verminderen.

Omdat er nauwelijks veilige en legale routes zijn, worden mensen gedwongen onveilige routes te nemen op zoek naar bescherming, en dat geeft mensensmokkelaars dus juist meer werk. Denk alleen al aan een van de meest recente voorbeelden: de tragedie met de overvolle boot voor de Griekse kust, waarbij honderden mensen verdronken. Autoriteiten kunnen mensen willen tegenhouden, maar dat houdt migranten, asielzoekers en vluchtelingen niet tegen. Ze zullen nieuwe routes vinden om door te reizen en Europa te bereiken.

EINDE

[61]

BBC

EU DEAL FUELLING MAURITANIA’S ABUSE OF

MIGRANTS-RIGHTS GROUP

27 AUGUST 2025

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cnv7lyp05qzo

Mauritania’s security forces have been systematically abusing migrants from other African countries, a report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) says.

The violations have been exacerbated by a deal with the European Union (EU) and Spain, which aims to curb dangerous sea crossings to the Canary Islands, the rights group alleges.

It documents how migrants and asylum seekers often trying to leave Mauritania have been subjected to rape, torture and extortion at the hands of the military, border personnel and other security staff.

Mauritania has rejected the findings, saying it has taken recent steps to protect migrant rights. The European Commission has said its deal is “anchored” in upholding rights.

Mauritania has become an increasingly common departure point for African migrants trying to reach Europe via Spain’s Canary Islands by boat.

Nearly 47,000 people reached the islands last year after making the extremely perilous crossing over the Atlantic Ocean.

• ‘Try or die’ – one man’s determination to get to the Canary Islands
• ‘I found out on social media that my son had died’

In 2024, Mauritania signed a new migration partnership with the EU in exchange for €210m (£181m, $244m) in funding.

The HRW report details that between 2020 and early 2025 Mauritania had allegedly pursued an “abusive migration control playbook”, highlighting that in some cases Spanish security personnel witnessed the violations.

Aside from the allegations of sexual assault, torture and extortion, the 142-page dossier also accuses Mauritania’s security forces of racism, keeping migrants in poor conditions and other violations.

HRW says all the victims their researchers interviewed were black, with many alleging that racial discrimination played a role in the violations they faced at the hands of the primarily lighter-skinned security staff from the Beidane ethnic group.

“If you have black skin, they don’t respect you, they insult you and take your papers,” a Senegalese person returned home told HRW.

A Togolese woman added: “When they see me, a foreigner, it’s like they see something strange or shady.”

The report was conducted over a four-year period and included interviews with more than 220 people, HRW says.

The group of people who were cited to have been victims of alleged abuses were a mix of asylum seekers and migrants, both with regular and irregular statuses, from countries such as Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, HRW said.

Women and children were also among those said to have faced rights violations.

Some of the recommendations made by HRW include increased training for security staff as well as the establishment of an independent process to probe alleged violations.

The right groups also acknowledged that migration reforms in recent months had improved the situation.

END

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

”THEY ACCUSED ME OF TRYING TO GO

TO EUROPE”

Migration control abuses and EU Externalization in

Mauritania.

27 AUGUST 2025

https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/08/27/they-accused-me-of-trying-to-go-to-europe/migration-control-abuses-and-eu

SUMMARY

“Europeans signed contracts with Mauritania, Morocco – they’re buffer countries. It’s always the same, the suffering of migrants, the abuse of migrants in detention, the expulsions… Africans are doing the work for the EU, and they know it.”

– Malian aid worker in Nioro du Sahel, Mali, at the border with Mauritania, May 24, 2022

Racial and ethnic profiling, extortion, mass arrests, detention for days or weeks with little to no food, collective expulsions, beatings and torture: these are just some of the violations migrants, asylum seekers, and others have experienced over the past several years at the hands of security forces in the context of border and migration control in Mauritania, a country in northwest Africa. Meanwhile, those same forces have continued to receive financial and material support from the European Union (EU) and Spain.

Located south of Morocco, Mauritania is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean, Senegal, Mali, Algeria, and the Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. Both a destination and transit country for mainly West and Central African migrants, Mauritania also hosts asylum seekers and refugees, the majority from Mali, where armed conflict and violence have worsened in recent years. With lighter-skinned Beidan Mauritanians, descendants of Arabs and Berbers, predominating in the security forces and upper levels of government, discrimination against Black Mauritanians – Haratine and Afro-Mauritanians – and Black migrants has persisted.

Due to the increasing migration pressures and insecurity in the Sahel, Mauritania has grown in geostrategic importance for the EU and Spain, whose Canary Islands are some 700 kilometers from Mauritania’s northernmost city, Nouadhibou.

The sea migration route from northwest Africa to the Canaries, known as the “Atlantic Route” or “Northwest African Route,” has grown increasingly active since 2020, becoming one of the busiest and deadliest irregular routes to Europe. In 2024, a record 46,000 migrants and asylum seekers – mostly from West, Central, or North Africa, with Malians the most numerous – arrived in the Canaries in small boats. That year, the majority of departures along the route were from Mauritania. Others embarked from Senegal, The Gambia, Morocco, and the Western Sahara.

In total, more than 147,000 people arrived in the Canaries by boat between 2020 and 2024, with 11,300 more arriving during the first half of 2025. Estimates of how many people lost their lives en route during this period vary from 4,300 to 24,800. Tens to hundreds of thousands of others were rescued or intercepted at sea, or blocked from departing, by Mauritanian, Moroccan, Senegalese, and Gambian forces, supported by EU funds and Spanish forces deployed in Mauritania and Senegal.

In March 2024, the EU announced a new migration partnership with Mauritania and €210 million in funding for the Mauritanian government to reinforce border and migration management, counter-smuggling, and security, while addressing “root causes” of migration through support to refugees, job creation, infrastructure, and more. This is part of the EU’s ongoing “border externalization” approach in Africa: seeking to prevent irregular arrivals in Europe by outsourcing migration controls to countries of origin and transit. In Mauritania, the EU and Spain had been pursuing this strategy long before the 2024 partnership, despite ongoing violations of migrants’ rights by Mauritanian authorities.

This report focuses on the impacts of migration control along the Atlantic Route during the last five years, documenting abuses by Mauritanian security forces and revealing how EU border externalization disregarded and exacerbated human rights violations.

MAURITANIAN SECURITY OFFICIAL’S ABUSES

Between 2020 and early 2025, Human Rights Watch documented scores of human rights violations against men, women, and children from multiple West or Central African countries committed by Mauritanian authorities enforcing migration and border controls at sea and on land. Documented violations include torture, rape, and other physical abuse; sexual harassment; arbitrary arrests and detention; inhumane detention conditions; extortion; confiscation of money and valuables; and summary and collective expulsions. Perpetrators were members of the police, coast guard or navy, gendarmerie, and army; in a few cases, victims were unable to identify the security service.

During over four years of research, Human Rights Watch interviewed 223 people by phone and in person during visits to Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, and Belgium. These included 102 migrants and asylum seekers and 121 others – government, UN, and EU officials; members of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups; relatives of abuse victims; witnesses; and experts, lawyers, community members, and others.

Among those interviewed, 78 people were victims of documented human rights violations in Mauritania. They included one Mauritanian accused of migrant smuggling and 77 foreign nationals – 3 asylum seekers and 74 migrants, some with regular migration status and some irregular – from Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, and Liberia.

Human Rights Watch examined scars and injuries sustained from alleged abuse and collected photos, videos, and legal documents corroborating interviewees’ accounts. We visited immigration detention centers in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou and Dar Naïm Prison in Nouakchott, observing conditions and interviewing people detained for immigration reasons or on smuggling charges.

As this report shows, Mauritanian security forces frequently subjected migrants and asylum seekers from African countries to harassment and arbitrary arrest. Authorities targeted individuals or groups based on information or assumptions that they were undocumented, planning irregular departures to North African countries or Spain, or involved in migrant smuggling – defined by the United Nations as the facilitation of irregular migration in exchange for financial or material benefit. Some used migration control as a pretext for extortion. Multiple migrants interviewed also alleged that security forces racially profiled them or demonstrated racist treatment because they were Black. Some said officers did not check their documents or allow them to retrieve their papers prior to arrest.

Human Rights Watch documented cases of physical abuse, ranging in severity from torture and rape to beatings and other mistreatment, against at least 43 people. Incidents occurred during or after boat interceptions and disembarkations; during arrests or interceptions on land; and during detention and expulsions. In a serious case in August 2022, police in Nouakchott tortured at least four men during interrogations related to migrant smuggling. “They removed my clothes…and beat me. …They shocked me with [electric] current…,” one man said. “They said I was helping people to go to Spain.”

Many people held in police-run immigration detention centers in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou described inhumane treatment and conditions, including lack of food, overcrowding, and sanitation issues, with adolescent children at times detained with adults.

Following detention, Mauritanian authorities have expelled tens of thousands of African foreigners to remote areas along the borders of Mali and Senegal, where limited available aid – and in Mali’s case, armed conflict – has put people at risk. Many such cases constituted collective expulsions – removals of groups of people without individual case assessments or due process – which are prohibited by international and African regional law. Some of those expelled to these land borders have included third-country nationals (who are neither Malian nor Senegalese), children, pregnant women, asylum seekers, refugees, and people with valid legal status in Mauritania.

Human Rights Watch interviewed 35 people who were expelled from Mauritania without due process between 2020 and April 2025. Other expulsions were reported by aid workers, UN officials, local media, and authorities. In early 2025, a spike in mass expulsions of migrants from Mauritania – which many attributed to increased EU funding and pressure to “manage” irregular migration – triggered political tensions with Mali and Senegal.

This report explores issues related to rescues and interceptions of migrant boats in the Atlantic and disembarkations in Mauritania, including inadequate search-and-rescue and the prioritization of “pullbacks” – forcibly returning people or preventing them from departing – which can violate the right to seek asylum and the right to leave any country. While Mauritanian authorities took some steps to improve post-disembarkation treatment of migrants between 2020 and 2024, they failed to consistently ensure screenings for medical and protection needs (such as for asylum seekers, trafficking victims, and children) after every disembarkation. However, in a positive step in May 2025, Mauritania formally adopted national standard operating procedures (SOPs) to regulate sea rescues, interceptions, disembarkations, and the management of migrants, outlining authorities’ obligations to respect rights and ensure protection and medical care.

The report also documents due process concerns in cases of people investigated or prosecuted for migrant smuggling in Mauritania, including alleged false charges; limited evidence of “financial or material benefit” (a key component of the UN definition of migrant smuggling); prolonged pretrial detention; limited access to legal aid; language barriers; and frequent penalization of lower-level “accomplices.” Human Rights Watch also heard allegations from multiple sources that some Mauritanian security force members colluded with smugglers.

ROLE OF SPAIN AND THE EU

Human Rights Watch interviewed EU officials in Brussels, attended European Parliament hearings, and analyzed hundreds of articles, reports, and EU and Spanish documents related to migration management efforts in Mauritania and West Africa. This report investigates the myriad and complex ways in which the EU and Spain have pursued a deterrence-focused externalization agenda in Mauritania for two decades, culminating in the new 2024 migration partnership. This includes political agreements; funding, equipment, and other support provided to the Mauritanian government and security forces to bolster border control, migration management, and counter-smuggling; development aid linked to migration control; extraterritorial activities by Frontex, the EU’s Border and Coast Guard Agency; and Spanish security forces, boats, and aircraft deployed to Mauritania to assist Mauritanian authorities with surveillance, patrols, interceptions, and counter-smuggling operations.

A number of EU projects in Mauritania have focused on human rights, refugee and child protection, development, and other needed areas, including support to Mauritania’s development of SOPs for migrant boat disembarkations. However, EU projects between 2015 and 2023 worth at least €61 million took a securitization approach that prioritized support to Mauritania’s border and migration control forces, notably the police, coast guard, and gendarmerie, without adequate safeguards to address risks of human rights violations. This does not include €100 million in funding accorded to Mauritania in 2024, for which the EU published no disaggregated budget; nor does it include the millions of euros in EU support to Mauritania’s armed forces for security and “territorial integrity” purposes, which can overlap with border control. Bilaterally, Spain has also continued and increased border control support to Mauritanian forces, particularly the coast guard.

Ultimately, EU externalization over the years encouraged and financed repressive approaches to migration control in Mauritania, conflicting with African free movement objectives and contributing to human rights violations against migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. “Since Europe put money into controlling migrants, we have become very tired… If [Mauritanian authorities] arrest us… we are mistreated,” said a Senegalese fisherman in Nouakchott.[1]

PROGRESS MADE AND ACTIONS NEEDED

Mauritania has the right to control its borders and regulate immigration, but authorities must respect Mauritania’s obligations under international human rights and refugee law.

This report recognizes positive steps the Mauritanian government has taken to enhance refugee and migrant rights since 2020, such as the SOPs for boat disembarkations, efforts to align national legislation with international law, increased openness to human rights monitoring and empowerment of national rights-focused mechanisms, a 2022 campaign to regularize migrants, increased attention to the protection of migrant children, and more.

However, the documented and ongoing violations of migrant rights indicate the need for increased vigilance and action to address persistent issues, notably with respect to detention, expulsions, due process, and oversight of security personnel. The Mauritanian government should hold to account any security personnel who commit violations against migrants, asylum seekers, or refugees.

The Mauritanian government replied on July 16, 2025 to a letter from Human Rights Watch that had set out our allegations and questions, “reiterat[ing] its commitment to constructive dialogue” and “to human rights, the protection of migrants, and strict compliance with international conventions.” The government stated that its “migration policies, based on respect for human dignity, will continue to evolve.”[2] We recognize and appreciate the government’s willingness to engage on human rights issues and have integrated responses and information from their letter throughout this report.

The Mauritanian government said that it “categorically reject[s] allegations of torture, racial discrimination, or systematic violations of migrants’ rights,” stating, “[N]o cases of torture have been formally established following internal investigations. All allegations are seriously examined, and if abuse is proven, sanctions are taken against the perpetrators in accordance with the law.” The government’s letter highlighted measures taken or in progress “to prevent violations of migrants’ rights,” notably since adoption of the SOPs in May 2025, including security force trainings, monitoring systems for disembarkations and detention, a “strict ban on collective expulsions” and expulsions of unaccompanied children, and other efforts, which are acknowledged in this report.[3]

The European Commission has also taken some recent positive steps by increasing focus on human rights, including planned monitoring and mitigation measures, within EU projects in Mauritania. For instance, a 2024 project document included a provision for suspension of financial support to Mauritanian migration management entities “in the event of a significant deterioration” in respect for refugee and migrant rights.

In its July 17, 2025 reply to Human Rights Watch, the European Commission wrote that “[EU] external actions are firmly rooted in a Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA)” and that it had “recently strengthened its internal guidance on applying the HRBA to international partnerships,” including “formalised internal procedures for handling specific allegations of human rights abuses.” It said that “all contracts signed by the EU include human rights clauses,” which were updated to include “clearer obligations for its contractual parties’ respect of EU values, as well as to report [violations] within 30 days.”

The European Commission said it “has put in place several [human rights] monitoring tools for its programmes, including initial assessments, regular reports from implementing partners, on the spot verification missions, results-oriented monitoring exercises and external evaluations.” The Commission stated: “Mauritanian authorities, through EU funding support, are strengthening human rights safeguards and guarantees.”

In light of the violations documented in this report, the EU and Spain should urgently ensure that human rights monitoring systems and specific criteria for suspension of contracts are in place for all projects in Mauritania. The EU should also reduce deterrence and securitization approaches to its migration-related policies in Mauritania and Africa in general.

To save more lives, Mauritanian and Spanish authorities should redirect resources and personnel from migrant boat interceptions to expand search-and-rescue in the Atlantic, and the EU should also increase its support to that end.

TERMINOLOGY AND ACRONYMS

GENERAL

• Asylum seeker – A person who hopes to gain refuge in another country. If a refugee arrives in a country and formally seeks asylum – the right to stay in the country to avoid being sent back to danger in their homeland – that person remains an asylum seeker pending a decision on their case.
• Expulsion / deportation / removal – Measures taken by a state’s authorities to remove a non-national from the territory of that state (to the border, to their country of origin, or to a third country).
  • Collective expulsion – Any measure compelling foreigners, as a group, to leave a country, without a prior reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual in the group. This is explicitly prohibited in African and European regional human rights treaties and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers, and the prohibition on collective expulsion has been interpreted as a customary norm of human rights and refugee law.
• Externalization of migration controls (or, border externalization) – A strategy often implemented by wealthier countries/regions extraterritorially to prevent the irregular entry of migrants and asylum seekers by outsourcing migration controls to transit countries and migrants’ countries of origin, thereby shifting international protection responsibilities to other states. The strategy is pursued by policies and practices that can include interceptions, pushbacks, transfers, bilateral or multilateral political agreements, the enlistment of private actors, destination-state agents operating outside their territory, support to countries’ border control and migration management forces and systems, the conditioning of development aid or other benefits on migration control, and domestic policies, such as making newly arriving asylum seekers legally inadmissible because they could have sought asylum in a third country.
• IOM – International Organization for Migration, i.e. the United Nations migration agency.
• Irregular migration – People on the move across borders not in compliance with the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing entry/stay in, or exit from, a country. An “irregular migrant” can include a person who entered a country irregularly (e.g. without documents, with fraudulent or improper documents, without following legal procedures, or outside of authorized entry points), or who entered lawfully but overstayed their legal authorization to remain in a country.
• Nonrefoulement – As set out by the UN and based on international refugee and human rights law, the principle of nonrefoulement prohibits states from transferring or removing individuals from their jurisdiction or effective control when there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be at risk of irreparable harm upon return, including persecution, torture, ill-treatment or other serious human rights violations. This principle applies to all migrants at all times, irrespective of migration status.
• Pullbacks – Measures taken by countries of origin or transit to 1) prevent people from physically leaving or 2) forcibly return (“pull back”) people to those territories before they can reach the jurisdiction of their destination countries. Pullbacks can take place on land or at sea, including the interception of departing boats, and the apprehension of people attempting to leave.
• Pushback – Measures that prevent people from reaching, entering, or remaining in a particular territory. Pushbacks can take place at land borders or at sea, and typically occur without allowing people to lodge asylum claims or otherwise access international protection.
• Protection screening – A process of identifying and assessing the needs or claims of individuals who may be in need of international protection or other special protections, such as refugees, asylum seekers, human trafficking victims, and children.
• Refugee – A person who has been forced to flee their country because of persecution, war, or violence. Under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, a refugee is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their home country because of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. The 1969 OAU (African) Refugee Convention’s expanded refugee definition also includes people fleeing external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in their country of origin or nationality.
• UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, i.e. the United Nations refugee agency.

MAURITANIA AND WEST AFRICA

• CDHAHRSC – The Commission for Human Rights, Humanitarian Action and Relations with Civil Society (Commissariat aux Droits de l’homme, à l’Action humanitaire et aux Relations avec la Société civile), i.e. the Mauritanian government’s human rights office.
• CFA / “francs CFA” – a West African currency used by Senegal, Mali, and other states (CFA = Communauté Financière Africaine, African Financial Community). US$1 = 500-600 CFA (value has fluctuated).
• CNDH – Mauritania’s National Human Rights Commission (Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme), an independent mechanism with government and civil society representatives.
• DST – Mauritania’s Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (Direction de la Surveillance du Térritoire) of the national police, in charge of immigration enforcement. In 2021, DST was renamed the Directorate of Air and Border Police (Direction de la Police de l’Air et des Frontières, DPAF), but reverted to DST in 2024.
• ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States. Mauritania withdrew its membership in 2000.
• INLCTPTM – the National Authority for Countering Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling (Instance Nationale de lutte contre la traite des personnes et le trafic de migrants), under the Mauritanian government’s human rights office (CDHAHRSC).
• MRU (Ouguiya) – Mauritania’s monetary currency (US$1 = ~40 MRU). Though the Central Bank of Mauritania in 2017 redenominated its currency at a rate of 1:10, many migrants and others in working classes continued to quote amounts in the old currency. For example, a person who said they paid 1,000 “ouguiyas” (or “old ouguiyas”) often meant 100 MRU (or “new ouguiyas”).
• Pirogue – A wooden dugout canoe, traditionally used for fishing in West Africa, also often used for cross-Atlantic migration. In Spain, these boats are also referred to as cayucos.
• SOPs – Standard Operating Procedures; in this report, referring to Mauritania’s SOPs for rescues/interceptions of migrant boats, disembarkations, and the management of migrants, adopted by the ministries of the interior, defense, and fishing and maritime infrastructure in May 2025, under Joint Regulations No. 00590/2025 and No. 00591/2025.

EUROPE

• EU – European Union
• Euros (EUR or €) – The EU’s monetary currency (US$1 = ~€1.13).
• EUTF / EUTFA – “EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa” (EU Trust Fund for Africa): an EU external financial support instrument, active 2015-2021.
• Frontex – The European Border and Coast Guard Agency: an EU agency established in 2004 that manages the EU’s external borders and fights cross-border crime.
• NDICI – EU Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument: an EU external financial support instrument, active since 2021.

RECOMMANDATIONS

TO THE GOVERNMENT OF MAURITANIA

• Increase training, monitoring and oversight of security forces responsible for border control and immigration enforcement, particularly the police, coast guard, and gendarmerie, with a view to combatting corruption and racism, preventing human rights violations against migrants, and ensuring accountability. In particular:
  • Establish independent oversight mechanisms to investigate alleged violations by security forces and to monitor deportations.
  • Ensure implementation of complaint mechanisms for migrants (as provided for in Joint Regulation No. 00591/2025 on Standard Operating Procedures for the Disembarkation and Management of Migrants) in all detention/reception centers and not just the two new reception centers for disembarked migrants (Centres d’Accueil Temporaire des Étrangers, CATEs); and ensure that migrants are protected from reprisals.
  • Create institutional mechanisms for accountability for abuse by guards or other authorities in detention facilities. This should include not only the complaint mechanisms for migrants, but also disciplinary measures, removal of staff in case of proven, serious wrongdoing, and, where appropriate, prosecution for wrongdoing, with respect to migrant holding centers, prisons, and other detention facilities.
• Ensure victims of human rights violations have access to effective remedies, including access to complaint mechanisms against security forces and the possibility to participate in a transparent judicial process against perpetrators.
• On deportations and border expulsions:
  • Cease collective expulsions of migrants and ensure individual case reviews and formal communication of deportation decisions, allowing people to appeal these decisions.
  • In light of the insecurity in Mali, temporarily halt all expulsions to Mali’s land borders.
  • Liaise with embassies and consulates to ensure deportations are conducted humanely and safely, with respect for due process rights and the principle of nonrefoulement, ensuring that third-country nationals are not left stranded in Mali or Senegal.
• On immigration detention:
  • Halt all immigration-related detention of children, and foreign nationals with international protection needs or valid legal status in Mauritania. Ensure that all unaccompanied or separated migrant children (under age 18) receive appropriate care and protection through the family ministry, IOM, or other specialized services.
  • Ensure adequate budgeting for food, maintenance, healthcare and other needs.
  • Explore and implement alternatives to immigration detention, such as open reception facilities or community-based case management.
• Ensure implementation by all relevant authorities, including all maritime security forces, of the standard operating procedures adopted in 2025 for migrant boat rescues, interceptions, and disembarkations, to ensure systematic medical and protection screenings of disembarked people.
• Enable the National Authority for Countering Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling (INLCTPTM) to offer legal aid not only to trafficking victims, but to 1) migrants who are victims of smuggling-related abuses, and 2) foreign nationals accused of migrant smuggling who do not have state-provided lawyers.
• Align migration management and border control practices with obligations and standards set out in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), the AU Migration Policy Framework, and AU Guiding Principles on the Human Rights of All Migrants, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers.

TO THE MINISTRIES OF THE INTERIOR, DEFENSE AND FISHING AND MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE

• Instruct all security forces involved in border control or immigration enforcement, particularly the police, coast guard, and gendarmerie, to cease all violence, racial profiling, arbitrary detention, extortion, and other abuses against migrants in Mauritania, making clear that those responsible for violations will be held to account. Instruct personnel to return all documents, money, and belongings to foreign nationals upon their release from custody or prior to deportation.
• Instruct police and other security officers to check individuals’ identity or immigration documents prior to any immigration-related arrests and to release all asylum seekers, refugees, or others with valid legal status in Mauritania, whether or not they are suspected of “preparing” to depart irregularly, which is not a lawful basis for arrest.
• Ensure access to the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) and refugee status determination procedures for any foreign national expressing fears of return to their country.
• Improve conditions of detention and ensure detained people are treated in accordance with human rights standards, including by enforcing the prohibition on torture or inhuman and degrading treatment and providing adequate food, water, sanitation, mattresses, mosquito nets, and medical care.

TO MARITIME SECURITY FORCES (COAST GUARD, NAVY AND GENDARMERIE)

• Implement the national standard operating procedures adopted in May 2025 for maritime search-and-rescue and migrant boat disembarkations, including by informing relevant services and agencies (IOM, UNHCR, the Mauritanian Red Crescent, health and family ministries, and others) of all intercepted, rescued, or shipwrecked migrant boats, regardless of location; ensuring that disembarked people are screened for medical and protection needs and provided immediate humanitarian aid; and ensuring that all unaccompanied or separated migrant children (under 18) receive appropriate protection and care through the family ministry, IOM, or other suitable agencies.
• Redirect resources and personnel to prioritize search-and-rescue of vessels in distress in the Atlantic rather than interceptions and forced returns of boats carrying migrants.

TO THE MINISTRIES OF JUSTICE AND INTERIOR

• Ensure individual case assessments, with appearances before a judge, for anyone administratively detained for immigration purposes, to prevent arbitrary detention or expulsion.
• Uphold due process rights for anyone detained or prosecuted for immigration reasons or migrant smuggling, including by ensuring interpretation during legal proceedings; communicating case decisions formally, in a language the individual understands; ensuring access to legal counsel for anyone charged with a crime; and allowing people to appeal case decisions (including deportation).
• Publicly clarify the mandate of the new Special Court for Countering Slavery, Human Trafficking, and Migrant Smuggling, and ensure that its role does not include penalizing migrants for irregular entry, stay, or exit. Publish regular public reports on the Court’s cases and rulings.

TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN

• Cease joint border/migration control operations with Mauritanian security forces focused on migrant interceptions and arrests.
• Redirect Spanish security personnel (police and civil guard) in Mauritania to focus solely on maritime search-and-rescue, protection, and human rights trainings.
• Instruct Spanish entities rescuing migrant boats in the Atlantic (Spanish Civil Guard, Salvamento Marítimo, or others) not to disembark migrants and asylum seekers in their known or presumed countries of origin, given the impossibility of fairly assessing nationalities and protection concerns while at sea.
• Effectively monitor implementation of Mauritania’s new 2025 standard operating procedures on migrant boat disembarkations to assess consistent respect for human rights, so that a credible determination can be made: 1) whether there is a risk that migrants or asylum seekers will be exposed to inhuman or degrading treatment incompatible with article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights; and 2) if Mauritania can be deemed a “place of safety” under international law for disembarkations of rescued migrants or asylum seekers.
• Increase search-and-rescue capacity along the Atlantic Route commensurate with the need and in compliance with international maritime, human rights and refugee law, which require disembarkation in a place of safety including protection from exposure to inhuman and degrading treatment or persecution.

TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, INCLUDING THE

EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND MEMBER STATES

• Set out specific and public criteria on which the suspension of contracts in the implementation of EU-funded projects on border control and migration management in Mauritania would be based in response to human rights violations, particularly with respect to the provision of funding, equipment, or technical support to Mauritanian security forces. EU member states, including Spain, should also take these steps for bilaterally-funded projects in Mauritania.
• Ensure that no EU projects or funding in Mauritania or immigration/visa benefits are tied to quotas of migrant boat interceptions or arrests of smugglers or irregular migrants, and ensure that these are never used as project indicators, given that this would increase incentives for arbitrary arrests.
• End conditionality of development aid on migration cooperation, and remove migration-control objectives from development or humanitarian projects.
• Conduct human rights impact assessments for all EU-funded projects (in Mauritania and elsewhere) prior to implementation, including through consultations with civil society groups in countries of origin and transit (including in Mauritania, Mali, and Senegal). Ensure continued human rights due diligence monitoring of all funding and projects. Make assessments and monitoring reports public.
• Increase transparency of EU foreign aid disbursement in Mauritania and globally: make detailed budgets and information on institutions/organizations involved publicly available and accessible; create web pages that clearly lay out all EU funding streams/instruments and projects in every third (non-EU) country.
• Reduce EU and bilateral (EU member state) deterrence and securitization approaches to migration policy in Mauritania and across Africa, and increase support to:
  • Search-and-rescue operations in the Atlantic with disembarkation in places of safety within the meaning of international maritime, human rights, and refugee law;
  • Human rights and protection, including support to groups and associations providing aid to migrants in Mauritania, Mali (particularly in Kayes region and Bamako), and Senegal (particularly in Rosso);
  • Locally designed and managed projects in Mauritania and other African countries focused on development, job creation, and reintegration support for returned migrants;
  • Humanitarian aid in Spain’s Canary Islands for migrants and asylum seekers;
  • Development of more equitable visa regimes (by EU member states), increased legal pathways to EU countries for migration and for international protection, and improved accessibility of these pathways (e.g. reduced fees, simplified requirements, and awareness-raising about processes); and,
  • In Mauritania and other North African countries:
    • Migrant regularization services and programs;
    • Legal aid services for migrants;
    • Independent, rights-focused monitoring of migrant smuggling prosecutions and trials.

TO THE AFRICAN UNION, INCLUDING THE AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION

• The African Union Commission should condemn abusive and collective expulsions of migrants; press Mauritania to ensure respect for migrants’ rights; and press African countries to seek to locate and provide assistance to their nationals through their diplomatic missions.
• Establish an AU-led independent investigation into collective expulsions and other abuses against African migrants and asylum seekers in and by North African countries, including Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt.
• Mandate the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the AU Mechanism for Police Reform to investigate the impact of border security arrangements on migrants’ rights.
• Promote regional cooperation on human rights-based migration governance, including by reviving and strengthening regional coordination through ECOWAS and the AU Horn of Africa Initiative on Migration, to ensure any migration agreements respect continental human rights standards.
• Monitor and address the human rights impact of the externalization of border controls in Africa. Urge member states to ensure that migration-related agreements with external partners (e.g. the EU, EU member states, and the UK) do not undermine AU human rights obligations or continental free movement aspirations, as outlined in the AU Protocol on Free Movement of Persons.
• Establish an AU-EU civil society dialogue mechanism (or support/expand any such existing mechanism), with representation from the AU Commission and human rights mechanisms (ACHPR, ACERWC) as well as civil society, to monitor the human rights impact of migration cooperation between African states and the EU or EU member states.

TO THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS (ACHPR)

• Engage with Mauritania under its State reporting obligations. Request an update from Mauritania under Article 62 of the African Charter, focusing on the treatment of migrants and the implementation of safeguards against torture and arbitrary detention.
• Use Special Mechanisms to respond to violations of migrants’ rights in Mauritania. The Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons and Migrants, and the Special Rapporteur on Prisons, Conditions of Detention and Policing in Africa, should issue appeals to the Mauritanian government and conduct a country visit to assess detention conditions and other abuses in line with their mandates.

To the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC)

• Investigate child rights violations in the context of migration control across Africa. In Mauritania, initiate an inquiry under Article 45 of the ACRWC into the current situation with respect to the detention of migrant children, age-sensitive screening mechanisms, and expulsions of children/minors.
• Issue recommendations to protect child migrants and asylum seekers. Recommend a moratorium on child immigration detention, the establishment of child protection units in all detention centers, and the implementation of child-sensitive migration screening and referral procedures.

Methodology

This report is based on interviews conducted between November 2020 and June 2025 by phone and during visits to Mauritania in June 2022 and August-September 2023 (to Nouakchott and Nouadhibou); Mali in November 2022 (Bamako); Senegal in November 2022 and August 2023 (Dakar, Saint-Louis, Rosso, Mbour, Nianing, Lompoul, and Kayar); and Belgium in April 2023 (Brussels). Others from Mali’s towns of Gogui, Nioro du Sahel, and Kayes were interviewed by phone. The researcher visited seven shelters hosting migrants, children, and other vulnerable groups (one in Nouakchott, one in Nouadhibou, five in Bamako) and three detention facilities (Dar Naïm Prison in Nouakchott, and immigration detention centers in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou). The researcher also attended three European Parliament human rights committee meetings in 2023 related to EU initiatives and policies in Mauritania and West Africa.

Human Rights Watch interviewed 223 people, including 102 current or former migrants and asylum seekers (92 migrants, 3 asylum seekers, and 7 migrant community leaders in Mauritania), of whom 84 were men, 11 were women, and 7 were boys aged 13-17; nationalities included 41 Senegalese, 25 Malians, 14 Guineans, 9 Sierra Leoneans, 5 Cameroonians, 2 Gambians, 2 Liberians, 2 Togolese, 1 Nigerien, and 1 Ivorian. We also interviewed 20 government officials (16 in Mauritania, 3 in Senegal, 1 in Mali); 3 officials from Mauritanian independent human rights mechanisms; 20 UN officials (10 in Mauritania, 5 in Senegal, 5 in Mali); 10 EU officials; 1 representative of the Spanish international cooperation foundation FIIAPP; 52 members of 31 non-governmental organizations, associations, or other civil society groups (24 in Mauritania, 12 in Mali, 16 in Senegal); 4 relatives of abuse victims; a Mauritanian man accused of migrant smuggling; and 10 others including experts, lawyers, diplomats, and community members in Mauritania. We attempted to meet with the Spanish Guardia Civil during our visit to Mauritania in 2023, but the Comandante in Nouakchott was unavailable at the time.

We conducted interviews in French or English, using interpreters for other languages.

Pseudonyms are used in the report for interviewees involved in sensitive cases, and we have withheld identifying details for others who faced security concerns or requested confidentiality.

Human Rights Watch informed all interviewees of the purpose of the research and our intention to publish a report with the information gathered. The researcher obtained oral consent for each interview and gave interviewees the opportunity to decline to answer questions. Interviewees did not receive material compensation for speaking with us, but were reimbursed for transport and communications expenses.

Human Rights Watch corroborated accounts where possible by obtaining evidence such as photos, videos, and documentation – court, identity, or asylum papers – and additional testimony from relatives, witnesses, or others with knowledge of the events.

When describing abuses that took place in Mauritania, interviewees often identified the security service of perpetrators (police, gendarmerie, coast guard, army, navy). However, some could not distinguish the specific service. Several used French terms for “the navy” or “naval officers” to refer generally to maritime security forces, which could include the coast guard or navy (who have similar uniforms) or gendarme maritime brigades.

Human Rights Watch also analyzed hundreds of EU and Spanish government documents and online content, as well as third-party reports and articles relating to European externalization in Africa and to EU or Spanish projects, agreements, and initiatives in Mauritania and West Africa.

Human Rights Watch sent letters on July 1, 2025 to authorities named in this report – the European Commission (DGs HOME, INTPA, and MENA), the Spanish government, and the Mauritanian government – presenting our findings, seeking responses, and posing questions, with assurances that answers would be reflected in the final report. Human Rights Watch received replies from the Mauritanian government on July 16 and the European Commission on July 17. Elements of these responses have been integrated into the report. No reply was received from the Spanish government.

SEE FURTHER FOR THE REPORT

https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/08/27/they-accused-me-of-trying-to-go-to-europe/migration-control-abuses-and-eu

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